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You know, everybody is against pollution. But most have an Achilles'
heel when antipollution efforts hit them personally.
-William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator, EPA**
Unfortunately, everything in this country, everything operates with
politicians. If you don't get the politicians on your side, you're doomed
to lose.
-M.S. Safadi, owner of the now-defunct Pasadena,
Texas Inspection and Maintenance Facility**
I. INTRODUCTION
For the twenty years preceding the enactment of the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1970, the history of pollution control in the United States was one of
increasing federal assumption of power and responsibility. 1 The next twenty years
witnessed huge battles over attempts by the federal government to compel, cajole,
or otherwise induce state and local governments to deal seriously with urban
pollution. For most of the nation's polluted cities, this was a period of standoff
in which state and local governments did little to bring about any serious changes
in urban lifestyles and the federal government took only modest action to force
auto manufacturers, petroleum producers and marketers to implement tech-
nologies aimed at reducing pollution at the source. As a consequence, polluted
urban areas saw very few of the promised improvements. The 1990 Amendments
to the Clean Air Act, which represented the culmination of years of intense legis-
lative deliberation, took a longer view toward attaining air quality goals in the
most severely polluted cities, but required stringent technological controls and
sought to induce state and local governments to begin seriously to address
necessary reductions in commuter traffic. Unfortunately, the familiar process of
reaction and retrenchment began to set in almost as soon as the 1990 Amend-
ments became law, and the complicated state/federal implementation scheme is
coming unraveled once again.
From the outset, the modem Clean Air Act has contained the hortatory
congressional finding that "air pollution prevention... and air pollution control
at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments. ' 2 The
history of the implementation of the Clean Air Act in urban areas, however,
demonstrates that the relevant state and local governments have failed to meet
** Coming Government Moves in War Against Pollution: Interview with William D. Ruckelshaus,
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. NEWs & WORLD REP., Mar. 29, 1971, at 72.
*** Leigh Hopper, Auto Emissions Flap Worries Contractors; Repeal Would Leave Operators in
Limbo, HousroN PosT, Dec. 24, 1994, at A20.
1. J. CLARENCE DAVImS III, THE POLmcs OFPOLLUrON 49-58 (1970).
2. Clean Air Act § 101(a)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401(a)(3) (West 1995).
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their responsibilities. Although the federal government in the early 1970s
attempted to force the state and local governments to meet their responsibilities,
concerns for federalism in the courts and Congress blunted that initial effort.
Since the mid-1970s, the history of the implementation of the Clean Air Act has
been one of federal nudging, cajoling, and sometimes threatening to administer
sanctions or to take over state programs, all of which resulted in very little serious
effort at the state and local levels. To be sure, air quality in most urban areas is
much healthier than it was twenty-five years ago, and the nation can take pride
in this progress, most of which has taken place in the last five years. This Article
will maintain, however, that nearly all of that progress is attributable to source
control requirements directly or effectively imposed at the federal level and by
lawsuits filed by affected citizens and environmental groups aimed at forcing
federal, state, and local agencies to fulfill their statutory responsibilities.3 As a
corollary, this Article will conclude that current efforts to accelerate the
"devolution" of federal power to the states, if directed to urban pollution control,
could very easily reverse the encouraging trend of the last five years and ensure
that millions of American citizens never breathe clean air.
II. THE PROBLEM OF AUTOMOBILE EMIsSIONS IN URBAN AREAS
A. Health and Environmental Effects of Photochemical Oxidants
The health and environmental effects of exposure to ozone in the ambient air,
like the health and environmental effects of many pollutants, is a subject of much
debate. Studies convincingly demonstrate that ozone causes "immediate, short-
term changes in lung function and increased respiratory [problems] among
healthy adults and children who exercise moderately or heavily during periods of
elevated ozone concentrations." 4 Exposure to ozone for one or two hours at levels
encountered in cities like Los Angeles, New York, and Houston can cause
decreases in lung function and pronounced symptoms like coughing and pain
when breathing deeply, but these effects appear to be reversible. 5 It is becoming
increasingly clear that the acute adverse effects of exposure to a particular con-
centration of ozone in the atmosphere depend upon both the duration of exposure
3. 1 am excluding from this assessment and from the discussion that follows the extraordinary progress
that the nation has made with respect to ambient concentrations of lead in urban air. Ambient levels of lead are
down more than 90% from those that routinely occurred in the 1970s. U.S. EPA, NATIONAL AIR QUALITY AND
EMISSIONS TRENDS REPORT 1991 1-6 (1992) [hereinafter 1991 EMISSIONS TRENDS REPORT]. This progress is
attributable almost exclusively to a single federal regulation requiring that lead be phased out as an additive
to gasoline. THOMAS 0. McGARrrY, REINVENING RATONALrrY 29-44 (1991). Thus, the experience with lead
is entirely consistent with this Article's conclusion that most important progress toward achieving the National
Ambient Air Quality Standards in urban areas is attributable to federal source-control programs.
4. UNITED STATES CONGRESS, OFFICE OFTECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CATCHING OUR BREATH: STEPS
FOR REDUCING URBAN OZONE 39 (1989) [hereinafter OTA OZONE REPORT].
5. Id. at 39-40,54.
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and the intensity of the individual's physical activities during the time of
exposure.6 Children engaged in moderate to heavy exercise for up to two hours
at exposure levels equal to the current primary ambient air quality standard of
0.12 parts per million (ppm) (which is supposed to include an adequate margin
of safety) suffer temporary loss of some lung function. Persons engaged in
moderate exercise levels have suffered acute effects at concentrations as low as
the former standard (promulgated in 1971, but amended in 1978) of 0.08 ppm.
Many individuals suffer from pre-existing lung diseases that make them
susceptible to extreme reactions to moderate concentrations of ozone in the air.
For example, exposure to relatively modest levels of photochemical oxidants can
precipitate asthma attacks in some individuals, although it is not clear that asthma
sufferers are generally more sensitive to ozone.7 It is also possible that exposure
to ozone may cause additional reductions in lung function in persons suffering
from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease like bronchitis and emphysema, but
existing studies have not established such a link.8
Many scientists believe that prolonged exposure to high levels of ozone
results in permanent lung impairment in some individuals who do not suffer from
pre-existing diseases.9 Thus, chronic exposure to ozone may cause accelerated
aging of the lung, retardation of lung development in children, and pulmonary
fibrosis.'0 Some scientists and economists, however, are not convinced that ozone
has been shown to cause any incapacitating or irreversible effects in humans."
More studies must be undertaken before it will be possible to draw any sup-
portable conclusions about the connection between ozone exposure and chronic
lung disease.'
2
According to a study undertaken by the U.S. Congress Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA), in the late 1980s, sixty-eight million people were exposed to
ozone levels of more than 0.12 ppm for periods ranging from four to nearly
nineteen hours per year. Of these, approximately thirteen million engaged in
heavy outdoor exercise. '3 OTA predicted that attaining the 0.12 standard in all
areas of the United States would prevent several hundred million incidents of
reversible respiratory symptoms, such as coughing or pain upon deep breathing.' 4
6. Id. at 40-41.
7. See id. at 43.
8. Id. at 50.
9. Id. at 40.
10. Id.
11. Brad Knickerbocker, CleanerAir But No Clarity on Next Steps, CHRISTIAN Sc. MoNrroR, Feb. 22,
1996, at 3 (reporting the results of a study for the Washington University Center for the Study of American
Business by economists Kenneth Chilton and Christopher Boerner).
12. OTA OZONE REPORT, supra note 4, at 4849.
13. Id. at 59.
14. Id. at 64. According to OTA, this works out to about one to three fewer cough episodes per person
per year for those living in nonattainment areas. But it would reduce coughing incidents by about four to 14
incidents per person per year for those living in the worst polluted cities. Id. at 66-67.
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It would also eliminate eight to fifty million "restricted activity" days on which
the victim feels ill enough to restrict activities, but not too ill to get up.
5
Another recent study by the American Lung Association found that about
12.1 million children under the age of thirteen and nearly 900,000 asthmatic
children under age eighteen live in areas in which ozone levels exceed 0.12 ppm.
The study also found that although a substantial percentage of all children in the
United States live in urban areas that have unhealthy levels of ozone pollution, the
burden falls disproportionately upon minority (African-American, Hispanic, and
Asian) children.16
Finally, damage to plants and animals can result if they are exposed to the
levels of ozone typically occurring in seriously polluted areas. The OTA report
estimated that photochemical oxidant pollution currently reduces crop yields in
exposed areas by from 1% to 20%.17 Meeting the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) for ozone would, by OTA estimates, produce economic
benefits in the range of $0.5 to $1 billion per year.8
B. The Contribution of Automobile Eimissions
Photochemical oxidants are formed when certain hydrocarbon compounds,
sometimes called volatile organic compounds (VOCs), combine with oxides of
nitrogen (NO.).' 9 As a measure of the concentration of photochemical oxidants
in the atmosphere, regulatory agencies rely upon the more easily measured
concentration of ozone. In hot summer months, there is probably a natural back-
ground concentration of ozone of about 0.04 ppm (one-third of the 0.12 ppm
national primary ambient air quality standard) attributable largely to vegetative
emissions of hydrocarbons. Automobiles are major contributors to both VOC
emissions and NO, emissions in urban areas. The relative contributions of auto-
mobiles and other mobile sources to VOC emissions vis-a-vis stationary sources
15. l at 64. OTA's admittedly highly speculative attempt to place a dollar value on these benefits of
attaining the primary NAAQS for ozone arrived at a range of $0.5 to $4 billion per year, with some estimates
ranging from less that $0.1 billion to more than $10 billion annually. Id.
16. See AMERICAN LUNG ASSOcIATIoN, DANGER ZONES: OZONE AIR POLLUTION AND OUR CHILDREN
(1995); see also Report Finds 12 Million Children Live in Areas Where Ozone Tops Federal Standard, 26
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 22 (May 5, 1995).
17. OTA OZONE REPORT, supra note 4, at 79.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 97. Oxides of nitrogen are pollutants in their own right, and EPA promulgated primary and
secondary NAAQS for one of the oxides of nitrogen-nitrogen dioxide. 40 C.F.R. § 50.11 (1995). Currently
only one area, Los Angeles, has not attained the NO, standards, and it may soon be redesignated. 1991
EMISSIONS TRENDS REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-8. Exposure to nitrogen dioxide in high enough levels can
irritate the lungs and lower resistance to respiratory illness, especially in children and in persons already
suffering from respiratory diseases. EPA has recently decided not to revise either of the standards for nitrogen
dioxide. See Standard for Nitrogen Dioxide Adequate to Protect Health, Environment, EPA Says, 26 Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 1035 (Oct. 13, 1995).
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is a question to which there is no clear answer, because existing VOC emissions
inventories are quite poor and emissions models are highly uncertain20 Since the
formation of photochemical oxidants depends upon sunlight and temperature and
because stagnant air tends to limit pollutant dispersal, ozone concentrations tend
to be highest on hot sunny days when the wind is not blowing.2 t
One of the most perplexing aspects of arriving at regulatory solutions to the
problem of photochemical oxidants is the phenomenon of "ozone transport."
Because photochemical oxidants remain in the air for a considerable period of
time, prevailing winds can transport ozone that is initially formed over a city to
surrounding rural areas. Ozone plumes can spread over large distances that
include both urban and rural areas. For example, photochemical oxidants that
originate in New York sometimes pollute the air over Boston.23 This phenomenon
can greatly complicate efforts to reduce ozone in particular areas. It may often be
the case, especially on the East Coast, that a 100% reduction of VOC emissions
in one area will not be sufficient to meet air quality standards in that area because
of ozone transported from other areas.24
According to one recent, but nevertheless highly uncertain modeling exercise,
automobiles account for between 40% and 45% of all VOC emissions and about
35% of all NO, emissions nationwide.25 In addition, automobiles are responsible
for at least 70% of carbon monoxide emissions nationwide?6 Although emissions
of both VOCs and carbon monoxide from individual automobiles have declined
over the last two decades as a result of EPA's emissions standards for auto-
mobiles, the increase in the size of the automobile fleet has to some extent offset
those declines. 27 The number of miles traveled in automobiles has more than
doubled in the last twenty years to more than two trillion miles per year.28 Further
declines in individual emissions are possible (though by no means assured) as a
result of a gradual shift away from gasoline to cleaner burning fuels mandated by
the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act.
The balance between VOC emissions and NO, emissions varies from city to
city, depending upon the degree to which stationary sources emit those pollutants.
In urban areas with high NO, emissions, reducing VOC emissions is the preferred
strategy, and reducing NO. emissions in such situations may even be counter-
20. OTA OZONE REPORT, supra note 4, at 26.
21. Id. at97.
22. Id. at 23.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 23-24.
25. Id. at 12, 98. EPA's estimates, based on the year 1985, are 34% and 45% contribution of motor
vehicles for VOC and NO., respectively. Inspection/Maintenance Program Requirements, 57 Fed. Reg. 52,950,
52,981 (1992).
26. Inspection/Maintenance Program Requirements, 57 Fed. Reg. at 52,981.
27. Id. at 52,950.
28. Id.
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productive.29 As the polluted air mass moves out of urban areas and into rural
areas with few NO, emissions, strategies aimed at reducing NQ, emissions are
increasingly attractive. ° This may in part be attributable to the fact that most
VOC emissions in rural areas are due to summertime emissions from vegetation. 3
Highway vehicles, including automobiles and trucks, produce about one-third
of overall NO, emissions nationally, but in highly polluted cities like Los
Angeles, they account for almost two-thirds of the total.32 In most cities highway
vehicles account for 30% to 45% of NO. emissions.33 The other primary source
of NO. emissions is electric utility boilers, which account for another 35%.?
Because NO, emissions from automobiles and trucks have historically been
subject to less stringent tailpipe emissions standards than VOCs, fleet turnover
has not brought about a reduction in overall emissions, and, in fact, they are
rapidly increasing as the rate of new vehicle production exceeds the rate at which
old vehicles are scrapped.35 Nevertheless, EPA has historically concentrated
almost exclusively upon reducing VOC emissions in its strategies for reducing
levels of photochemical oxidants in the ambient air.36 This approach has changed
somewhat in recent years.37
Ill. INSPECTION AND MAINTNANCE AS A TOOL FOR FIGHTING URBAN SMOG
Although vehicle tailpipe and running emissions have declined dramatically
through design changes in new model automobiles, even the best designed
systems wear out and break down.38 Automobiles that have been on the road for
several years emit between two to seventeen times the amount of pollutants that
they emitted when brand new.39 Sadly, in the early years, some people disabled
29. OTA OZONE REPORT, supra note 4, at 17-18.
30. Id at 18. NO, concentrations also diminish more rapidly as a polluted air mass moves from urban
to rural areas. Id. at 98.
31. Id In suburbs, vegetative emissions may account for one-half of all VOC emissions in the summer.
Id.
32. Id. at 18.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 98.
35. Id. at 18.
36. Id. at 98.
37. Id.
38. See generally Clean Air Act Amendments: Hearings on Inspection and Maintenance Programs
Before the Subcomm. on Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property and Nuclear Safety of the Senate Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, 104th Cong. 178 (1995) (statement of Mary D. Nichols, Assistant
Administrator for Air and Radiation, EPA) [hereinafter Hearings on Inspection and Maintenance: Statement
of Mary D. Nichols]; Arnold W. Reitze, Controlling Automotive Air Pollution Through Inspection and
Maintenance Programs, 47 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 705 (1979); Arnold W. Reitze & Barry Needleman, Control
ofAir Pollution from Mobile Sources Through Inspection and Maintenance Programs, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
409 (1993).
39. Hearings on Inspection and Maintenance: Statement of Mary D. Nichols, supra note 38, at 178.
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the pollution control devices on their automobiles out of a desire to increase
performance. 40 Even those who do not deliberately disable pollution controls have
little incentive to repair them when they break or wear out.41 EPA estimates that
20% to 40% of the vehicles on the road are emitting more pollutants than they are
supposed to emit.42 Obviously, even the best designed automobiles burning the
cleanest fuels will emit too many pollutants if the emissions control systems are
in need of repair or replacement. Minor malfunctions in control devices can result
in large increases in emissions, and major malfunctions can cause emissions to
"skyrocket." EPA estimates that only 10% to 30% of all vehicles cause a majority
of vehicle-related emissions.43 Yet not all "clunkers" are gross emitters. For
example, on a single day in April 1993, a roadside testing facility in Fresno,
California, flunked two well-maintained 1985 vehicles and passed a "1974
Cadillac Coupe de Ville with torn upholstery, missing chrome, [and] dust thick
enough to write in.' 44
The problem of identifying those vehicles that need additional maintenance
can be solved through the implementation of an effective vehicle inspection and
maintenance (IM) program. Relatively inexpensive equipment exists for
measuring tailpipe emissions from idling automobiles, and somewhat more ex-
pensive equipment can accurately measure emissions from automobiles operating
under road-like conditions. Onboard diagnostic devices on many newer autos can
detect poorly functioning emissions controls that could result in a failure to attain
the tailpipe emissions standards, and inspection and maintenance of these new
diagnostic systems can help ensure that drivers are on notice of the need to repair
pollution control devices.45 At the cutting edge of I/M technology, remote sensing
devices use lasers to detect gross emitters as they travel down the road.46 Vehicle
40. Reitze, supra note 38, at 724; see Hearings on Compliance with Title H1 (Auto Emissions Standards)
of the Clean Air Act Before the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 93d Cong. 396 (1973) (statement of Clarence
M. Ditlow III, Public Interest Research Group). The incidence of tampering has declined steadily with the
phase out of cheaper leaded gasoline and the advent of sophisticated computerized emission control devices.
Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance Requirements for State Implementation Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 27,771
(1992).
41. Reitze, supra note 38, at 727-28.
42. Hearings on Inspection and Maintenance: Statement of Mary D. Nichols, supra note 38, at 178.
43. Inspection/Maintenance Program Requirements, 57 Fed. Reg. at 52,950-52.
44. Maria L. LaGanga, Anti-Smog Program Offers Hazy Idea of Dirty Cars, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1993,
at A3.
45. EPA was supposed to have promulgated regulations requiring auto manufacturers to install onboard
diagnostic devices covering at least catalytic converters and oxygen sensors within 18 months of the 1990
amendments. Clean Air Act § 202(m)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7521(m)(1) (West 1995). Once EPA promulgates
standards requiring onboard diagnostic devices, state implementation plans must provide for inspection and
maintenance of these devices in areas in which inspection and maintenance programs are in effect. Clean Air
Act § 202(m)(3). 42 U.S.C.A. § 7521(m)(3) (West 1995).
46. Hearings on the Implementation of the Motor Vehicle Emissions Inspection and Maintenance
Program of the EPA Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce,
104th Cong. 232 (1995) (statement of Douglas R. Lawson, Reno, Nevada) [hereinafter Hearings on Inspection
and Maintenance: Statement of Douglas R. Lawson].
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I/M programs can bring about rapid reductions in emissions at a relatively small
cost.
4 7
"Basic" I/M consists of visual examinations by trained personnel of pollution
control equipment, like catalytic converters and purge canisters, and machine
measurement of exhaust emissions when the engine is running at high and low
speeds in idle mode. The equipment for administering basic I/M is relatively
inexpensive and can easily be afforded by a medium sized service station. Basic
IfM also requires only a modest amount of training for the operators. Programs
using basic I/M typically allow the service station that does the testing to make
48
any necessary repairs.
"Enhanced I/M," which is required by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
for serious, severe, and extreme nonattainment areas, means different things to
different people. EPA initially took the position that enhanced I/M required a
"loaded mode" test that measured tailpipe emissions as the engine accelerated and
decelerated against resistance. The agency developed a "high-tech" procedure,
called IM-240, in which the vehicle is placed on a treadmill or dynamometer and
operated for up to 240 seconds (four minutes) over a predetermined driving cycle
that simulates actual driving conditions.4 9 This test more accurately measures
emissions under actual driving conditions and is more likely to detect malad-
justments and malfunctions in modem computerized ignition systems. It is also
able to measure NO, emissions, which do not occur in sufficient amounts in idle
mode to be accurately measured. EPA's preferred loaded mode inspection tech-
nology, costs about $140,000 per lane versus $15,000 to $40,000 for basic I/M
equipment. Since centralized facilities were envisioned to be large multi-lane
affairs, EPA expected that any repairs would be undertaken at separate facilities
with follow up tests at a centralized testing facility50
Huge battles have been waged in recent years over whether enhanced I/M
should require "centralized test-only" programs or allow "decentralized test-and-
repair" regimes employing equipment somewhat more sophisticated than basic
I/M. Proponents of centralized test-only systems, a group that includes EPA,
argue that such regimes are much more effective than decentralized test-and-
repair programs because they are more accurate and more reliable.5 ' They are
47. Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance Program Requirements, 57 Fed. Reg. at 52,971. EPA estimates
that sophisticated I/M programs can bring about a 28% reduction in automobile emissions in heavily polluted
urban areas at a cost of about $12.50 per vehicle per year. Id.
48. Id.; Reitze & Needleman, supra note 38, at 424-25.
49. Hearings on Inspection and Maintenance: Statement of Mary D. Nichols, supra note 38, at 179.
50. Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance Requirements for State Implementation Plans, 57 Fed, Reg.
at 52,954; U.S. EPA, I/M BRIEFING BOOK § 4, at 3-4 (1995); Reitze & Needleman, supra note 38, at 424-25.
51. See Hearings on Clean Air Act Oversight Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of
the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 316-17 (1995) (statement of Joseph Belanger, Director of Plan.
ning and Standards, Bureau of Air Management, Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection); see
also Hearings on Inspection and Maintenance: Statement of Mary D. Nichols, supra note 38, at 178 ("IT]he
inescapable conclusion [is] that test-and-repair programs are much less effective than test-only programs.").
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more accurate because they rely upon sophisticated loaded mode inspection
technologies that can only be implemented on a centralized basis. 2 For example,
the OTA study concluded that while basic inspection and maintenance can reduce
auto emissions by 12%, enhanced inspection and maintenance with centralized
test-only facilities can reduce emissions by an additional 17%
3
Centralized test-only programs are more reliable because the test-only feature
eliminates the conflict of interest inherent in the test-and-repair regime.
Numerous covert audits have demonstrated that small test-and-repair facilities
lack either the training or the desire to detect malfunctioning or even nonexistent
pollution control devices. 4 The results of more than 10,000 covert audits of test-
and-repair facilities conducted by EPA and states during the 1980s revealed
improper testing more than 80% of the time 5 In thirty-eight covert audits that
EPA undertook in St. Louis, 84% of the stations falsely passed vehicles that EPA
had deliberately modified to fail the test. Almost 75% of the stations passed
vehicles for which EPA had removed the catalytic converters altogether.5 6 It is a
sad fact of life that some test-and-repair operators are willing to forego expensive
repairs to maintain consumer goodwill or to secure bribes. A 1992 California
sting operation, for example, netted thirty-two service mechanics and station
owners who had fraudulently issued almost 100,000 bogus smog certificates
5 7
The potential for fraud diminishes when the repairs have to be undertaken at a
separate facility. Moreover, it is inherently easier to police a limited number of
centralized test facilities (50-100 for a large city) than a large number of decen-
tralized facilities (4000 or more for a large city).58 The bottom line is that test and
repair facilities pass "a very large number of automobiles which should fail."5 9
The proponents of decentralized test-and-repair systems stress their con-
venience to auto owners, lower cost, and ease of operation. In a large city, the
ratio of decentralized inspection facilities to vehicles is typically around 1 to
52. Hearings on Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance Before the Subcomm. on Clean Air and Nuclear
Regulation of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Environment, 104th Cong., available at 1995 WL 408044, *3
(1995) (statement of Michael P. Walsh, Former Director, Motor Vehicles Pollution Control Program, EPA)
(copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter Hearings on Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance:
Statement of Michael P. Walsh] (describing an extensive audit of a centralized test-only program in British
Columbia).
53. OTA OzONE REPORT, supra note 4, at 133.
54. Hearings on Clean AirAct Oversight Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 179 (1995) (statement of Mary D. Nichols, Assistant Administrator
for Air and Radiation, EPA) [hereinafter Hearings on Clean AirAct Oversight: Statement of Mary D. Nichols].
55. Id.
56. Inspection/Maintenance Program Requirements, 57 Fed. Reg. at 52,972.
57. Maria L. LaGanga, 32 Arrested in Sting Aimed at Fraudulent Smog Checks, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 18,
1992, at Al.
58. Hearings 6n Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance: Statement of Michael P. Walsh, supra note 52,
at *6.
59. Most Car Owners Favor Emissions Checks, Improved Accuracy in Testing, Survey Shows, 24 Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 855 (Sept. 10, 1993) [hereinafter Most Car Owners Favor Emissions Checks].
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1000. In a centralized system, the ratio is on the order of 1 to 35,000.60 This
means that in a centralized regime more vehicles must be tested at a single
facility, and the average drive to get to a facility is greater. Centralized testing,
therefore, raises the specter of driving five or more miles to a facility for the
privilege of joining a long line of waiting vehicles.6'
Advocates of decentralized regimes also point out that decentralized tests are
less expensive to the consumer because they require less costly equipment. In
addition, by allowing the mechanic who tested the vehicle to repair it, a test-and-
repair regime can avoid the "ping-pong" effect that can occur when a driver
whose automobile fails the inspection takes it to a separate service station for
repairs and returns to the testing facility to see if the repairs worked, possibly
repeating the process if the vehicle fails a second time.62 Proponents of decen-
tralized test-and-repair facilities, many of whom are service station owners who
stand to lose income from both testing and repairs if states adopt centralized test-
only regimes, resent the implication that a high proportion of small service station
mechanics are gross incompetents or outright frauds. Taking issue with the con-
clusions of EPA's secret audits, they maintain that the superiority of centralized
testing has not been conclusively established.6 3 Finally, they predict that a move
away from decentralized testing will result in the loss of jobs with a resulting
negative impact on local economies. 4
Proponents of centralized test-only facilities respond that they are not
necessarily less convenient than decentralized testing programs. First, unlike local
garages, centralized facilities operate multiple lanes, and they devote full attention
to emissions testing. Second, since each test at a fully automated centralized
facility only lasts about seven minutes and since consumer "hot lines" can provide
up-to-the-minute information on lane availability, the potential for long waits is
normally not very high. Third, most programs provide for levying fines against
operators when wait times exceed fifteen minutes. Fourth, centralized testing
60. Inspection/Maintenance Requirements, 57 Fed. Reg. at 52,959.
61. See Hearings on Clean Air Act Oversight Before the Subcomm. On Oversight and Investigations
of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 73 (1995) (statement of George Allen, Governor,
Commonwealth of Virginia).
62. Most Car Owners Favor Emissions Checks, supra note 59, at 855.
63. See, e.g., Hearings on Inspection and Maintenance: Statement of Douglas R. Lawson, supra note
46, at 232; Hearings on Clean Air Act Oversight Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 230 (1995) (statement of Lynn Scarlett, Chairperson, California
Inspection and Maintenance Review Committee) [hereinafter Hearings on Clean AirAct Oversight: Statement
of Lynn Scarlett]; Hearings on Clean Air Act Oversight Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations
of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 64 (1995) (statement of Joel Schwartz, Staff Member,
California Inspection and Maintenance Review Committee) [hereinafter Hearings on Clean Air Act Oversight:
Statement of Joel Schwartz].
64. Greg Lucas, EPA Plan for Cleaner Air, S.F. CHRON., May 24, 1993, at Al. On the other hand a
high-tech test-only regime could actually increase small service station business by detecting more violations.
Id.
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using high-tech testing equipment need only be undertaken biennially, thus
effectively cutting in half the number of trips. Fifth, allowing the same facility to
perform the repairs adds to customer convenience only if the customer can leave
the vehicle at the facility for a period of time for both testing and repairs. 6 Sixth,
the ping-pong effect can be reduced by requiring testing facilities to share the
testing data with repair shops. Finally, polling evidence suggests that urban
drivers are willing to tolerate any additional inconvenience caused by a cen-
tralized test-only regime. For example, in an August 1993 national Gallup poll,
82% of auto owners said that they favored annual inspections of pollution
controls on automobiles, 87% said that existing programs should be improved,
and 81% said that ten dollars was a reasonable price to pay for the inspection. In
addition, 72% believed that separating the testing function from the repair
function would ensure proper repairs.6
It would be nice if only those vehicles that needed maintenance could be
easily identified without requiring every vehicle to undergo periodic inspection.
Engineers are in fact developing laser-based techniques for measuring tailpipe
emissions from stations situated on the side of the road.67 These "remote sensing"
technologies offer a relatively inexpensive mechanism for identifying "gross
emitters. 68 The possibility of being caught by a remote sensing device should
also deter those who are inclined to tamper with their emission control systems. 69
Current versions of remote sensing technologies, however, are incapable of
detecting heavy emitters of NO,, and they cannot detect evaporative emissions.70
They also require that automobiles proceed in single file past the remote sensing
device, an arrangement that is impractical at most road locations.71 Single file
remote testing might, for example, be feasible at entrance and exit ramps to major
freeways, but a high enough proportion of the driving population of a large city
may not proceed through a small enough number of entrance or exit ramps to
ensure that most vehicles are subjected to remote testing.72
65. See generally Hearings on Clean Air Act Oversight Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 315 (1995) (statement of Joseph Belanger,
Director of Planning and Standards, Bureau of Air Management, Connecticut Department of Environmental
Protection).
66. Most Car Owners Favor Emissions Checks, supra note 59, at 855.
67. Hearings on Clean Air Act Oversight:. Statement of Joel Schwartz, supra note 63, at 71; Hearings
on Inspection and Maintenance: Statement of Douglas R. Lawson, supra note 46, at 234.
68. See Clean Air Act and Nuclear Regulation: Hearings on Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance
Before the Subcomm. on Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property and Nuclear Safety of the Senate Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, 104th Cong. 59-60 (1995) (statement of Lynn Scarlett, Chairperson, California
Inspection and Maintenance Review Committee) [hereinafter Hearings on Vehicle Inspection and Main-
tenance: Statement of Lynn Scarlett].
69. Hearings on Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance: Statement of Michael P. Walsh, supra note 52,
at *8.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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EPA has sponsored or participated in several field tests of remote sensing
devices, none of which has produced definitive results. In the most compre-
hensive attempt to compare vehicles tested in the IM-240 regime with vehicles
identified through remote sensing, the remote sensors missed many autos that
failed the IM-240 test while flunking many that passed the IM-240 test. EPA's
engineers, in peer-reviewed publications, have concluded that remote sensing
showed some promise as a supplement to, but not a substitute for, centralized
testing using the IM-240 technology.73 Although the debate over remote sensing
technologies is heavily influenced by the politics of centralized versus decen-
tralized testing, the most balanced analyses appear to support this conclusion? 4
Once an inspection reveals that a vehicle is not performing up to par, repairs
will usually be necessary. Those states that implemented I/M during the 1970s
and 1980s attempted to ease the economic burden of such repairs on people with
modest incomes by setting a ceiling (often in the $300-$400 range) above which
repairs would not be required. Recent studies in states that employ high-tech
centralized I/M technologies found that most repairs cost between $150 and
$300,75 suggesting that the ceiling should be somewhat higher than $300.
The OTA report on urban ozone predicted that enhanced inspection and
maintenance would reduce total nationwide VOC emissions by about 2%.76 OTA
estimated that the cost of implementing enhanced inspection and maintenance is
relatively high, in the range of $3500 per ton." EPA, on the other hand, found the
cost of enhanced I/M to be only about $500 per ton , 78 which is very low com-
pared to the cost of "reasonably available control technology" for many existing
stationary sources and the cost of "best adequately demonstrated control tech-
73. Hearings on Clean Air Act Oversight: Statement of Mary D. Nichols, supra note 54, at 180. In
1995, EPA entered into an agreement with the State of California to conduct a much more comprehensive study
of remote sensing technologies in Sacramento, and it was hoped that the results of that experiment would help
resolve questions about the efficacy of existing remote sensing technologies. The initial results, however, have
proved susceptible to varying interpretations. See Hearings on Vehicle Inspection trd Maintenance: Statement
of Lynn Scarlett, supra note 68, at 59-60 (criticizing one interpretation of the Sacramento study and offering
an alternative interpretation); Hearings on Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance: Statement of Michael P.
Walsh, supra note 52, at *8-*9.
74. Hearings on Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance: Statement of Michael P. Walsh, supra note 52,
at *9 ("Remote sensing is not, however, an appropriate substitute for periodic I/M at the present time because
practical difficulties regarding the comprehensiveness of testing have not been resolved and it is currently
limited in its ability to sense high NO. and evaporative hydrocarbon emissions.").
75. Hearings on Clean Air Act Oversight: Statement of Mary D. Nichols, supra note 54, at 180.
76. OTA OZONE REPORT, supra note 4, at 13, 133.
77. Id. at 17, fig.1-8.
78. Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance Requirements for State Implementation Plans, 57 Fed. Reg.
at 52,952. The OTA apparently assumed that enhanced I/M would be conducted annually. EPA's figure is
based upon biennial inspections. EPA's figure also fails to quantify "inconvenience costs" to owners for the
time consumed by undergoing the tests. This is a difficult calculation, given the wiaely differing values that
people assign to their time. EPA concluded that even at $20 per hour (and assuming 45 minutes for driving to
and from the testing facility and undergoing the tests), the cost per ton would still be under $1600 per ton. Id.
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nology" for new stationary sources.79 According to EPA, enhanced I/M is "seven
times more cost effective than more stringent new car tailpipe standards and at
least ten times more cost effective than additional controls beyond reasonably
available control technology (RACT) on small and large industrial sources. ' °
IV. HISTORY OF INSPECION AND MAINTENANCE UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACr
A. State of Regulation Prior to 1970
Middle class America's love affair with the automobile perfectly com-
plemented its flight to the suburbs. The automobile provided the means to escape
from the noise and dirt of the city to the clean air and green, open spaces of the
suburbs. If you were paid well enough and did not mind the time spent in
commuter traffic, the automobile offered freedom to travel to and from work
unconstrained by bus or train schedules. Whereas the cities of the Northeast were
built around a single downtown in which rich and poor alike traveled by foot, rail,
or bus, the automobile commute to the suburbs was the assumption around which
urban planners and real estate developers built the sunbelt cities of the fifties.
During the boom years following World War II, the suburbs flourished and
urban automobile traffic increased dramatically. Commuting times corres-
pondingly increased as freeways and feeder roads became clogged with traffic
during the rush hours. As people adjusted their schedules to avoid peak traffic
times, the rush hours also grew in length. Later, during the sixties and seventies,
the entry of women into the work force in large numbers often meant two auto-
mobile commuters per household, each bound for a different destination.
It soon became apparent that congestion was not the only downside of
America's greatly expanded mobility. In 1950, Dr. A. J. Haagen-Smit, a bio-
chemist at CalTech, reported to the California Assembly the results of a study,
prepared at the behest of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, in which he
concluded that the brown haze that engulfed Los Angeles with increasing
frequency during the previous decade was caused by photochemical oxidants that
resulted from a photochemical reaction in the upper atmosphere between certain
volatile organic hydrocarbon compounds (VOCs) and certain oxides of nitrogen
(NO). 8 1 The VOCs came mostly from petrochemical refineries and automobiles;
the NO. came mostly from power plants and automobiles.82 No matter how you
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. JAMEs E. KRmER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLIcY 79 (1977). Until this time, local
officials in Los Angeles and other cities operated on the assumption that air pollution was the result of
stationary sources like coal-burning power plants that emitted sulfur dioxide and particulates into the air. Many
localities therefore enacted pollution ordinances based on the Eastern Seaboard model aimed at such stationary
sources and ignored automobiles. Id. at 56.
82. Id. at 6-7.
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sliced it, reported Dr. Haagen-Smit, the automobile was a major contributor to
what the locals called "smog."
The automobile manufactures and the petroleum refining companies did what
they could to cast doubt on Dr. Haagen-Smit's conclusions, 3 and for the next
fifteen years, state and federal agencies were content to study the matter rather
than take precipitous action.8 Further study demonstrated that not only was the
smog in Los Angeles attributable in large part to automobile traffic 5 but the
automobile was also responsible for rapidly increasing levels of photochemical
oxidants in other urban areas like New York and Houston. 6 In addition, in some
especially congested areas, automobiles were present in sufficient numbers to
contribute to levels of carbon monoxide in the air that posed a serious health
threat.87 It was becoming increasingly apparent that "smog" was not a problem
unique to Los Angeles. Although photochemical oxidant pollution in the South
Coast Basin was certainly exacerbated by its unique terrain and frequent tem-
perature inversions, the problem was national in scope,"8 and the solution was not
to construct huge fans to blow the polluted air across the mountains and into the
surrounding desert.89
State and federal agencies first turned their attention to the automobile itself,
hoping that a technological fix might render that machine relatively pollution
free.9° The automobile manufacturers had seen the writing on the wall in 1954
and had entered into a cooperative arrangement for funding and sharing research
on approaches to controlling emissions to the tune of one million dollars per
year.9' After a decade passed with no noticeable progress, the United States
Justice Department concluded that the cooperative agreement was merely a
vehicle for discouraging competition among the manufacturers in developing
pollution control technologies. 92 During this critical time little thought was given
to reducing pollution by reducing the amount of auto traffic.93
83. Id. at 80-82.
84. Id. at 6-9.
85. Id. at 86.
86. JOHN C. EsPosrro, VANISHING AIR 9-11 (1970).
87. No one questioned that carbon monoxide in high levels in the ambient air resulted from the
automobile. There are no large stationary sources of carbon monoxide, which is produced through the
incomplete combustion of hydrocarbon fuels. FRANK P. GRAD Er AL., THE AUTOMOBILE AND THE REGULATION
OF UTS IMPACT ON THE ENVIRONMENr 115 (1974). Likewise, no one questioned that human exposure to carbon
monoxide in levels that were showing up in some urban areas like New York was dangerous. Id. at 43.46.
88. KRIER&URSIN, supra note 81, at 41, 90-91.
89. Id. at 7.
90. Id. at 92-93.
91. Id. at 87.
92. DAviEs, supra note 1, at 94; KRIER & URSIN, supra note 81. at 88. The antitrust suit that thel Justice
Department filed ended with a controversial consent decree. United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F.
Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd in part sub nom. Grossman v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 397 U.S. 248 (1970);
ESPOSITO, supra note 86, at 44-46.
93. KRiER & UiN, supra note 81, at 95-96.
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The citizens of California were unwilling to wait until Detroit came up with
a solution. In 1962, the California Assembly created the Motor Vehicle Pollution
Control Board to certify pollution control technology that would be required on
new and some existing automobiles.94 As other states began to consider similar
legislation, the automobile manufacturers realized that their industry faced the
possibility of fifty different standards for a single vehicle model, and they began
to lobby Congress to prescribe uniform standards. In 1965, Congress enacted the
Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act, which empowered the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) to establish emission standards for new
automobiles limiting emissions of pollutants that "cause or contribute to... air
pollution which endangers the health or welfare of any persons," giving
"appropriate consideration to technological feasibility and economic costs."95
Within a year, HEW had promulgated emissions standards that closely resembled
the pending California standards, both of which were to apply to the 1968 model
year. 6
Requiring automobile manufacturers to install pollution controls, however,
could not be the end of the matter. Like any other technology, pollution control
devices are apt to fail on occasion. Since the absence of a properly working
pollution control device does not normally affect driveability or performance,
owners had no incentive to check to see if they were working or to fix them when
they failed. More ominously, articles in the popular press suggested that pollution
control devices adversely affected performance and could even result in engine
failure during acceleration, a potentially deadly development.97 Thus informed,
many purchasers of new automobiles equipped with pollution controls promptly
headed for the nearest local garage to have those devices disabled.98 If that were
not enough, Detroit's device of choice, the catalytic converter, was easily
"poisoned" by the leaded gasoline that was universally available in local gas
stations. If owners ignored the instructions to use unleaded gas, the converters
became useless.
All of this pointed to the need for a legal requirement that automobiles be
inspected periodically by impartial personnel and repaired when necessary.9
Nevertheless, when the California pollution control agency initiated the nation's
94. Id. at 8.
95. Pub. L. No. 89-272,79 Stat. 992 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7521 (West Supp.
1996)); see DAvIES, supra note 1, at 54; KRIER & URsrN, supra note 81, at 8-9, 173-75.
96. KlUER & URSiN, supra note 81, at 175.
97. Id. at 366.
98. U.S. EPA, MOTOR VEHICLE TAMPERING SURVEY (1978).
99. KRiER & URSIN, supra note 81, at 149.
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first mandatory inspection program in 1964, it was quickly abolished by the
California Assembly after a large public outcry' 0
The Air Quality Act of 1967 required states to write air quality standards
pursuant to criteria issued by HEW.101 States were then obliged to draft and
submit to HEW state implementation plans containing emissions limitations and
control strategies capable of meeting the air quality standards. The Act also pro-
vided funds for state automobile inspection programs and provided that national
automobile emissions standards preempted all state auto emissions standards
except for those of California.'02
The performance of the states in meeting their responsibilities under the 1967
Act was quite disappointing. Powerful industries played a large role in drafting
many state implementation plans, and it appeared that states might have been
competing for industrial development by establishing lax requirements."3 After
two years passed without any state submitting an implementation plan,1' 4 it was
apparent that the federal government would have to play a stronger role in
cleaning up urban air.
B. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 marked "a sharp break with the
past."105 Concluding that little progress was likely if it left air pollution control up
to the states, Congress decided to assign a much more prominent role to the
federal government acting through the newly created Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).
First, the 1970 Amendments directed EPA to write national primary and
secondary ambient air quality standards for pollutants that would have an adverse
effect on public health and welfare and would result from numerous or diverse
mobile or stationary sources."'° The NAAQS were to establish concentrations of
such pollutants in the ambient air at the levels necessary to protect the public
health with an adequate margin of safety, in the case of primary standards, and
to protect the public welfare, in the case of secondary standards. 0 7 The initial
standards would be based on the criteria documents already developed or nearly
100. Id. at 151. The mandatory inspection was coupled with a requirement that owners of all existing
automobiles install a crankcase pollution control device. The public outcry was probably directed more at this
requirement than at the testing requirement per se. Id. at 151-52.
101. Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 499 (1967) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (West 1995)).
102. DAViES, supra note 1, at 57; KRIER & URSIN, supra note 81, at 9, 181-82.
103. KRiER & URSiN, supra note 81, at 201.
104. IL at 191.
105. ILd. at 10.
106. Clean Air Act § 108(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C.A § 7408(a)(1)(B) (West 1995).
107. Clean Air Act § 109(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7409(a) (West 1995).
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developed by HEW,1°8 and they would be uniform across the country. Although
no longer responsible for promulgating the air quality standards, the states were
to play the primary role in ensuring that the standards were attained by the
statutory deadlines. Within nine months after the promulgation of a NAAQS,
each state was supposed to submit to EPA a state implementation plan (SIP) that,
inter alia, provided for the attainment of any primary NAAQS within three years
from the date that EPA approved the plan.t19 If a state failed to submit an SIP by
the deadline, or if a submitted plan did not meet the statutory requirements, EPA
was to write, within two years, a federal implementation plan (FIP) containing
regulations capable of meeting the statutory requirements. ° Congress clearly
recognized that attaining the standards by the deadlines would require significant
changes in transportation habits in large metropolitan areas. The Senate Report
warned that "as much as seventy-five percent of the traffic may have to be
restricted in certain large metropolitan areas," '' and the Act's chief sponsor,
Edmund Muskie, predicted that "the way in which people move about, go to their
work, and live ... must be modified if the objective of clean air is to be
achieved."t
2
Second, having grown impatient with the speed with which EPA was
implementing the mobile source provisions of the 1965 Act, Congress provided
for direct regulation of tailpipe emissions from automobiles." EPA was to
promulgate tailpipe emission standards for automobiles capable of reducing
emissions of hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide by 90% by the 1980 model
year.14 Congress recognized that the new standards were "'drastic medicine,'
108. Clean Air Act § 109(a)(1), (2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7409(a)(1), (2) (West 1995).
109. Clean Air Act § 1l10(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(a)(1) (West 1995). The statute provided for an
extension of the deadline for submitting a plan for an additional 18 months for the secondary standards. Clean
Air Act § 110(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(b) (West 1995). It further provided for an extension of the three-year
attainment deadline for an additional two years if the necessary technology or other alternatives were
unavailable and the state had required reasonably available alternative means of achieving the standard. Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604 § 4(a), 84 Stat. 1680 (1970), repealed by Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549 § 101(d)(4), 104 Stat. 2409 (1990). Thus, the final deadlines
envisioned by the 1970 Amendments for attaining the primary standards could be extended until 1977. SIPs
were to provide for the attainment of secondary NAAQS within a "reasonable time." Clean Air Act § I 10(a)(2),
42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(a)(2) (West 1995).
110. Clean Air Act § 110(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(c) (West 1995). The federal plan would not go into
effect if the state submitted an adequate plan within the two year period that EPA was preparing its FIP. Clean
Air Act § 1 10(c)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(c) (West 1995).
111. S.RE.No. 91-1196, at 12 (1970).
112. 116 CONG. REc. 42,381, 42,394 (1970) (statement of Edmund Muskie).
113. The Secretary of HEW had testified that "the state of the art has tended to meander along until some
sort of regulation took it by the hand and gave it a good pull.... There has been a long period of waiting for
it, and it hasn't worked very well." Hearings on Air Pollution-1967: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air
and Water Pollution of the Senate Conm. On Public Works, 90th Cong. 766-67 (1967) (statement of John W.
Gardner, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare).
114. Clean Air Act § 202(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7521(b) (West 1995).
1539
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 27
designed to 'force the state of the art."' '1 5 But Congress provided an "escape
hatch" through which an auto manufacturer could petition EPA for a one-year
extension if it could demonstrate the following: (1) The extension was "essential
to the public interest or the public health and welfare,"(2) the company had
undertaken good faith efforts to meet the standards, (3) the necessary technology
was unavailable, and (4) a study undertaken by the National Academy of Sciences
and other information available to EPA did not indicate that appropriate tech-
nology was available.'16 If necessary, EPA was to promulgate more stringent
standards for future model years." 7 EPA was empowered to conduct assembly
line inspections and monitor in-use performance to ensure that the manufacturers
met their statutory obligations."8 The statute explicitly preempted any state
tailpipe standards that differed from the federal standard, except that the more
stringent California standards could remain in effect." 9
Third, the 1970 amendments authorized EPA to regulate mobile source fuels
and fuel additives.'" The statute provided that once EPA had designated a fuel
or fuel additive by regulation, no one could sell or distribute any additive that was
not registered with EPA. EPA could require manufacturers of fuels and fuel
additives to conduct health and environmental testing on such additives' 2' The
agency was empowered to control or prohibit the sale of a fuel or fuel additive if
it determined that the fuel, the additive or any combustion products would
endanger the public health or welfare or would impair to a significant degree the
performance of any pollution control device that was or would likely be in
general use.'2 States were empowered to regulate fuels and fuel additives in SIPs
if necessary to achieve the NAAQS.' 23
C. Implementation of the 1970 Amendments
1. Promulgating the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
On April 30, 1971, EPA published a final NAAQS for photochemical
oxidants (as measured by ambient concentrations of ozone) of 0.08 parts per
million as a maximum one-hour concentration.' 24 Fortunately for the agency, only
115. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
116. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604 § 6, 84 Stat. 1692 (1970), repealed by
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549 § 101(d)(3)(C), 104 Stat. 2409 (1990).
117. Clean Air Act § 202(b)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7521(b)(1)(C) (West 1995).
118. Clean Air Act § 206, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7525 (West 1995).
119. Clean Air Act § 209(a),(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7543(a),(b) (West 1995).
120. Clean Air Act § 211(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7545(a) (West 1995).
121. Clean Air Act § 21 1(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7545(b)(2) (West 1995).
122. Clean Air Act § 21 1(c)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7545(c)(1) (West 1995).
123. Clean Air Act § 21 1(c)(4)(C), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7545(c)(4)(C) (West 1995).
124. National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air and Quality Standards, 36 Fed. Reg. 8186, 8187
(1971) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 410.9).
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the secondary NAAQS for sulfur dioxide was actually challenged in court, and
that standard was not relevant to automobile pollution.' 25 In 1978, EPA changed
the one-hour standard for ozone to 0.12 ppm, thereby relieving many urban areas
of their nonattainment status.
26
2. Promulgating Emissions Standards for Automobiles
EPA published the statutorily required standards and testing procedures for
tailpipe emissions on June 23, 1971.127 Hydrocarbon emissions for 1975 model
year automobiles and light duty trucks were limited to 0.41 grams per mile. 'sThe
regulations limited NO. emissions to 3.0 grams per mile for 1973 model year
autos, a rate that EPA confidently believed was feasible, and to 0.4 grams per
mile for the 1976 model year, the statutory rate about which the agency was much
less confident.1 29 The agency also required that catalytic converters used to meet
the standards be fully operational for at least 50,000 miles of use.t3° EPA's
required testing procedures specified that emissions be measured during a "cold
start" of the automobile, the time during the driving cycle at which emissions
were usually highest. 131 In late August 1971, EPA granted the State of
California's request for a waiver to promulgate more stringent automobile emis-
sions standards for cars sold in that state.
132
The auto manufacturers immediately appealed the Administrator's refusal to
allow a one-year extension for meeting the tailpipe standards to the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals, which, in an expedited opinion, found the Administrator's
decision to be "arbitrary and capricious.' '133 The court noted that the economic
cost of an erroneous decision to deny the one-year extension could be very high
125. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 847 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
126. American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 609 F.2d 20,21 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
127. Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle Engines, 36 Fed. Reg.
12,657 (1971).
128. The Natural Resources Defense Council challenged the hydrocarbon standard on the ground that
in invoking a better procedure for testing vehicle emissions, the agency had subtly weakened the standard. The
District Court for the District of Columbia rejected this challenge in a brief nine-paragraph opinion, only one
of which addressed the testing question. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 3 ELR
20787 (D.D.C. May 5, 1972).
129. EPA Expresses Moderate Optimism that Emission Standards Can Be Met, 2 Env't Rep. (BNA) No.
11, at 307 (July 16, 1971).
130. New Motor Vehicles and Engines, 36 Fed. Reg. 8698, 8698-99 (1971) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt.
1201); EPA Proposes Definition of Useful Life for Emission Controlled Motor Vehicles, 2 Env't Rep. (BNA)
No. 2, at 34 (May 14, 1971).
13 1. Hearings on Clean AirAct Oversight Before the Subcomm. on Public Health and Environment of
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong. 192 (1971-72) (statement of Dr. Edward
Ginzton, Chairman, Committee on Motor Vehicle Emissions, National Academy of Sciences, National
Research Council).
132. Motor Vehicle Pollution Control, 36 Fed. Reg. 17,458, 17,458-59 (1971); California Request
Granted by EPA forAssembly-Line Testing of 1973 Cars, 2 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 527 (Sept. 3, 1971).
133. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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and that the human health costs of erroneously granting the extension were fairly
small, and it suggested that if catalyst-equipped autos did in fact suffer poor
driveability, the public would refrain from buying new cars and drive their more
heavily polluting existing automobiles, thus causing lower air quality. The court
ultimately concluded that the Administrator had not adequately justified his
finding that the technology would in fact be available.'3 Among other things, the
court was troubled by EPA's assumption that pollution control devices would be
adequately maintained by consumers who derived no direct benefit from
maintenance expenditures. 35
There followed a decade-long period of extensions and delay as EPA and
then Congress retained the interim standards that EPA had promulgated in 1973
for the 1974 and 1975 model years. The 90% reduction goal was not in fact
achieved until the early 1980s after Congress once again imposed that goal in the
1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act. The delays were blamed upon many
factors, including the absence of reliable pollution control technologies, 36 the
energy crises of the mid and late 1970s, t37 and a brief crisis over the possibility
134. The court concluded:
We think the vehicle manufacturers established by a preponderance of the evidence, in the record
before us, that technology was not available, within the meaning of the Act, when they adduced the
tests on actual vehicles; that the Administrator's reliance on technological methodology to offset
the actual tests raised serious doubts and failed to meet the burden of proof which in our view was
properly assignable to him, in the light of accepted legal doctrine and the intent of Congress
discerned, in part, by taking into account that the risk of an "erroneous" denial of suspension
outweighed the risk of an "erroneous" grant of suspension.
Id. at 648.
135. Id. at 634-35. By contrast, the District of Columbia Circuit upheld EPA's regulations on lead-free
gasoline in all important regards. Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722,727 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
136. International Harvester, 478 F.2d at 622-28.
137. See Hearings on Clean Air Act Extension Before the Subcomm. on Public Health and Environment
of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong. 8 (1973) (statement of William D.
Ruckelshaus) [hereinafter Hearings on Clean Air Act Extension: Statement of William D. Ruckelshaus];
Hearings on Decision of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency Regarding Suspension of
the 1975 Auto Emissions Standards, Part IV Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate
Comm. on Public Works, 93d Cong. 1691 (1973) (statement of John K. McKinley, President, Texaco, Inc.);
Hearings on Energy and Environmental Standards Before the Subcomm. on Energy of the House Comm. on
Science and Astronautics, 93d Cong. 22-24 (1973) (statement of Dr. Betsy Ancker-Johnson, Assistant
Secretary for Science and Technology, Department of Commerce); Hearings on New Motor Vehicle Emissions
Standards and Fuel Economy Before the Subcomm. on Public Health and Environment of the House Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong. 49 (1973) (statement of Peter N. Gammelgard, American
Petroleum Institute); id. at 199-341 (statements of various auto industry representatives); Chrysler President
Tells Committee Emissions Standards Should Be Revised, 4 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 189 (June 8, 1973);
Cole Recommends Congress Freeze Interim 1975 Emissions Standards, 4 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 156
(June 1, 1973); EPA Seeks Change in NO, Standard for 1976 Autos Because of New Findings, 3 Env't Rep.
(NA) No. 52, at 1549 (Apr. 27, 1973); lacocca Asks for Two-Year Extension of 1975 Interim Emissions
Standards, 4 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 129-31 (May 25, 1973); Ruckelshaus Requests New Authority to
Change Auto Standards for 1976, 3 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at 1519 (Apr. 20, 1973); see also Energy
Supply and Environmental Coordination Act, Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246 (1974) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 791-798 (West 1976 & Supp. 1996)).
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that catalytic converters were causing automobiles to emit greater quantities of
sulfur dioxide.1
38
The delays had the very disruptive effect of rendering obsolete the optimistic
assumptions in SIPs and FIPs for urban areas that the stringent statutory tailpipe
emissions standards would be in effect by the 1975 model year. Since the tailpipe
emissions standards would not go into effect until 1977 at the earliest, even those
states that received two-year extensions of the attainment deadline had no hope
of achieving the standards on time.
3. Writing the Original State Implementation Plans
The 1970 Amendments vested responsibility in the states for ensuring that the
NAAQS would be met by the three-year deadline. The states were to come up
with SIPs that imposed controls on individual stationary sources of air pollution
and that required "such other measures as may be necessary" to ensure the
attainment and maintenance of the NAAQS. 39 The sponsors of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970 knew full well that restrictions on automobile traffic would
be necessary to ensure the attainment of the NAAQS in many urban areas,' 40 but
the statute did not explicitly require states to implement IM programs. Whether
or not an J/M program would be implemented in areas that exceeded the ambient
air quality standards was left up to state discretion. As long as a state could
arguably demonstrate that the standard would be achieved by the deadline (e.g.,
through requirements on stationary sources), EPA was powerless to require states
to implement I/M programs.
138. Hearings on Compliance with Title 11 (Auto Emissions Standards) of the Clean AirAct Before the
Senate Comm. on Public Works, 93d Cong. 431-38 (1973) (testimony of Russel E. Train, Administrator, EPA);
John E. Burby, Environment Report/Sulfates Present Major New Problem In Growing Debate Over Clean Air
Act, NAT'L J., Sept. 22, 1973, at 1412.
139. Clean Air Act § 1 10(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(a)(1)(B) (West 1995).
140. The Senate Report accompanying the amendments stated:
The Committee recognizes that during the next several years, the attainment of required ambient
air quality in many of the metropolitan regions of this country will be impossible if the control of
pollution from moving sources depends solely on emission controls. The Committee does not
intend that these areas be exempt from meeting the standards. Some regions may have to establish
new transportation programs and systems combined with traffic control restrictions in order to
achieve ambient air quality standards for pollution agents associated with moving sources.
S. REP. No. 91-1196, at 13 (1970); see Air Pollution Bill May Force Cities to Curb Use ofAutomobiles, NAT'L
J., Aug. 15, 1970, at 1756 (reporting that Senator Muskie and others were convinced that the bill about to be
reported out of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee would require transportation controls
in urban areas).
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a. EPA's SIP Guidelines
As soon as President Nixon signed the Amendments, EPA began to write
regulations to guide the states in writing state implementation plans. The agency
issued proposed regulations on April 7, 1971.41 The proposed regulations
required SIPs to include assurance of sufficient legal authority to implement its
provisions and adequate control strategies, including emissions limitations, other
measures and timetables sufficient to attain the NAAQS by the deadlines.' 42 The
proposal required SIPs to demonstrate, inter alia, that the relevant state agency
had sufficient legal authority to "[c]arry out a program of inspection and testing
of motor vehicles to enforce compliance with applicable emission standards when
necessary and practicable...
When the guidelines were circulated within the Administration, they were
sharply criticized by officials in the Department of Commerce and the Office of
.Management and Budget, both of which wanted the guidelines to place greater
emphasis on cost and economic feasibility.144 The internecine battles precipitated
rumors that Administrator Ruckelshaus was planning to resign. 4 Reports of the
pressure on EPA in the press also motivated Senator Muskie, a probable Demo-
cratic presidential candidate in 1972, to charge that the Administration was
attempting to weaken EPA's efforts to implement the Amendments.
46
Ruckelshaus acknowledged the attempts by other agencies to weaken the regu-
lations, but vigorously denied the implication that he had allowed those efforts to
influence him.'47 Environmental groups maintained that as the Administration's
opposition to stringent SIP requirement became widely known in the states, the
willingness of state legislatures and agencies to impose stringent controls rapidly
evaporated.148 In any event, the internal conflicts delayed EPA's release of the
141. National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 36 Fed. Reg. 6680 (1971) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt 420).
142. ld. at 6680-81.
143. ld. at 6681.
144. See Hearings on Clean AirAct Extension: Statement of William D. Ruckelshaus, supra note 137,
at8.
145. E. W. Kenworthy, Muskie Assails Nixon on Pollution Bill, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 8, 1971, at Al.
146. Terence Smith, Ziegler Confirms Water Code View, N.Y. TmIES, Nov. 18, 1971, at A22.
147. Hearings on Implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970-Part 1 Before the
Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong. 239.43 (1972)
(statement of William D. Ruckelshaus) [hereinafter Implementation of 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments:
Statement of William D. Ruckelshaus]; Ruckelshaus, Congressman Rogers Disagree Over EPA
Implementation Plan Guidelines, 2 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1201 (Feb. 4, 1972).
148. See Hearings on Implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970-Part I Before the
Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Corm on Public Works, 92d Cong. 3-4 (1972) (statement
of Richard Ayres, Natural Resources Defense Council) [hereinafter Hearings on Implementation of the 1970
Clean Air Act Amendments: Statement of Richard Ayres].
When OMB took those guidelines and cut them, the result was to break that momentum and in
many states what happened was that the agencies decided the federal government would not push
them, and they didn't have to do very much to meet the federal rules, and I think the plans
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guidelines, leaving the states with less than the statutory nine months to adapt
their plans to the guidelines. 49 Once published, the proposed regulations attracted
a good deal of negative comment from states, industries, and environmental
groups, but few of the negative comments focused on mobile source requirements
in SIPs. 50
EPA published the final regulations on August 14, 1971.151 The final regu-
lations changed the requirement that states have legal authority to require
inspection and maintenance "when necessary and practicable" to a requirement
that the plans merely set forth timetables for obtaining such authority.5 2
Administrator Ruckelshaus announced that the agency intended for the final
regulations to be flexible guidelines to the states, rather than a "straightjacket"
within which EPA would limit state discretion.153 These changes sent a strong
message to recalcitrant states that EPA was not very serious about inspection and
maintenance requirements.
b. Drafting Plans in the States
Despite EPA's generous offers of assistance,5 4 state officials were not
optimistic about their ability to write honest SIPs that would be capable of
demonstrating attainment within three years of approval. Dr. Haagen-Smit, now
the head of the California Air Resources Board (CARB), stated flatly that the
NAAQS were "unachievable" in the South Coast Air Basin, which included Los
demonstrate very strongly the effects of that change.
Id.
149. Automobile-Use Curbs Pose Problems for States, NAT'L J., Oct. 30, 1971, at 2187; Hearings on
Implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments ofl1970: Statement of Richard Ayres, supra note 148, at 3-4.
150. EPA Receives Critical Comments on Proposed Implementation Plans, 2 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 11,
at 306 (July 16, 1971); Proposed Rules for State Plans Upheld by Defense Council, Opposed by Others, 2
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 65 (May 21, 1971).
151. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 36 Fed. Reg.
15,486 (1971).
152. Id. at 15,489; Hearings on Implementation of the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments: Statement of
Richard Ayres, supra note 148, at 6.
153. Hearings on Implementation of the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments: Statement of William D.
Ruckelshaus, supra note 147, at 229-30.
154. By mid-1971, EPA had already assigned 105 federal employees to the states to help in drafting
SIPs, and it was planning to send 295 more. Hearings on Agriculture-Environmental and Consumer Protection
Appropriations for 1972 Before the House Comm. on Appropriations, 92d Cong. 334 (1971) (statement of
William Ruckelshaus, Administrator, EPA). EPA even created a $2 million fund to allow states to hire
contractors to aid in SIP preparation. States Must Meet Health Standards in Five Years, Steigerwald Tells
Board, 2 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 307 (July 16, 1971). Environmental groups maintained that the
resources that EPA provided to the states to help in drafting transportation control plans were not nearly
enough to yield high quality plans. Hearings on the Environmental Protection Agency's Responsibilities in
Relation to its Budget Request Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on
Public Works, 93d Cong. 144 (1973) (statement of David Hawkins, Natural Resources Defense Council).
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Angeles and surrounding counties.'55 A Colorado official frankly acknowledged
that his agency had decided to prepare two implementation plans-an "idealistic"
plan to submit to EPA and a "realistic" plan that would actually be imple-
mented. 56 When another state air pollution official was asked how the states
would make the required attainment demonstrations, he candidly, if anon-
ymously, replied: "You're just going to lie like everybody else does.' 5 7 A state
consultant speculated that some of the states with large urban areas would simply
refuse to require any transportation measures at all and thereby "call [EPA's]
bluff."58
Inspection and maintenance was critical to ensuring that predicted emissions
reductions from improved automobile pollution reduction technologies became
a reality.' 59 Unfortunately, in the early days equipment for performing inspections
was very expensive and often unreliable.t6Therefore, EPA freely approved SIPs
that did not contain provisions requiring inspection and maintenance in areas that
were likely to exceed the primary NAAQS for the automobile standards by the
1977 deadline.'
6
'
4. The Riverside and NRDC Lawsuits
When it became clear that EPA was not going to insist that the states prepare
adequate transportation control provisions in a timely fashion, the environmental
groups and other affected citizens grew impatient with the agency. The cities of
Riverside and San Bernardino, California, suburbs of Los Angeles, sued EPA for
failing to promulgate an FIP meeting the statutory requirements upon finding the
plan that California had submitted was inadequate because, inter alia, it had failed
to demonstrate that the South Basin would attain the primary NAAQS by the
statutory deadline. 62 Concluding that the agency had violated a nondiscretionary
duty to write an FIP for Los Angeles by July 31, 1972, the court in a very brief
opinion ordered EPA to publish in the Federal Register by January 15, 1973, an
155. KRIER&URSIN, supra note 81, at 213.
156. James A. Noone, Environment Report/Doubts About 'Clean' Fuels Fall To Deter EPA, States On
Air Pollution Battle Plans, NAT'L J., June 24, 1972, at 1050.
157. Automobile-Use Curbs Pose Problems for States, supra note 149, at 2187.
158. Id.
159. Reitze, supra note 38, at 718.
160. See Hearings on Clean Air Act Oversight Before the Subcomm. on Public Health and the
Environment of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong. 1290 (1971-72) (statement
of Sidney L. Terry, Vice President, Environmental and Safety Relations, Chrysler Motors Corporation).
161. See Hearings On Implementation of Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970-Part I Before the
Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Sente Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong. 31 (1972) (statement
of Richard Ayers, Natural Resources Defense Council).
162. City of Riverside v. Ruckelshaus, 3 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst) 20,043 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16,
1972).
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FIP containing provisions sufficient to demonstrate attainment of the NAAQS by
1977, "including all necessary transportation controls and land use controls."
163
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) challenged the agency's
decision to grant several states an extension to submit transportation control plans
until February 17, 1973 and its decision to grant two-year extensions to many
areas without following the statutory procedures. 64 The court in a terse opinion
agreed with NRDC that the agency had violated the statute, and it ordered the
Administrator to rescind the extensions and to require all states to submit
complete SIPs by April 15, 1973. In addition, the court ordered EPA to
promulgate FIPs by August 15, 1973 for all areas in which the states submitted
unacceptable plans. Finally, the court allowed EPA to grant two-year deadline
extensions only after following the required procedures, including the require-
ment that the state demonstrate that reasonably available alternatives would not
result in the attainment of the standards by the May 31, 1975 deadline.
65
5. Back to the Drawing Board for EPA and the States
The Riverside and NRDC cases sent EPA staff scurrying back to the drawing
board for several months' worth of ten and twelve hour days devoted to coming
up with approaches for achieving the standards in ways that were politically
acceptable.'6 In this massive effort, EPA received very little help from the states,
nearly all of which had thrown in the towel.167 The Director of the Los Angeles
County Air Pollution Control District bluntly stated that the "[c]hances of Los
Angeles County or any neighboring county meeting the Federal oxidant standard
even by 1977 are zero.' '168 Indeed, many state and local officials now became
harsh critics of EPA's efforts to comply with the law.169 They did not deny that
air pollution posed a significant health threat to urban dwellers, but instead of
forging ahead in a common effort with EPA to achieve the pollution reduction*
goals, they began to complain about the unreasonableness of the statute and to
express their resentment that the heavy hand of the federal government was
interfering with local prerogatives. 70
163. Id.
164. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
165. Natural Resources Defense Council, 475 F.2d at 971.
166. KRIER & URSIN, supra note 81, at 219-20.
167. Id.; Thomas B. Bracken. Transportation Controls Under the Clean Air Act: A Legal Analysis, 15
BOSTON INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 749, 750-51 (1974).
168. Coast Air Pollution Aide Criticizes U.S. Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1972, at E13. The official
was optimistic, however, that the standard could be attained by sometime between 1980 and 1982. Id.
169. Id. (Director of Los Angeles County Air Pollution Control District complains that the NAAQS lack
an adequate scientific basis).
170. KIrER & URSIN, supra note 81, at 219; Coast Air Pollution Aide Criticizes U.S. Standards, supra
note 168, at E13 (Executive Director of California Air Resources Board opines that the Clean Air Act is
"probably unreasonable" in subjecting large cities to the same deadlines as smaller urban areas); id. (Director
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In writing FIPs for areas in which state plans were inadequate, EPA elected
to require the states to implement and enforce the federally promulgated require-
ments, rather than attempting the vast implementation task on its own.17 1 The
agency realized that to implement inspection and maintenance requirements, it
would have to establish a federal licensing regime (which no doubt would
duplicate many similar state safety licensing regimes), construct testing facilities,
and come up with a way to take licenses away from noncompliant drivers. EPA
concluded that the only practical solution was to order states to take the necessary
implementation and enforcement actions t.17 EPA claimed authority to back up
such orders with various sanctions, including injunctive relief, imposing a
receivership on certain state functions, holding state officials in civil contempt,
and requiring a state to allocate funds from one portion of its budget to another
in order to finance the undertakings required by the Agency. 73 This strategy, of
course, raised sensitive issues of federal/state comity that would later contribute
heavily to the collapse of the transportation control program.
a. California
In drafting FIPs, EPA felt constrained by the statute to write FIPs that were,
in fact, capable of attaining the NAAQS by the 1977 deadline. Therefore, the FIP
for Los Angeles provided for 100% gas rationing by 1977.174 Not surprisingly,
this drew sharp criticism from powerful congresspersons. After hearing from the
staunchest congressional supporters of stringent regulation that it would be best
advised to back off, EPA began to withdraw the plan's most controversial
aspects. 175 Not satisfied with EPA's conciliatory actions, the State of California
filed suit against EPA in late November 1973. The lawsuit alleged, inter alia, that
EPA could not constitutionally order state officials to take any action pursuant to
of Los Angeles County Air Pollution Control District urges Congress to "re-evaluate the whole program and
bring back some sanity").
171. Transportation and Land Use Controls; Texas Plan, 38 Fed. Reg. 30,626, 30,632-33 (1973).
172. Id. at 30,633. There was good support for this position in the legislative history of the 1970
Amendments. Congressman Staggers, the House floor manager for the bill, stated:
If we left it all to the Federal Government, we would have about everybody on the payroll of the
United States. We know this is not practical. Therefore, the Federal Government sets the standards,
we tell the States what they must do and what standards they must meet. These standards must be
put into effect by the communities and the states, and we expect them to have the means to do the
actual enforcing.
116 CONG. REc. 19204 (1970) (statement of Rep. Staggers).
173. Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 831 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated in part, 431 U.S. 99 (1977).
174. Air Programs; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, California Transportation
Control Plan, 38 Fed. Reg. 31,232,31,240 (1973).
175. Environmental Protection Agency Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 39 Fed.
Reg. 1848, 1848-49 (1974); Environmental Protection Agency Approval and Promulgation of Implementation
Plans, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,064, 20,864-65 (1975); Environmental Protection Agency Approval and Promulgation
of Implementation Plans, 40 Fed. Reg. 29,713, 29,713-14 (1975).
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the FIP. EPA then issued a "notice of violation" to the CARB for its failure to
submit a compliance schedule demonstrating compliance by the deadline and for
failure to establish an inspection and maintenance program.176 In May 1975, the
CARB, now composed mostly of appointees of Governor Ronald Reagan,
1
"
defiantly voted to repeal some aspects of the federal plan, an action that could not
have gone into effect without EPA approval. 78
b. Texas
EPA also rejected many important aspects of the Texas SIP. EPA was not
persuaded that the Texas Air Control Board's (TACB's) allegedly more sophis-
ticated pollution reduction model was any more accurate that EPA's Appendix
J model. The State had produced no actual data on the relative reactivity of
different hydrocarbons to support its conclusion that particular emissions would
combine less readily with NOx to produce smog. 179 But in order to give Texas the
benefit of the doubt, EPA decided to use a more lenient "straight rollback" model
to calculate the extent to which hydrocarbon emissions would have to be reduced
to meet the NAAQS. The straight rollback model was based on the simple
assumption of linear proportionality-reductions in photochemical oxidants
would be directly proportional to reductions in hydrocarbon emissions. 18°For the
Houston region, however, this dispute made little difference, because under both
models Houston was so badly polluted that at least a 75% reduction in hydro-
carbon emissions would be required. 181
TACB disagreed vehemently with EPA, however, on the extent to which
reducing hydrocarbon emissions from the numerous stationary sources of
hydrocarbons (e.g., petrochemical plants and oil refineries) would achieve the
required 75% reduction. EPA estimated that even if fully enforced, EPA's emis-
sions limitations on stationary sources would only achieve a 65.5% decrease in
hydrocarbon emissions in the Houston/Galveston Air Quality Control Region.'82
Consequently, EPA prescribed various transportation control measures to achieve
the additional 10% reduction. By EPA's own calculations, however, transpor-
176. Brown, 521 F.2d at 830.
177. KRiER & URSIN, supra note 81, at 244.
178. Id. at 231-32.
179. Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 298 (5th Cir. 1974).
180. Id. at 298.
181. Id. at 302.
182. Id. EPA estimated that in 1972, "294,000 tons per year of reactive hydrocarbons were emitted from
stationary sources and 106,000 tons per year from mobile sources." Id. (emphasis omitted). The state's
calculations were 481,000 and 99,000, respectively. Id. To a large extent the disparity turned upon a
disagreement about what percentage of overall hydrocarbon emissions from stationary sources consisted of
reactive hydrocarbons. Id.
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tation controls would bring about only a relatively small percentage (2.6%) of the
reductions in hydrocarbon emissions necessary to attain the NAAQS. 83
6. Judicial Review of Implementation Plans
Things rapidly began to unravel for EPA as state after state challenged in
court EPA's disapproval of their SIPs and promulgation of its own FIPs.
a. California
More than 200 petitions were filed to review various aspects of the California
FIP in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. ' Without reaching the question of the
constitutionality of the Clean Air Act, the court held that the statute did not grant
EPA authority to force states to take any particular regulatory or enforcement
action by way of implementing an FIP. The court recognized that insofar as the
state itself engaged in polluting activities. (e.g., driving state-owned motor
vehicles), such activities were subject to regulation by EPA, and the federal
government could impose sanctions on states for violating EPA regulations. The
states also had a judicially enforceable obligation to refrain from hindering EPA
in its efforts to implement and enforce the Clean Air Act with respect to polluting
activities within the state. The court, however, rejected EPA's contention that the
Act empowered it to impose sanctions against the state or its officials for failure
to administer and enforce EPA-promulgated requirements. In the words of the
court, "the Act, as we see it, permits sanctions against a state that pollutes the air,
but not against a state that chooses not to govern polluters as the Administrator
directs."' 85 The court noted that had it interpreted the statute to support EPA's
position, the statute would have raised serious constitutional questions.
186
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear EPA's appeal of the Ninth
Circuit ruling. While the case was pending, the Supreme Court decided National
League of Cities v. Usery,18 7 in which it held that Congress could not constitu-
tionally require states and their political subdivisions to comply with the wage
and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Court found that Con-
183. Id. at 310 n.38.
184. Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 830 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated in part, 431 U.S. 99 (1977).
185. Id. at 832.
186. Id.; see Alaska v. EPA, 521 F.2d 842, 844 (9th Cir. 1975) (affirming the reasoning of Brown). The
District of Columbia Circuit reached the same conclusion in a challenge to EPA's FIP for Maryland, Virginia,
and the District of Columbia. District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 984-85 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated
sub nom Costle v. District of Columbia, 431 U.S. 99 (1977). The court found that the inspection and main-
tenance requirements were arguably authorized by the Clean Air Act, but held that they were unconstitutional
as intruding too greatly on state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 992-93.
187. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985).
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gress lacked the power under the Commerce Clause "to force directly upon the
States its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral
governmental functions are to be made."
188
Although requiring states to enact and enforce regulatory programs was not
the same as requiring them to comply with wage and hour requirements, it argu-
ably forced choices about the conduct of integral governmental function on the
states. The Usery opinion therefore required an abrupt change in EPA's strategy.
At EPA's behest, the Solicitor General informed the Court that the agency had
conceded that all of the FIPs would have to be reworked to eliminate any
requirement that any state legislature or regulatory authority enact implementing
legislation or regulations.8 9 The Supreme Court obligingly remanded the pending
appeals to the appellate courts to consider whether the case was moot in light of
EPA's concession.
EPA's revised FIP for California omitted any requirements that the State
enact legislation or pass regulations, but it did place on the State the affirmative
obligation to inspect all automobiles at periodic intervals, flunk a specified
number of vehicles consistent with the emissions reductions relied upon in the
State's SIP, and ensure that failed vehicles received the required maintenance. 19°
Analogizing the State's roads to stationary sources of pollution, EPA contended
that the Clean Air Act and the Constitution authorized it to impose the foregoing
obligations on the states, because it had the power to require any polluter to re-
duce pollution. 91 In this view, the state-owned highway was equivalent to a state-
owned power plant. The agency believed that this adroit shift in focus fell within
the Ninth Circuit's prior dicta.
The Ninth Circuit nevertheless held that the Clean Air Act did not authorize
EPA's revised FIP. 92 The court declined EPA's innovative suggestion that
Congress had authorized it to treat state-owned roads as indirect sources of
pollution. 93 Once again, the court believed that accepting EPA's reading of the
statute would have raised serious constitutional concerns, especially in light of the
Supreme Court's opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery. 94 Ironically, the
Supreme Court seven years later overruled the Usery case, thus removing many
188. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 855.
189. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99, 103 (1977). EPA's petitions for review of court opinions involving
the FIPs for Arizona, Maryland, and Washington, D.C. were consolidated in the appeal from the Ninth
Circuit's opinion involving the California plan. Id. at 102. EPA's petition for certiorari was limited to the
inspection and maintenance issue. Id. at 103-04.
190. Brown v. EPA, 566 F.2d 665, 669 n.2 (1977).
191. Id. at 669.
192. Id. at 669 n.2.
193. Id. at 670. The court noted that Congress had, in the interim, enacted the 1977 Amendments and
in the process had rejected an EPA-sponsored provision that would have empowered EPA to seek injunctive
relief against states that refused to implement required inspection and maintenance programs. Id. at 670-71.
194. Id. at 672-74.
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of the constitutional doubts surrounding EPA's original assertion of power over
state governmental functions.' 95
b. Texas
Twenty-five petitions for review of EPA's rejection of the Texas SIP and
promulgation of its own FIP were filed in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.96
The petitioners challenged EPA's rejection of Texas's model for determining the
emissions reductions required to meet a given level of air quality for photo-
chemical oxidants and its assessment of how effective the pollution reduction
measures selected by Texas would be. Although it found little support for EPA's
straight rollback model in the record, the court could not find EPA to be arbitrary
and capricious in adopting it. The EPA model, at least, squared with the
"common-sensical proposition that pollutants will be reduced proportionally to
reductions in their chemical precursors."'197
The court also upheld EPA's rejection of TACB's stationary source inventory
for Houston from which TACB had deduced that the required 75% reduction in
hydrocarbon emissions could be achieved solely by regulating stationary sources.
The court could make little sense out of the jumble of unexplained tables that
TACB had submitted to EPA to justify its inventory.'98 The court, however, also
rejected EPA's calculations for petroleum refineries, because it failed adequately
to explain why it based them on reactivity factors drawn from similar plants in
Louisiana. Since EPA's choice of Louisiana plants over similar plants in
California was outcome determinative on the issue of the need for transportation
controls, the court remanded to EPA to provide better support for the reactivity
factors that it selected for petroleum refineries. 99 Thus, because the petitioners
prevailed on a single issue among the dozens of issues raised in the appeal, the
transportation controls prescribed in EPA's FIP for Houston never went into
effect.2m
195. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
196. Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 294 (5th Cir. 1974).
197. Id. at 301.
198. Id. at 303.
199. Id. at 309-10.
200. The issue of EPA's authority to order state and local governments to take particular implementing
actions was raised by Harris County, but the court found it unnecessary to address it because Harris County
had failed to raise it in EPA's hearings and because the State of Texas did not voice any objections. 'The court
took Texas's silence as an understanding that it would require Harris County to take implementing action if
TACB were convinced that transportation controls were in fact necessary in order to meet the NAAQS. Id. at
320.
1552
1996/Regulating Commuters to Clear the Air
7. Administrative and Congressional Backpedaling
The judicial setbacks forced EPA to undertake a thorough re-examination of
its approach to administering the Clean Air Act in heavily polluted cities. Without
the power to commandeer state resources, EPA was faced with the prospect of
writing implementing regulations governing traffic-related pollution for dozens
of separate cities and employing a federal police force to enforce those regu-
lations.2°1 Not surprisingly, the agency began to engage in some serious back-
tracking. Congress was more than willing to join in the backpedaling exercise.
Just as several Arab nations announced a boycott on exports of oil to the
United States, EPA announced that it would no longer require gasoline rationing
in major cities.? Although it was unclear how this action advanced the cause of
energy conservation, it undoubtedly helped reduce the considerable political pres-
sures that were building on the agency and its allies in Congress. According to
John Quarles, who was the Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and General
Counsel at the time, Administrator Ruckelshaus took this action only after
meeting with congressional supporters of the Clean Air Act and being assured
that the Clean Air Act would otherwise be amended to take away EPA's authority
to impose gasoline rationing and perhaps other authorities as well.2°3
By the end of 1975, EPA's transportation control program was effectively
dead in nearly all major cities in which photochemical oxidants were a serious
problem. Only in the very few cities like Los Angeles and New York where states
had (perhaps foolishly) attempted to cooperate by coming up with their own
transportation control plans (albeit consisting mostly of vague promises) were any
enforceable transportation controls in place. And even in those cities, state
officials were struggling mightily to avoid the responsibilities that they had earlier
promised to fulfill.
D. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977
As the 1977 deadline for attaining the primary NAAQS passed, nearly all of
the most heavily polluted urban areas in the country were far out of attainment,
and it was clear that "mid-course corrections" were in order. Congress enacted
comprehensive amendments to the Clean Air Act on August 7, 1977. 04 By that
201. KRIER & URsIN, supra note 81, at 233.
202. EPA Softens Plans for Gasoline Rationing in Cities, But Keeps Other Transport Rules, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 16, 1973, at 3.
203. John Quarles, The Transportation Control Plans-Federal Regulation's Collision with Reality, 2
HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 241, 250 n.39 (1977).
204. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671 (West
1995)). Although the bill signed by the President contained its own numbering scheme, it also followed for the
most part the numbering scheme of the 1970 Amendments. It did not attempt to conform to the numbering
scheme of the United States Code, which by then had become hopelessly complicated. The 1990 Amendments
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time, fewer than ten cities had established I/M programs. 2 5 The 1977 Amend-
ments required EPA and the states to identify all areas of the country in which the
standards for photochemical oxidants, carbon monoxide, and NO. were not
attained by the enactment date.206 For these areas, states were to submit a "non-
attainment SIP" to EPA for approval or disapproval by January 1, 1979.Y37 The
nonattainment SIP had to correct the deficiencies of the existing plan and ensure
that the NAAQS would be achieved by the new deadline of December 31,
1982.208 If a state could demonstrate that, despite the implementation of all rea-
sonably available measures, it could not achieve the standards for photochemical
oxidants or carbon monoxide by December 31, 1982, it could submit an
"extension SIP" by July 1, 1982,m that provided for attainment by December 31,
1987.210 The extension SIP had to include "a specific schedule for implementation
of a vehicle emission control inspection and maintenance program" and any
"other measures" necessary to meet the NAAQS by the 1987 deadline.?"
The 1977 Amendments provided for a variety of sanctions for states that
failed to: (1) Submit an adequate SIP by the January 1, 1979 deadline; (2) reach
attainment by the December 31, 1982 (or extended December 31, 1987) deadline;
or (3) failed to take adequate steps to implement their nonattainment plans. The
allowable sanctions included a moratorium on the construction of major
stationary sources in the relevant area,212 a cutoff of sewage treatment con-
struction grants and other EPA aid, and a cutoff of all federal highway funds
other than those essential for safety and those devoted to mass transit and air
quality improvement.2 13 The 1977 Amendments also prohibited any federal
agency from funding or licensing any project that did not conform to the relevant
SIP.2 14 In addition, federal agencies like the Department of Transportation were
obliged to give priority to programs with air-quality related transportation con-
sequences.215
to the Clean Air Act also followed the 1970 Amendments' numbering scheme. For purposes of the following
description, the 1970 numbering scheme will be adopted except for those relatively rare instances, usually
concerning transitory plan submission dates in which the 1977 Amendments did not adhere to the 1970
numbering scheme. The reader should be forewarned, however, that the 1990 Amendments have rendered most
of the substantive provisions of the 1977 Amendments obsolete.
205. Reitze & Needleman, supra note 38, at 415 n.411 (citing NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE ON MOTOR VEHICLE EMISSIONS 132 (1974)).
206. Clean Air Act § 107(d)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7407(d)(1)(A) (West 1995).
207. Clean Air Act § 172(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7502(c) (West 1995).
208. Clean Air Act § 172(a)(2), (b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7502 (West 1995).
209. Clean Air Act § 172(a)(2)(A), (C), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7502 (West 1995).
210. Clean Air Act § 172(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7502(a)(2) (West 1995).
211. Clean Air Act § 172(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7502(b)(1 1) (West 1995).
212. Clean Air Act §§ 113(a)(5), 179, 173(4); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7413(a)(5), 7503(4), 7509 (West 1995).
213. Clean Air Act §§ 176(A), (C), 316(b), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7506(a), 7506(b), 7616(b) (West 1995).
214. Clean Air Act § 176(c), 42 U.S.C.A § 7506(c) (West Supp. 1996).
215. Clean Air Act § 176(d), 42 U.S.C.A § 7506(d) (West 1995).
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E. Implementation of the 1977 Amendments
In March, 1978, EPA designated over 400 areas as nonattainment for one or
more primary or secondary NAAQS. 2 6 Although the 1977 Amendments did not
draw a distinction between urban and rural areas, EPA required nonattainment
SIPs to implement inspection and maintenance programs only in areas with
populations of 200,000 or more.21 7
1. EPA Approval/Disapproval of Plans and Extension Requests
EPA published regulations on February 24, 1978, providing the criteria that
it would use in evaluating SIPs that provided for attainment by the December 31,
1982 deadline and submittals accompanying requests for deadline extensions until
December 31, 1987.218 With respect to the required IM programs, EPA agreed
to approve "committal SIPs" upon a proper showing that the state planned to pro-
mulgate an adequate program and that the state agency was diligently seeking
legislation to give it the authority to implement the program.21 9 Those states
requesting a 1987 extension had to submit to EPA by January 1, 1979, a demon-
stration of adequate legal authority to implement an I/M program, a commitment
to implement and enforce a program that would reduce hydrocarbon and carbon
monoxide exhaust emissions from light duty vehicles in 1987 by 25%, and a
schedule for implementationYm EPA made it clear that it would hold the states to
the promises made in their committal SIPs, and it took the firm position that a
fully functioning I/M plan had to be in effect by December 31, 1982, or the state
would be guilty of failing to implement its committal SIP and appropriate
sanctions would be forthcoming.22'
Despite EPA's extreme flexibility with respect to approving committal SIPs
containing mostly promises about what the state planned to do in the future,
several states failed to make any submission.222 For the most part, these failures
216. General Preamble for Proposed Rulemaking on Approval of State Implementation Plan Revisions
for Nonattainment Areas, 43 Fed. Reg. 8902 (1978).
217. Reitze & Needleman, supra note 38, at 416 (citing U.S. EPA, INFORMATION DOCUMENT ON
AUTOMOBILE EMIssIONS INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM 53 (1978)).
218. State Implementation Plans Under Clean Air Act, 43 Fed. Reg. 21,673, 21,674-75 (1978); State
Implementation Plans General Preable for Proposed Rulemaking on Approval of Plan Revisions for
Nonattainment Areas, 44 Fed. Reg. 20,372, 20,373 n.6 (1979).
219. State Implementation Plans Under Clean Air Act, 43 Fed. Reg. 21,673 (1978).
220. See Approval and Promulgation of State Implementation Plans; Colorado, 45 Fed. Reg. 47,682
(1980) (describing general requirements).
221. State Implementation Plans Under Clean Air Act, 43 Fed. Reg. 21,673 (1978). EPA then approved
extension SIPs for 28 states and the District of Columbia for about 40 nonattainment areas. U.S. EPA, State
Implementation Plan;; Approval of 1982 Ozone and Carbon Monoxide Plan Revisions for Areas Needing an
Attainment Date Extension, 46 Fed. Reg. 7182 App. A, B (1981); OTA OZONE REPORT, supra note 4, at 31.
222. OTA OZONE REPORT, supra note 4, at 30. By January 1, 1983, states containing 17 ozone
nonattainment areas had failed to request extensions and EPA proposed construction bans for all 17 areas.
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were attributable to the unwillingness of the state legislatures to enact legislation
empowering state agencies to implement I/M programs. In California, for
example, the relevant legislative committees had considered TIM legislation for
five years, but it had never been voted out of committee despite extensive
meetings between EPA officials, state officials, and representatives of business,
labor and environmental groups. As a consequence, EPA imposed a con-
struction moratorium, highway funding limitations, and sewage treatment grant
limitations on nonattainment areas in California2 4 as well as Kentucky 2  and
Colorado.? The moratoria were gradually lifted as the states passed the neces-
sary legislation.
Anticipating that many states that had requested deadline extensions for the
automobile pollutants would submit inadequate I/M programs, EPA on January
22, 1981, published a guidance document stating the criteria by which it would
judge such programs in extension SIPs.227 EPA reiterated its firm position that
"[f]ull implementation of [the I/M] program ... is required in all cases by
December 31, 1982."228 The January 22 guidance document was one of the
"midnight regulations" issued at the very end of the Carter Administration before
the Reagan Administration assumed office,229 and it did not take the new
Administration long to begin to backtrack from its relatively strict position on I/M
programs. In several important states, including Arizona, California, Connecticut,
Maryland, Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania, state and local agencies ran
into fierce citizen opposition to proposed inspection and maintenance programs,
and implementation efforts began to bog down.230
223. Federal Assistance Limitations; State of California, 45 Fed. Reg. 81,746, 81,747 (1980).
224. Id.
225. Federal Assistance Limitations; Kentucky, 45 Fed. Reg. 81,752, 81,754 (1980) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. ch. 1).
226. Approval and Promulgation of State Implementation Plans; Colorado, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,150,72,150-
51(1980).
227. U.S. EPA, State Implementation Plans; Approval of 1982 Ozone and Carbon Monoxide Plan
Revisions for Areas Needing an Attainment Date Extension, 46 Fed. Reg. 7182,7186 (1981) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51). The SIP revision was supposed to include:
(1) Inspection test procedures; (2) emission standards; (3) inspection station licensing requirements;
(4) emission analyzer specification and maintenance/calibration requirements; (5) recordkeeping
and record submittal requirements; (6) quality control, audit, and surveillance procedures; (7)
procedures to assure that noncomplying vehicles are not operated on the public roads; (8) any other
official program rules, regulations, and procedures; (9) a public awareness plan; and (10) a
mechanics training program if additional emission reduction credits are being claimed for
mechanics training.
Id.
228. Id. at7186.
229. Timothy B. Clark, Outgoing Carterites Rush to the Printer with a Flood of Rules, 13 NAT'L J. 127
(1981); Timothy B. Clark, Task Force to Work to Implement Reagan's Regulatory Freeze, 13 NAT'L J. 215
(1981).
230. See Reitze & Needleman, supra note 38, at 416 (citing U.S. GAO, VEHICLE EMISSIONS INSPECTION
AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM IS BEHIND SCHEDULE 15 (1985)).
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In April and June, 1982, EPA notified twelve governors that their states had
not met important milestones set out in their plans and warned them that if EPA
made formal findings of nonimplementation, certain nonattainment sanctions
would go into effect.231 By December 31, 1982, only one of the twelve states had
put an adequate I/M program in place and one state had adequately demonstrated
that all relevant areas were no longer nonattainment areas and were therefore not
subject to the I/M requirements. EPA therefore proposed to find that ten states
had not implemented the nonattainment provisions in their SIPs. 2 As a con-
sequence, EPA noted that it could withhold all or part of the funds that it had
made available to states for developing SIPs. More importantly, EPA concluded
that upon publication of a final finding of nonimplementation, the statutory
construction moratorium would go into place and no new major stationary
sources of ozone precursors could be constructed in the affected nonattainment
areas.Y3 Finally, EPA mentioned the possibility of cutting off all federal highway
funds for the affected nonattainment areas.234 Since EPA was not anxious to
impose any of these sanctions, it elicited comments on whether it should forego
the sanctions if the affected states, prior to the final finding of nonimple-
mentation, submitted "evidence to EPA that it has taken concrete steps toward
starting its I/M program in an expeditious manner." 25 This approach, of course,
flatly contradicted EPA's position, taken at the end of the Carter Administration,
that sanctions would be imposed if a state receiving an extension did not have a
fully operable I/M program in place on December 31, 1982.
At the same time that it was deciding how to deal with states that did not have
fully operable I/M programs in place by December 31, 1982, EPA had to address
how it would react to the seventeen areas that did not request 1987 extensions for
the automobile pollutants and did not reach attainment by December 31, 1982, as
the statute envisioned.z 6 Arguably, the statute required EPA to impose sanctions
for these nonattainment areas as well. On February 3, 1983, the agency proposed
a construction ban in all such areas and all areas that were designated nonattain-
ment after that deadline, except for those areas that could demonstrate that
nonattainment was attributable to ozone transport.237
231. Federal Assistance Limitations and Construction Moratorium; Notice of Proposed Actions, 48 Fed.
Reg. 35,312 (1983) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
232. Id. The 10 states were Maryland, Kentucky, Tennessee, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin,
Texas, Missouri, and Nevada.
233. Id. at 35,313.
234. Id. at 35,314.
235. Id.
236. OTA OzONE REPORT, supra note 4, at 30.
237. Compliance with the Statutory Provisions of Part D of the Clean Air Act, 48 Fed. Reg. 4972, 4975
(1983) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
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The affected states reacted very negatively to this proposal.23 8 They pointed
out that the statute technically required only that nonattainment plans "provide"
for attainment by December 31, 1982; it did not actually require that the states
"achieve" attainment. By this logic, the sanctions were not appropriate for any
nonattainment area with an approved SIP "providing" for attainment by the 1982
deadline, even if in retrospect it became clear that the goal had not been achieved.
The states noted that when the 1977 deadline approached under the 1970 Amend-
ments, EPA declined to impose a construction moratorium if the state, in good
faith, revised its plan so as to meet the standards as expeditiously as practicable. 239
On July 12, 1983, Congress came to the rescue of the recalcitrant states by
enacting an appropriations rider prohibiting EPA from using any appropriated
funds to implement the threatened construction moratoria for states that failed to
achieve the NAAQS by the December 31, 1982 deadline.240 The legislative
history made it plain that the language was aimed precisely at EPA's February 3
proposal. Although the appropriations rider would last for only one year, EPA
took it as a signal that the states' interpretation of the statute was the correct one.
On November 2, 1983, EPA re-interpreted the statute to say that sanctions could
not go into effect so long as a state had an approved plan that "provided" for
attainment by December 31, 1982, even if attainment did not result by that date. 241
It therefore withdrew its proposed disapprovals. The agency did, however, feel
obliged to find that the plans were inadequate, because they had in fact failed to
reach the statutory goal. It therefore issued a "SIP call" demanding that states
containing nonextension areas that did not meet the December 31, 1982 deadline
amend their SIPs within a reasonable time to provide for attainment by December
31, 1987.242 So long as the states responded to the SIP call in a reasonable way,
EPA would impose no sanctions.243 The agency also adhered to its proposal to
decline to impose sanctions on areas that were nonattainment solely because of
238. Mayors Say EPA Air Act Sanctions Policy Attempts to Use Cities to Weaken Statute, 13 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 43, at 1890 (Feb. 25, 1983).
239. Compliance with the Statutory Provisions of Part D of the Clean Air Act, 48 Fed. Reg. 50,686,
50,687 (1983) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52).
240. The appropriation's rider read as follows:
None of the funds provided in this Act may be obligated or expended to impose sanctions under
the Clean Air Act with respect to any area for failure to attain any national ambient air quality
standard established under Section 109 of such Act by the applicable dates ....
Pub. L. No. 98-45, 97 Stat. 226 (1983).
241. Compliance with the Statutory Provisions of Part D of the Clean Air Act, 48 Fed. Reg. at 50,688-89.
EPA also agreed with the states that this interpretation was consistent with its past position with respect to state
plans that had missed the original 1977 deadline of the 1970 Amendments. Indeed, EPA opined that the 1977
Amendments effectively ratified that position. Id.
242. Id.
243. The agency would also decline to impose sanctions on newly designated nonattainment areas so
long as they submitted plans within a reasonable time demonstrating compliance with the NAAQS within five
years of approval. Id. at 50,693-94.
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ozone transport.244 For the automobile pollutants, then, the appropriations rider
and EPA's timely re-interpretation had the effect of putting those areas for which
states had not requested extensions on roughly the same footing as those areas for
which extensions had been requested.2 45
This solved the problem of the failed SIPs in areas not receiving extensions,
but it left open the question of what to do with the states containing areas that had
received extensions to December 31, 1987, but were not effectively implementing
their SIPs. In its November 2, 1983 reinterpretation, EPA took the position that
sanctions would only go into effect for those states that did not undertake a good
faith effort to revise their SIPs to cure the deficiencies. 24 If a state with a
deficient SIP (e.g., because the state was not implementing its I/M program)
"commits to remedy its deficiency by a specific date and, at the same time, shows
that it cannot possibly move any more quickly, EPA may defer final action until
that date, unless it learns later that the State will not meet its commitment." 247 As
a last resort, EPA noted that it would consider imposing its own control measures
in a federal implementation plan (FIP) in addition to imposing sanctions. But it
cautioned that "[r]esource constraints will almost certainly make it impossible for
EPA to promulgate Federal plan revisions immediately in all areas where they
might be needed."248
All of this amounted to a considerable retreat from the firm position the
agency had previously taken with respect to the states that were not carrying out
their I/M responsibilities. The worst was yet to come. The states that had not sub-
mitted adequate extension SIPs in 1982 did submit SIPs purporting to
demonstrate that they would come into attainment by December 31, 1987, but
EPA did not get around to evaluating their adequacy until after the December 31,
1987 deadline had expired.2 49 Although EPA took action with respect to some
especially recalcitrant states,250 the states that avoided directly spitting in EPA's
eye escaped sanctions until after the December 31, 1987 deadline had passed.
The I/M programs that did go into effect were often ineffective. EPA never
published definitive regulations providing criteria for adequate I/M programs, and
after the initial furor in the early 1980s, it stressed flexibility for the states over
244. Id. at 50,692.
245. The sanctions remained in effect, however, for Kentucky, the only state that had failed to submit
an approveable nonattainment SIP for the automobile pollutants and had not had the resulting sanctions lifted
prior to February, 1983. Id. at 50,688. The sanctions also remained in effect for nonattainment areas for
nonautomobile pollutants that had failed to submit approveable SIPs.
246. Id. at 50,691-92. States could also avoid sanctions by getting the relevant area redesignated as
"attainment" if the monitoring evidence warranted redesignation. Id. at 50,691.
247. Id. at 50,692-93.
248. Id. at 50,692.
249. OTA OZONE REPORT, supra note 4, at 30.
250. See Federal Assistance Limitations and Construction Moratorium; State of Pennsylvania, 47 Fed.
Reg. 9477, 9478 (1982) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1) (EPA notice proposing to find that Pennsylvania
was not implementing its previously approved extension SIP).
1559
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 27
effectiveness.25l States with I/M programs were given emissions reduction credit
based on exceedingly optimistic assumptions about how well they were working
in the real world. As a result, the efficacy of IM programs varied widely from
state to state. 2 An EPA audit published in 1991 found that in many cases auto-
mobiles that it had deliberately modified so as to fail the tests nevertheless passed.
EPA attributed this to unreliable test equipment, inadequately trained personnel,
and insufficient state enforcement programs. 
3
2. The Second Failure to Attain the Standards
As the 1987 deadline passed, it became painfully clear that dozens of non-
attainment areas had not attained the primary NAAQS by that deadline, despite
the illusory assurances that the states had been making "reasonable further
progress" toward that end for the previous decade. EPA's 1988 prognosis for Los
Angeles, for example, was almost exactly what it had been in 1973-the stan-
dards for carbon monoxide and photochemical oxidants could not be met over the
next five years without wholesale social and economic disruption. 
4
Although much of the ensuing national attention focused on the most difficult
trouble spots, like Los Angeles, New York, and Houston, the shameful fact of the
matter was that some of the areas that had nearly attained the 0.08 ppm primary
standard for ozone in 1970 had not attained the considerably less stringent revised
0.12 ppm primary standard by 1987.2 5 Indeed, instead of making "reasonable
further progress" as the approved SIPs had promised, some less severely polluted
areas in fact got worse.2 6
251. Reitze & Needleman, supra note 38, at 418.
252. Id.
253. Id. (citing EPA, FINAL REPORT OF THE AUDIT ON THE VEHICLE INSPECTIONIMAINTENANCE
PROGRAM (1991)).
254. In late 1988, EPA concluded that:
a plan that provides for attainment in the [Los Angeles area] immediately or even within five years
would have to prohibit most traffic, shut down major business activity, curtail the use of important
consumer goods, and dramatically restrict all aspects of social and economic life. Implementation
and enforcement of such drastic measures may well be impossible, and could prevent satisfaction
of the basic necessities of life-including food, shelter, and medical services. Such a plan would
effectively usurp many state and local government functions and would radically restrict individual
opportunity. Indeed, an immediate or a near-term attainment FIP for ozone would destroy the
economy of the South Coast, so that most of the population would be forced to resettle elsewhere.
Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; California-South Coast Air Basin; Ozone and Carbon
Monoxide Plans, 53 Fed. Reg. 49,494,49,495 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
255. For example, the State of Texas convinced the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1974 that the
Dallas/Ft. Worth area was so close to attaining the 0.08 ppm ozone standard that EPA was arbitrary and
capricious in not granting the state an additional year (to 1976) to meet the standard. Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d
289, 317-18 (5th Cir. 1974). By 1991, Fort Worth had still not attained the relaxed 0.12 ppm standard. 1991
EMISSIONS TRENDS REPORT, supra note 3, tbl.4-5.
256. 1991 EMIsSIONS TRENDS REPORT, supra note 3, at tbl.5-2.
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Nevertheless, EPA's posture with respect to SIPs that had obviously failed
to attain the standards by the statutory deadline was to sidestep the statute's auto-
matic sanctions; the agency took the position that it would impose sanctions only
if the state failed to carry out its SIP commitments in good faith or if the plan was
inadequate on its face. 7 In other words, absent bad faith on a state's part, EPA
would impose no sanctions so long as the SIP appeared to demonstrate attainment
by the 1987 deadline, even though the deadline had passed and the area remained
out of attainment. EPA proposed sanctions for eleven areas with deficient SIPs
in July 1987, but Congress, as usual, came to the rescue with legislation
extending the deadlines for a year and prohibiting EPA from carrying out the
sanetions.2 8
Several reasons were given for the wholesale failure to meet the statute's
goals even in areas where doing so was not an especially difficult task. First,
President Reagan had appointed officials to the top offices at EPA who were far
from committed to meeting the statutory goals. And the disdain that they had for
long-time agency employees reduced agency morale to painfully low levels5 9
Second, the states no doubt received subtle and sometimes explicit messages
that few consequences would attend the failure to meet their SIP obligations.
They also correctly surmised that, after the transportation control fiasco of the
mid-1970s, the probability that EPA would write its own FIPs for the states was
vanishingly small. States simply had no incentive to implement effective
inspection and maintenance programs over the determined opposition of local
service station owners and vocal automobile drivers.
Third, the petroleum industry had reacted to EPA's regulations requiring that
lead be phased out of gasoline by changing the blend so that gasoline contained
more of the "light ends" like butane, benzene, and xylene. While this eliminated
the knocking problem that lead additives had previously addressed, it also greatly
increased the volatility of new blends. This in turn greatly increased running VOC
emissions from both new and existing automobiles as well as emissions from
storage and transfer facilities.? None of these increases in emissions were taken
into account in the extension SIPs that were written during the early 1980s. By
the late 1980s, some states were attempting to place limitations on the volatility
of gasoline marketed within their borders, but a court held that any such state
regulations violated the Commerce Clause if unapproved by EPA.26'
257. OTA OZONE REPORT, supra note 4, at 30.
258. Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329 (1987); OTA OZONE REPORT, supra note 4, at 31.
259. This author personally observed flyers in EPA elevators during this period questioning the extent
to which EPA employees could in good conscience do the bidding of a "corrupt regime."
260. Arnold W. Reitze, The Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives Under Section 211 of the Clean Air
Act, 29 TULSA LJ. 485, 515 (1994).
261. American Petroleum Inst. v. Jorling, 710 F. Supp. 421,429-30 (N.D.N.Y. 1989).
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F. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
By the end of the 1980s it was clear that EPA and the states had once again
failed to attain the primary NAAQS in the most heavily populated areas by the
statutory deadlines. It was equally clear that automobile emissions were a primary
reason for this failure. Yet, while the reasons for the wholesale failure to achieve
clean air were painfully obvious, there was very little agreement about how to
proceed. For more than two years, political stalemate prevented the enactment of
much needed amendments to the Clean Air Act. Finally, the Bush Administration
seized the initiative, and after much serious deliberation and good faith com-
promise, Congress enacted comprehensive amendments in November 1990.
1. New Designations
In enacting the 1990 Amendments, Congress wanted very much to put in
place a regulatory regime that had a legitimate chance to succeed. The Amend-
ments therefore divided the ozone nonattainment areas into five categories,
depending upon the degree to which the maximum exposure (or "design value")
for the area exceeded the primary NAAQS for ozone.6 2 The five ozone nonattain-
ment areas were named "marginal, moderate, serious, severe, and extreme. ' 263 At
the time that EPA made the initial designations, there were forty-three marginal,
thirty-one moderate, fourteen serious, nine severe, and one extreme areas?4
Areas with more serious pollution problems were given longer to attain the
primary standards, but they were subject to increasingly stringent implementation
plan requirements.
2. Reasonable Further Progress
Like the 1977 Amendments, the 1990 Amendments required that SIPs for
nonattainment areas assure "reasonable further progress," which was defined to
prevent any temporary increases in pollution and to require "annual incremental
reductions" in emissions as needed to achieve the standards by the relevant
deadlines.2 5 The 1990 Amendments went beyond the 1977 Amendments, how-
ever, in specifying a 15% reduction in VOC emissions from the 1990 baseline by
262. Clean Air Act §§ 181(a)(1), 186(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7511(a)(1), 7512(a)(1) (West 1995). A
"design value" for an area is the fourth highest of all of the daily peak one-hour average ozone concentrations
actually observed over the most recent three-year period. It is meant to be a measure of the maximum one-hour
of exposure in a particular area. OTA OZONE REPORT, supra note 4, at 52-53.
263. Clean Air Act § 181(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 751 1(a)(1) (West 1995).
264. 1991 EMISSIONS TRENDS REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-10.
265. Clean Air Act §§ 171(1), 172(c)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7501(1), 7502(c)(2) (West 1995).
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1996 in moderate areas2 and an additional 3% per year on average after 1996 for
serious, severe, and extreme areas. 67
3. Inspection and Maintenance
The 1990 Amendments required all states containing nonattainment areas for
which I/M programs had been put into place under the 1977 Amendments and
moderate ozone nonattainment areas that lacked I/M programs to revise their SIPs
immediately to ensure that they did in fact contain I/M programs that were
adequate under the pre-existing criteria.28 Recognizing that in the name of flex-
ibility EPA's previous vague guidance to the states had allowed for considerable
variation, Congress required EPA by November 15, 1991 to revise the previous
guidance to the states on "basic I/M" programs, taking into account what the
agency had learned from its audits of the ongoing programs in the statesO9
Although the statute did not prescribe criteria for the new guidance, it did specify
what aspects of IM the new guidance should cover.270 At the same time the
amendments made it clear that the guidance should "provide the States with con-
tinued reasonable flexibility to fashion effective, reasonable, and fair programs
for the affected consumer. 27' Once EPA's basic I/M guidance was issued in final
form, all moderate ozone nonattainment areas were to incorporate that guidance
into all SIPs requiring basic I/M programs.272
Serious, severe, and extreme ozone nonattainment areas with a 1980 popu-
lation of greater than 200,000 and all metropolitan statistical areas in the North-
east Ozone Transport Region with a population of 100,000 or more were required
266. Clean Air Act § 182(b)(1)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7511 a(b)(1)(A)(i) (West 1995). A reduction of less
than fifteen percent is allowable in moderate nonattainment areas if the state puts into place a new source-
permitting regime that is equivalent to that required in extreme areas, and RACT is in place for existing
sources. Clean Air Act § 182(b)(1)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C.A. § 751 la(b)(1)(A)(ii) (West 1995).
267. Clean Air Act § 182(c)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7511a(c)(2)(B) (West 1995).
268. Clean Air Act §§ 182(a)(2)(B), 182(b)(4), 187(a)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 751la(a)(2)(B), 751la(b)(4).
7512a(a)(4) (West 1995).
269. Clean Air Act § 182(a)(2)(B)(ii), 42 U.S.C.A. § 751 la(a)(2)(B)(ii) (West 1995).
270. The new guidance was to cover
the frequency of inspections, the types of vehicles to be inspected (which shall include leased
vehicles that are registered in the nonattainment area), vehicle maintenance by owners and
operators, audits by the State, the test method and measures, including whether centralized or
decentralized, inspection methods and procedures, quality of inspection, components covered,
assurance that a vehicle subject to a recall notice from a manufacturer has complied with that
notice, and effective implementation and enforcement, including ensuring that any retesting of a
vehicle after a failure shall include proof of corrective action and providing for denial of vehicle
registration in the case of tampering or misfueling.
Clean Air Act § 182(a)(2)(B)(ii), 42 U.S.C.A. § 751 la(a)(2)(B)(ii) (West 1995).
271. Clean Air Act § 182(a)(2)(B)(ii), 42 U.S.C.A. § 751 la(a)(2)(B)(ii) (West 1995).
272. Clean Air Act § 182(a)(2)(B)(ii), 42 U.S.C.A. § 751 la(a)(2)(B)(ii) (West 1995).
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to include "enhanced I/M" programs in their SIPs by November 15, 1992.273 The
enhanced I/M programs were to comply "in all respects" with EPA guidance as
it became available.274 Congress meant for the enhanced programs to cover more
of the vehicles in operation, employ more sophisticated inspection methods for
finding high emitting vehicles, and contain additional features to ensure that all
vehicles were tested properly and effectively repaired.275 In particular, the amend-
ments required that an enhanced I/M program operate "on a centralized basis,
unless the State demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Administrator that a
decentralized program will be equally effective. 276 In addition, states were
required to enact regulations providing for inspection and maintenance of any
new diagnostic devices that EPA required auto manufacturers to include on new
model automobiles within two years after EPA's requirements became effec-
273. Clean Air Act § 182(c)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 751 la(c)(3)(A) (West 1995); Vehicle Inspection and
Maintenance Requirements for State Implementation Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. at 31,059.
274. Clean Air Act § 182(c)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7511a(c)(3)(B) (West 1995). The guidance was to
include:
a performance standard achievable by a program combining emission testing, including on-road
emission testing, with inspection to detect tampering with emission control devices and misfueling
... and program administration features necessary to reasonably assure that adequate management
resources, tools, and practices are in place to attain and maintain the performance standard.
Id.
275. Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance Requirements for State Implementation Plans, 57 Fed. Reg.
at 31,059. At the very least a state's enhanced I/M program had to include the following elements:
(i) Computerized emission analyzers, including on-road testing devices.
(ii) No waivers for vehicles and parts covered by the emission control performance warranty...
unless a warranty remedy has been denied in writing, or for tampering-related repairs.
(iii) In view of the air quality purpose of the program, if, for any vehicle, waivers are permitted
for emissions-related repairs not covered by warranty, an expenditure to qualify for the waiver of
an amount of $450 or more for such repairs (adjusted annually as determined by the Administrator
on the basis of the Consumer Price Index...).
(iv) Enforcement through denial of vehicle registration (except for any program in operation
before [the date of the enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990] whose enforcement
mechanism is demonstrated to the Administrator to be more effective than the applicable vehicle
registration program in assuring that noncomplying vehicles are not operated on public roads).
(v) Annual emission testing and necessary adjustment, repair, and maintenance, unless the State
demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Administrator that a biennial inspection, in combination with
other features of the program which exceed the requirements of this [Act], will result in emission
reductions which equal or exceed the reductions which can be obtained through such annual
inspections.
(vi) Operation of the program on a centralized basis, unless the State demonstrates to the
satisfaction of the Administrator that a decentralized program will be equally effective. An
electronically connected testing system, a licensing system, or other measures (or any combination
thereof) may be considered, in accordance with criteria established by the Administrator, as equally
effective for such purposes.
(vii) Inspection of emission control diagnostic systems and the maintenance or repair of
malfunctions or system deterioration identified by or affecting such diagnostics systems.
Clean Air Act § 182(c)(3)(C), 42 U.S.C.A. § 751 la(c)(3)(C) (West 1995). Each state was required to prepare
biannual reports for EPA on the efficacy of its enhanced IM program. Id.
276. Clean Air Act § 182(c)(3)(C)(iv), 42 U.S.C.A. § 751 la(c)(3)(C) (West 1995).
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tive.277 Finally, states that allowed waivers from repair requirements for especially
expensive repairs could not set the waiver ceiling below $450.278
4. Sanctions
The 1990 Amendments provided that if a state failed to submit a plan that met
the minimal criteria for plan submission, submitted an inadequate plan, or failed
to implement any provision of an approved SIP, EPA could elect one of two
sanctions against the state. First, the Administrator could impose a prohibition on
the award of certain federal highway funds for the area subject to the sanction.
Second, the Administrator could limit the construction or modification of major
new sources in the area by requiring two-for-one offsets in the permit process that
was applicable to major new stationary sources.27 9 The first sanction was avail-
able under the 1977 amendments. The second sanction represents something of
a retreat from the new source moratorium of the 1977 Amendments. In addition,
EPA was obliged to give the affected state eighteen months to cure the defect
before invoking the sanction. Finally, any area that failed to attain the standards
by the new deadline would be automatically "bumped up" to the next higher
classification and would have to implement all additional requirements applicable
to that category.280
G. EPA's Inspection and Maintenance Regulations
1. The Proposed Rule
Soon after President Bush signed the 1990 Amendments, EPA undertook an
extensive public outreach process in which it attempted to elicit the views of a
broad range of potentially affected people and institutions. The agency naively
hoped that it could forge a consensus on the need for I/M and on the proper tech-
niques for conducting basic and enhanced J/M programs.281 At first, it looked like
EPA's consensus-building efforts would succeed. Nearly everyone who
277. Clean Air Act § 182(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 751 la(a)(2)(B) (West 1995).
278. Clean Air Act § 182(c)(3)(C)(iii), 42 U.S.C.A. § 751 la(c)(3)(C)(iii) (West 1995).
279. Clean Air Act § 179(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7509(b) (West 1995).
280. Clean Air Act § 181(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7511(b)(2) (West 1995).
281. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property and Nuclear Safety of
the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works (1995) (statement of Mary D. Nichols, Assistant
Administrator for Air and Radiation, EPA), available at 1995 WL 408045, *5 (copy on file with the Pacific
Law Journal) [hereinafter Hearings: Statement of Mary D. Nichols] ("After the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990 became law, EPA initiated an extensive public participation and outreach process to develop a
consensus on how to proceed with enhanced 1/M regulations.").
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contributed to the initial outreach process, including the affected states, supported
centralized testing at test-only facilities using high-tech equipment.
EPA issued a proposal for enhanced I/M guidelines and for revising its basic
IM guidelines on July 13, 1992, nearly eight months after the statutory deadline
for the issuance offinal guidelines.23 The agency proposed a model program for
basic I/M that was identical to the I/M model program that EPA had implemented
under the 1977 Amendments in which the state could implement a test-and-repair
regime using the simple idle test." The agency proposed to require a minimum
repair expenditure of $75 for pre-1981 vehicles and $200 for 1981 and later
vehicles.n The bulk of the proposal was devoted to the enhanced IM that would
replace basic IYM in the most heavily polluted areas.
In the agency's view, the effectiveness of an I/M program depended upon its
"ability to accurately fail problem cars and pass clean cars," a "comprehensive
quality control and aggressive enforcement" policy and "skillful diagnostics and
capable mechanics." 2 6 The agency found that these critical elements were
"lacking" in most of the I/M programs that the states had adopted pursuant to the
1977 Amendments. 7 EPA auditors found problems in many areas, including
"excessive waivers, motorist noncompliance, inadequate quality assurance and
quality control measures, outdated test procedures, insufficient enforcement
against inspectors that violate regulations, inadequate data collection and analysis,
inadequate resources, and improper testing."' 8 Covert EPA audits of state I/M
programs revealed that about one-half of the inspections at existing test-and-
repair stations were conducted improperly.2 9 To EPA this suggested that the
states were not enforcing their SIPs adequately.29 Similar audits revealed that
state efforts to educate I/M mechanics were "often poor or nonexistent."29'
There were technical problems with the state regimes as well. The simple idle
test had worked well for pre-1981 automobiles with carburetors rather than com-
puterized ignition systems because typical emission control problems involved
"rich" air/fuel mixtures that affected idle as well as cruising emissions. In the day
and age of computerized ignition systems, effective inspections involved "cycles
282. See id. ("Almost all sectors-industry, states, and environmental groups-strongly supported a high
performance standard for enhanced T/M, one that would involve both advanced testing procedures and
separation of testing from repair to make the programs effective.").
283. Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance Requirements for State Implementation Plans, 57 Fed. Reg.
at 31,058.
284. Id. at 31,062.
285. Id. at 31,072.
286. Id. at 31,059.
287. Id.
288. Id at 31,075.
289. Id. at 31,059.
290. Id.
291. Id.
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of acceleration and deceleration under loaded conditions." 292 For similar reasons,
simple visual inspection was rarely sufficient to determine whether the emissions
control system is working properly.2 93 More importantly, the I/M tests typically
employed in existing regimes were incapable of detecting NO. emissions and
excess running emissions caused by leaks at various points in the fuel system.294
Finally, EPA was concerned about the potential for fraud in existing test-and-
repair regimes that allowed local service stations to inspect automobiles, to repair
the autos that flunked the tests and to check whether the repairs were successful
in a single session. Since the service station made money on the test and repairs
there was a perverse incentive to issue the required certification, whether or not
the repairs were successfully completed.295 EPA and state audits showed that the
test-and-repair regime using relatively sophisticated BAR90 testing devices
passed vehicles that should have failed about 30% of the time.296 The audits also
demonstrated that states employing decentralized systems lacked both the
authority and the enforcement resources to pursue miscreant testing facilities
aggressively.2 97 The agency noted that "[e]ven very tightly designed and run
quality assurance schemes in decentralized systems have not insured that proper
inspections take place, that forms are adequately controlled, or that the program
actually achieves estimated emission reductions."298 Although recognizing that
centralized programs "are not completely immune" to fraud and tampering, it
would be virtually impossible to test vehicles improperly with high-tech testing
equipment.299 Similarly, in a centralized test-only system it would be very
difficult for a vehicle owner to bribe the tester/repairperson or to "game" the
system by doping gasoline with additives or disconnecting vacuum hoses.313 The
results of EPA audits indicating that tampering rates were 20% to 50% higher in
areas using decentralized testing suggested that centralized regimes were more
effective in deterring tampering 01
The agency therefore expressed a strong preference for testing at centralized
"test-only" facilities, but did not require that all testing facilities be operated by
292. Id.
293. Id. Visual inspection was useful primarily in detecting tampering and evidence of misfueling.
Misfueling is fortunately a thing of the past with the phase-out of leaded gasoline, and tampering is very
difficult to accomplish with computerized emission control technologies. Id.
294. Id.
295. Dana Wilkie, Lawmakers Shun Federal Smog Plan, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 1, 1993, at A3.
296. Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance Requirements for State Implementation Plans, 57 Fed. Reg.
at 31,076.
297. Id. at 31,078. The agency concluded that "[1]ack of authority, low fines or penalties, and lack of
consistent and systematic penalty schedules have appeared as serious impediments to program enforcement
in audits of decentralized programs across the country." Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 31,069.
301. Id. at 31,075.
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the same entity.30 EPA was firm in concluding that "it is not possible for a
decentralized test-and-repair program to meet the proposed performance standard
for enhanced I/M, regardless of the test type or vehicle class coverage," 303 but it
acknowledged that the statute allowed states an opportunity to convince the
agency that a test-and-repair program would be equally effective as the model
centralized program.3 4 To avoid delays in the event of failure, however, EPA
announced that it would not approve any test-and-repair regime as enhanced I/M
unless the state legislation creating the regime provided for automatic conversion
to a test-only regime as soon as the program failed to meet an emissions reduction
benchmark.
30 5
EPA proposed a model enhanced I/M regime requiring centralized testing
with a high-tech "IM-240" testing device that would simulate actual driving con-
ditions to allow more accurate measurement of tailpipe emissions (including NO.
emissions), employ a pressure check to find leaks in the fuel system, and check
the "purge" system that removes gasoline vapors stored in the charcoal canister
and routes them to the engine where they can be burned as fuel?06 The "cut
points" for requiring repairs would be set so as to fail only vehicles emitting at
least twice the levels of their design standards.307 To serve as a backstop, the
model program would conduct "on road" testing using remote sensing or a
selective pull-over program that would test at least 0.5% of all vehicles as they
operated on the road.3 °0 EPA was confident that the enhanced tests that it pro-
posed would be so effective that they could be conducted biennially and be just
as effective, and states could decline to test new autos for two or three years.
309
Moreover, although the equipment necessary for enhanced I/M would be much
more expensive (approximately $140,000 jler lane versus $10,000 to $15,000 for
existing equipment),310 the cost per year for biennial inspections would actually
be less than two annual inspections under the existing regime (nine dollars per
year versus eight dollars per year for centralized tests).3 The enhanced tests
would, however, take somewhat longer to perform (ten to fifteen minutes versus
five minutes). EPA noted that any I/M program would identify some vehicles
needing repairs, and that would entail unbudgeted expenses for some car owners.
The agency noted, however, that manufacturer warranties should cover many of
302. Id. at 31,066.
303. Id. at 31,067.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 31,067.
306. Id. at 31,059.
307. Id. at 31,064.
308. Id. at 31,065. Remote sensing was not, however, to serve as a substitute for periodic testing at
centralized facilities. Id.
309. Id. at 31,059, 31,065. EPA concluded that "doing the test right has proved much more important
than doing it often." Id.
310. Id. at 31,081-82.
311. Id. at 31,059.
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these costs, and it pointed out that the tests would also result in a fuel economy
savings of 7% to 13% that would largely offset repair costs? 2
Rather than mandate a particular testing regime, EPA proposed a "perfor-
mance standard" under which the states would have flexibility to use alternatives
to EPA's model requirements if they could achieve the same degree of pollution
reduction as EPA's model technology. EPA predicted that its model enhanced
I/M program would achieve emissions reductions of 28% for VOCs, 31% for
carbon monoxide, and 9% for oxides of nitrogen by the year 2000.31 The agency
therefore required that states attempting to use alternative programs demonstrate
equivalent reductions by specified benchmarks.
EPA was convinced that the proposed model testing program would not be
unduly inconvenient to the public. By far the most important factor in assessing
convenience was frequency of testing. Under the model program, as opposed to
decentralized test-and-repair alternatives, automobiles would only have to be
tested once every two years, thus increasing convenience by a factor of two. The
agency acknowledged that decentralized regimes made testing available in
hundreds or even thousands of places, whereas centralized testing facilities would
only be available at less than one hundred locations in a large city.3 14 But the
agency believed that strategically located automated facilities should not greatly
inconvenience the public. The agency noted that "[c]onvenient, contractor-run,
centralized programs are currently being operated in a wide range of large and
small cities and result from good network design, contractual requirements to
insure convenience, and competition in the bidding process. '315 It cited a survey
indicating that a majority of the surveyed motorists reported that testing centers
were conveniently located in both centralized and decentralized networks.31 6
EPA was concerned about the "ping-pong" phenomenon, under which a
driver faced the possibility of traveling back and forth between the testing facility
and repair facilities until the repair facility finally identified the malfunction that
was causing the vehicle to flunk the test. The agency noted, however, that only
10% to 20% of the tested vehicles would fail the test and thus be subject to rpairs
and retesting. The agency even expressed a willingness to allow retesting at the
repair facilities, but it cautioned that this might not yield as ffective a program.31 7
It observed that repairs needed to pass the new high-tech test might "require
greater diagnostic proficiency on the part of technicians," and repair stations in
312. Id.
313. Id. at 31,064.
314. Id. at 31,068.
315. Id.
316. Id. (citing Rnst RESEARCH, ATrruDEs AND OPINIONS REGARDING VEHICLE EMISSION TESTING
(1991), which was conducted for the Coalition for Safer Cleaner Vehicles).
317. Id. at 31,071.
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a test-only regime were, in any event, not likely to possess the expensive equip-
ment needed to retest.
3 18
One solution would be for the repair technician to take the automobile to the
centralized testing facility, but EPA had no way to guarantee that repair facilities
would be willing to undertake this additional responsibility.3 19 EPA could, how-
ever, encourage this solution by requiring testing facilities to allow repair
technicians priority access for a free retest of vehicles that failed the initial test.
EPA also proposed to require that centralized testing facilities provide diagnostic
information to owners of vehicles that failed the test and suggestions regarding
how their vehicles might be repaired. 2° More advanced computerized onboard
diagnostic systems would also prove of great value as they became available in
future model years. In addition, EPA predicted that increased demand would lead
to the development of relatively inexpensive testing equipment designed to
simulate real-world driving conditions that could be employed at repair facilities
for diagnostic purposes.
32
'
The ultimate solution to the ping-pong problem was a highly trained cadre of
mechanics at repair facilities. EPA strongly suggested that states initiate repair-
person certification programs under which only certified technicians could
perform repairs on vehicles that flunked centralized tests. The agency also recom-
mended implementing state-run technical assistance programs, with hot line
services, newsletters, and other outreach efforts, for repair persons who
encountered diagnostic difficulties. The proposed rule would also have required
a computerized technician performance monitoring program that would track the
effectiveness of individual technicians and issue them "report cards." Finally, to
ensure against a second trip back to the testing facility, EPA suggested that states
could issue a certificate of compliance to any vehicle that failed the retest after
being repaired by a certified technician and after passing a thorough physical
inspection.322
EPA recognized that the statutory $450 cutoff for required repairs in areas
needing enhanced I/M was much higher than the $50 to $75 cutoffs typically
employed in states currently employing I/M. Although EPA predicted that the
average repair would come to less than $120, the $450 cap would place an
additional burden on impecunious vehicle owners, and it could allow unscru-
pulous repair facilities to install $450 worth of repairs knowing full well that
more expensive repairs were needed to pass the test. 32 One solution was for states
simply to purchase and retire old vehicles for which $450 in repairs would either
318. Id. at 31,069.
319. Id. at 31,071.
320. Id. at 31,070.
321. Id. at 31,071.
322. Id. at 31,070.
323. Id. at 31,071.
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exceed or amount to a large share of the automobile's blue book value. Many
states had already been considering a "cash-for-clunkers" program that would
implement this solution. The program could be financed by charging higher
testing fees for all vehicles. To avoid abusive practices like raiding junkyards for
old clunkers and importing out-of-state clunkers, the vehicles would be required
to have a current registration from the nonattainment area and proof of past regis-
tration for some suitable period of time. A final solution would be for states to
allow time extensions to the owners of the vehicles requiring major repairs to
come up with the money to pay for the repairs or to sell the vehicle?'
EPA also recognized that existing test-and-repair facilities that had invested
in training and equipment that was adequate for basic testing would be opposed
to any transformation into a test-only regime that rendered such equipment
obsolete, and it proposed three approaches for mitigating the adverse impact on
existing facilities. First, states could offer direct financial assistance to stations
"either in the form of cash for recently purchased test equipment or in the form
of subsidized software or peripherals to give that equipment new functionality." 3s
Second, states could design the enhanced program to include "transitional
mechanisms" to soften the economic burden of moving to the new system. Third,
states could provide less direct assistance, such as establishing programs to "assist
stations and inspectors through retraining and retooling programs. 326
EPA calculated the overall costs and benefits of enhanced IM under its
proposed performance standard. When fully implemented in the year 2000, the
testing itself would cost about $451 million, and required repairs would total
about $710 million. There would be offsetting fuel efficiency benefits of $825
million, because testing would increase engine performance and decrease
evaporative emissions. 27 This net expenditure of $336 million would yield
268,000 tons of reduced VOC emissions and 779,000 tons of reduced carbon
monoxide emissions.
328
2. The Final Rule
In the preamble to the final rule, EPA reiterated its conclusion that the
agency's "experience over the last fifteen years has shown that the lack of federal
minimum requirements has led to less than effective I/M programs. 329
The more than 300 comments did nothing to shake EPA's conclusion that a
centralized test-only system was far preferable to a decentralized test-and-repair
324. Id. at 31,072.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 31,080.
328. Id. at 31,081.
329. Inspection/Maintenance Program Requirements, 57 Fed. Reg. at 52,953. The agency determined
that I/M programs would have to be implemented in 181 areas, 56 of which lacked any I/M program. Id.
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regime. Many states had in fact urged EPA to stick to the centralized test-only
approach. For example, both the State of California and the South Coast Air
Quality Management District asked EPA to delete a proposal to allow test-and-
repair facilities for a trial period to see if past problems could be solved.330 EPA
was unpersuaded by the arguments that decentralized systems were more con-
venient to automobile owners. In the most recent audit of the operation of decen-
tralized test-and-repair SMOGPROS stations in California, 82% of the motorists
getting tested waited for the test and only 9% dropped the vehicle off and went
to work. About 62% of those who waited remained for more than twenty minutes.
Of the 18% that failed, only 33% sought repairs elsewhere. Although the audit did
not ascertain whether the 66% who did not go elsewhere waited for the repairs to
be completed, anecdotal evidence suggested that most made appointments to
return on another day. Any added convenience to the owners over centralized
testing was therefore at best marginal.3 1 A random audit of a similar
decentralized test-and-repair system in Missouri revealed that the average wait to
get a test was forty-eight minutes, and 40% of those auditors who showed up
unannounced were told that they would have to come back another time.332 EPA
also cited a California study of the total time consumed in traveling to the facility,
administering the test and returning home that found that decentralized facilities
consumed eighty-three minutes while centralized facilities consumed about
seventy-six minutes.333 To EPA these studies reinforced other studies that demon-
strated that the wait at decentralized test-and-repair facilities was considerably
longer than at centralized test-only facilities, which EPA estimated to be about
five minutes per car.33
The comments added additional support to EPA's conclusion that test-and-
repair systems were grossly ineffective. A 1992 draft report by the California I/M
Review Committee demonstrated that "the enhanced BAR90 system being used
in California is achieving only 42% of the potential for hydrocarbons, 32% for
carbon monoxide, and 34% for hydrocarbons."335 The California report also noted
the "inherent conflict of interest between the desire of the Smog Check station to
satisfy the customer and the need to perform a proper and thorough inspection
that may cause the vehicle to fail. 336 The report concluded that while increased
enforcement could reduce the incidence of fraudulent tests, it would probably not
330. Hearings: Statement of Mary D. Nichols, supra note 281, at * 4.
331. Inspection/Maintenance Program Requirements, 57 Fed. Reg. at 52,973.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 52,974.
336. Id. at 52,972. EPA was generally of the opinion that "[tihere's a built-in conflict of interest unless
you totally separate testing and repair, [because] mechanics who run service stations have an interest in
pleasing their customers." Elliot Diringer, California Gets Air Ultimatum, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 15, 1993, at A3.
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be cost-effective.337 Similarly, New York, which also used the BAR90
decentralized test-and-repair system agreed that a 50% discount factor was
appropriate.?
The final rule adopted the proposed "performance standard" based on the
levels that could be achieved by the IM-240 testing technology, an evaporative
system integrity (pressure) test, and an evaporative system performance (purge)
test.339 The final rule also adopted the proposed rule's $450 waiver cap (EPA
presumed that this would lead to a 1% waiver rate), "cut points" to fail only
vehicles emitting twice their design standards, and requirement for on-road
testing of at least 0.5% of the subject vehicle population using either remote
sensing or a pullover program. In addition, the final rule adopted the following:
(1) The proposed rule's "report card" monitoring requirement for technician per-
formance, (2) its requirement that owners of failing vehicles be provided
diagnostic information, and (3) its additional solutions to the "ping-pong"
problem.3"4 Although many commentators requested that EPA implement a
national certification program for repair technicians, EPA decided to limit certi-
fication to those states that elected to create such programs. 342 Finally, in order to
allow existing test-and-repair facilities to recoup investments in I/M technology,
the final rule allowed states to phase out the decentralized test-and-repair portion
of the program through January 1, 1996.34
According to EPA, the IM-240 equipment was the most sophisticated equip-
ment available, and it was especially effective in detecting pollutants emitted from
vehicles employing newer pollution control technologies.34 The agency conc-
luded that the IM-240 was at least three times as effective as the best of the
existing I/M programs. 345 Following the statute, the rule required that enhanced
I/M testing be performed at a centralized facility unless a state could demonstrate
that a decentralized system was as effective as EPA's model program.3" The
regulations went on to provide that decentralized testing would be presumptively
as effective as centralized testing if the local service stations were not allowed
both to test-and-repair vehicles. By contrast, decentralized "test-and-repair"
regimes were presumptively not equivalent, and if the state did not demonstrate
337. Inspection/Maintenance Program Requirements, 57 Fed. Reg. at 52,974.
338. Id. at 52,972.
339. Id. at 52,951.
340. Id. at 52,954.
341. Id. at 52,961.
342. Id. at 52,977.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 52,953-54.
345. Id. at 52,950.
346. Id. at 52,951.
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equivalency,347 the emissions reductions that it could claim toward meeting the
performance standard (and other statutory emissions reduction goals) would have
to be discounted by 50%. EPA's justification for this hard line toward decen-
tralized test and repair programs was a series of audits that it had conducted of
such systems that revealed "egregious levels of improper testing" at test-and-
repair facilities. 8
EPA concluded that its model enhanced I/M program would reduce VOC and
carbon monoxide emissions by about one-third at a cost of about $500 per ton for
VOC emissions.349 This was a good deal more cost-effective than some of EPA's
stationary source standards that cost up to $10,000 per ton.350 EPA later predicted
that moving to a centralized test-only regime in seriously polluted areas would
help achieve the NAAQS at a savings of about $1 billion? 51
For basic I/M programs, EPA also promulgated a performance standard, but
it varied only slightly from the I/M programs in place under the 1977 Amend-
ments. 352 In particular, it was not based on the IM-240 technology and was there-
fore not nearly as stringent.353 Centralized testing was not required, and there was
no presumption in favor of "test only" programs. EPA predicted that a city could
meet the basic I/M performance standard by using "a reasonably comprehensive,
conventional [decentralized] test-and-repair system. 354
3. Judicial Review
The final I/M rule was challenged in the D.C. Circuit by the National Auto-
mobile Dealers Association and several environmental groups who also chal-
lenged EPA's policy of approving "committal SIPs" for I/M programs.3 55 In a
May 4, 1994 opinion, the court held that EPA's committal SIP policy was
unlawful, but rejected the challenges to EPA's I/M regulations.
NRDC challenged EPA's extension of the November 5, 1992 deadline by
which enhanced J/M programs in serious, severe, and extreme areas were to "take
effect."356 The final rule required that states have enhanced I/M programs fully
implemented by 1996 with looser cutpoints and by 1998 with more stringent cut-
points. The court agreed with EPA that the congressional mandate that enhanced
347. The final regulations dropped the "provisional equivalency" suggestion of the proposed regulations
in which a state could presume that a decentralized test-and-repair regime was equivalent to EPA's model for
a period of time until equivalency could be demonstrated. Id. at 52,950.
348. Id. at 52,959.
349. Hearings: Statement of Mary D. Nichols, supra note 281, at *2-3.
350. Id.
351. Id. at *3.
352. Inspection/Maintenance Program Requirements, 57 Fed. Reg. at 52,954.
353. Id. at 52,959.
354. Id.
355. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 22 F.3d 1125, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
356. Id. at 1137.
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I/M programs "take effect" within two years meant only that the state had to
adopt all necessary statutory and regulatory authority, not that the state had to
have a fully implemented program by then.357 The court mentioned only in
passing that EPA had not even promulgated its enhanced J/M regulations by the
November 1992 deadline.358 According to the court, "it strains credulity to assert
that Congress expected states simultaneously to undertake the legal legwork
necessary to implement a wholly new enhanced I/M program and to begin, much
less complete, the task of getting such a program up and running within a year of
promulgation of the EPA's guidance."3 59 The court also rejected NRDC's argu-
ment that EPA was arbitrary and capricious in choosing the deadlines that it did
for full implementation.36
NRDC's most serious challenge was to the enhanced I/M standards them-
selves. NRDC argued that the final rule employed unduly lenient testing methods
in order to dilute the enhanced I/M performance standard and that EPA used the
weak performance standard, in turn, to justify allowing biennial testing. In parti-
cular, NRDC challenged EPA's decision to exempt older automobiles from many
testing requirements, arguing that EPA was obliged to require the most stringent
testing that was technologically feasible for all automobiles.36' The court found
that EPA had not been arbitrary and capricious in concluding that the costs of
imposing IM-240 "high tech" inspection requirements on pre-1986 autos greatly
exceeded the benefits.362 The agency could sensibly conclude that idle tests would
suffice for older carbureted, noncomputerized models, but would be insufficient
for newer cars, which come equipped with sensors and computers that continually
adjust emissions. But the statute did not provide EPA with discretion to exempt
any vehicles from visual inspection to detect tampering.
3 63
The court next took up the National Automobile Dealers Association
(NADA) claims that EPA's enhanced model I/M program reflected an unlawful
and arbitrary bias against decentralized test-and-repair networks. NADA first
argued that EPA had no authority to impose a 50% penalty on such systems for
purposes of meeting the performance standard. The court, however, found
nothing in the language of the statute to preclude EPA from levying a 50%
penalty on states that could not demonstrate equivalency. Moreover, the evidence
in the record "amply" supported EPA's conclusion that decentralized test-and-
repair regimes were only about one-half as effective as centralized test-only
regimes. The court observed:
357. Id. at 1137-38.
358. Id. at 1138 n.15.
359. Id. at 1138.
360. Id. at 1139-40.
361. Id. at 1142-43.
362. Id. at 1144.
363. Id.
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The fundamental problems with these networks appear to be the
incompetence of unlicensed and ill-trained testers and the inherent
incentive on the part of testers simply to pass cars along for a quick fee
(or the customer's satisfaction) instead of engaging in time-consuming
repairs. The audits also revealed that testers frequently pass the vehicles
of familiar customers, and that customers sometimes "shop" test-and-
repair stations in search of a free pass?'
The agency also reasonably concluded that a decentralized test-only system was
presumptively equivalent to a centralized test-only system based on the same
audits of test and repair networks. 65 Finally, the court held that EPA was not
arbitrary and capricious in using the IM-240 testing vehicle as the model for the
performance-based equivalency determination. According to the court, the agency
reasonably rejected the alternative BAR90 test that was in effect in some test-and-
repair programs.
V. THE COLLAPSE OF THE 1990 INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE REGIME
A. Progress Under the 1990 Amendments
Congress hoped that the exceedingly complex, but relatively stringent 1990
Amendments would bring about relatively rapid improvements in air quality in
less polluted areas and significant progress over a fairly short period in more
heavily polluted areas. In 1991, just after the amendments were signed, there were
ninety-eight nonattainment areas for photochemical oxidants and forty-two areas
that did not meet the standards for carbon monoxide.3 67 The statute envisioned
that all but one of the carbon monoxide nonattainment areas would be in attain-
ment by December 31, 1995,36 and that seventy-four of the ninety-eight ozone
nonattainment areas would attain the standards by November 15, 199669
364. Id. at 1149.
365. Id. The court did not explain how audits of test-and-repair networks demonstrate the equivalence
of centralized and decentralized test-only networks.
366. Id.
367. 1991 EMISSIONS TRENDS REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-4, 1-10; National Ambient Air Quality
Standards: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations and the Subcomm. on Health and
Environment of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 124 (1995) (statement of Mary D. Nichols,
Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, EPA) [hereinafter National Ambient Air Quality Standards:
Statement of Mary D. Nichols].
368. Clean Air Act § 186(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7512(a)(1) (West 1995). Only one carbon monoxide
nonattainment area met the statutory definition for "serious"; the remaining 41 were designated "moderate."
See 1991 EMISSIONS TRENDS REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-4.
369. Clean Air Act § 181(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7511(a)(1) (West 1995). EPA designated 43 ozone
nonattainment areas "marginal" and 31 "moderate." 1991 EMISSIONS TRENDS REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-10.
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Although the results are mixed, it is clear that significant progress has been
made in modestly polluted areas. According to EPA, only nine areas are currently
in nonattainment for carbon monoxide, and fifty-five of the seventy-four marginal
and moderate areas currently meet the standard for photochemical oxidants. On
the other hand, only eight of the forty-two carbon monoxide and twenty-two of
the seventy-four ozone areas have formally been redesignated as being in attain-
ment, because formal redesignation must await three-years' worth of monitoring
data.370 In addition, eight of the forty-two carbon monoxide nonattainment areas
apparently did not meet the primary NAAQS by the new deadline,37' and it is
likely that ten to twenty marginal and moderate areas will fail to meet the
November 15, 1996 deadline for photochemical oxidants. Finally, ambient levels
of nitrogen dioxide have actually risen since 1970 due primarily to a 14% in-
crease in NO, emissions from power plants and non-road vehicles.3 72 Although
only one area (Los Angeles) is currently in nonattainment for NOx, 373 the
increases in emissions is troubling because of the role that NO, plays in the for-
mation of photochemical oxidants.
Despite significant progress in some states, others are making very little pro-
gress. A 1995 report prepared by Clean Air Network found that little or no pro-
gress was being made in Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Texas, and Virginia, and
that fifteen other states were making only minimal progress. 3 74 The bottom line
is that despite significant progress, more than 90 million people live in counties
that are in nonattainment for carbon monoxide and photochemical oxidants, and
many of those counties are still experiencing days during which pollution levels
are quite high.3 75 At the same time, some areas that have been in attainment for
years or that have been nearly in attainment are now at risk of going non-
370. Among the areas that have formally been redesignated as in attainment for ozone are Indianapolis,
Toledo, Detroit, Winston-Salem, Memphis, and San Francisco. Areas now meeting the standards for carbon
monoxide include Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Cleveland, Memphis, Syracuse, and Winston-Salem.
See NationalAmbient Air Quality Standards: Statement of Mary D. Nichols, supra note 367, at 126. Some of
these areas may not retain that status for long. For example, Detroit may have to be redesignated "non-
attainment" in light of recording its fourth exceedence of the primary standard in the last three years. See
Hearings on Clean Air Act Oversight Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation and the Subcomm.
on Health and Environment of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 20 (1995) (statement of Dennis
Drake, Chief, Air Quality Division, Michigan Department of Environmental Quality) [hereinafter Hearings
Clean AirAct Oversight: State of Dennis Drake].
371. These areas will presumably be "bumped up" to the status of "serious" nonattainment areas for
which the statutory deadline is December 31, 2000.
372. National Ambient Air Quality Standards: Statement of Mary D. Nichols, supra note 367, at 125.
373. 1991 EMISSIONS TRENDS REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-8.
374. Several States Make Little or No Progress in Meeting AirAct Requirements, Report Says, 26 Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 1286 (Dec. 1, 1995).
375. Hearings on the Clean Air Act before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Governmental Affairs of the
Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong. 34 (1995) (testimony of Mary D. Nichols, Assistant
Administrator for Air and Radiation, EPA).
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attainment.3 6 Although this phenomenon is attributable to some extent to the very
hot weather that the United States experienced in the summer of 1995, increased
vehicle traffic in growing urban areas may have also played a role.
B. State Reactions to the 1994 Elections
The 1994 elections did not just change the landscape of Congress. Soon after
the 104th Congress convened, representatives of several state organizations,
including the National Governors' Association and the Environmental Council
of the States, drafted a long list of sixty-five proposals for "improving" the imple-
mentation of the Clean Air Act. Among other things, the sixty-five proposals
included (1) a two year moratorium on the initiation of any sanctions against any
state for failure to meet its obligations when the state acted in good faith, (2) EPA
approval "committal SIPs" that adopted controls sufficient to produce a
"substantial portion" of emissions reductions and promised to adopt additional
controls in the future, and (3) revisions in the enhanced I/M requirements to do
away with the preference for centralized test-only facilities and to allow states to
adopt as enhanced J/M programs that were "only slightly more stringent" than
basic JIM.3"7
Under the leadership of Governors George Allen of Virginia and Christine
Todd Whitman of New Jersey, representatives of several states met with EPA
Assistant Administrator Mary Nichols on January 18, 1995 to present their pro-
posals. After an all-day meeting, EPA officials essentially declared an uncon-
ditional surrender. 78 State officials expressed their pleasure with EPA's new-
found flexibility. The head of the State and Territorial Air Pollution Program
Administrators and Association of Local Air Pollution Control Officials reported
that the "states were extremely pleased with the level of cooperation and respon-
siveness that EPA provided at the meeting."
379
EPA Administrator Browner denied that EPA was sacrificing clean air goals
in its attempts to be more flexible with respect to the states: "We tried to give
376. Higher Temperatures Prompt Exceedances of EPA's Ambient Air Standard for Ozone, 26 Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 862 (Sept. 1, 1995). At least 10 of the 61 areas designated as in attainment suffered at
least one exceedence of the ozone standard during the summer of 1995. Id. The Detroit area, which had only
recently been one of the success stories by achieving attainment status prior to 1995, suffered several
exceedences during the summer of 1995. Id.
377. Moratorium on Sanctions Under Clean Air Act Among Dozens of EPA Actions Sought by States,
25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1828 (Jan. 27, 1995) [hereinafter Moratorium on Sanctions Under Clean Air
Act].
378. Gary Lee, Compromising on Clean AirAct; UnderRepublican Pressure, EPA Reduces Enforcement
Efforts, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1996, at Al; see Hearings on Clean Air Act Oversight Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 19 (1995) (statement of Carol
M. Browner, Administrator, EPA) [hereinafter Hearings on Clean AirAct Oversight: Statement of Carol M.
Browner] ("EPA agreed to almost every recommendation from the states.").
379. Moratorium on Sanctions Under Clean Air Act, supra note 377, at 1828.
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state officials as much flexibility as possible in reaching the goals set under the
act. But we did not relax a single standard for improving air quality. We are not
backtracking on the objectives of the statute.,, 380 Browner hoped that by avoiding
a showdown with those who would gut the Clean Air Act, the agency's strategic
retreat would avoid disastrous amendments.3" The retreat, however, quickly
became a rout. From that date forward, EPA backed down from virtually every
confrontation with state officials.
C. Continued Resistance to Inspection and Maintenance and the Demise of
IM-240
According to EPA, automobile inspection and maintenance programs are
"critical" to the nation's efforts at improving air quality.8 2 Yet most states remain
bitterly opposed the concept. Although EPA had compiled a solid administrative
record to support its strong preference for centralized test-only I/M programs, the
battle was far from over. The same local car dealers and service stations that
opposed centralized test-only I/M in Congress, in the rulemaking hearings, and
in court continued to fight for decentralized test-and-repair regimes in the state
legislatures.
1. California
When Pete Wilson was running for Governor of California in 1990, he
garnered many environmentalist votes by promising to be a Teddy Roosevelt-
style conservationist.38 3 Among other things, he promised to create a new cabinet-
level Environmental Protection Agency to consolidate the regulatory functions
of several state agencies, including the CARB.384 Soon after he was elected,
Wilson confidently predicted: "We are going to take charge of California's
380. Lee, supra note 378, at Al; see Hearings on Clean Air Act Oversight: Statement of Carol M.
Browner, supra note 377, at 19.
381. Lee, supra note 378, at Al. According to Browner "There are some in Congress who believe that
the Clean Air Act should be repealed. By giving the states flexibility in enforcing the law, we hope to avoid
a congressional fight over the act." Id.
382. Hearings on Clean AirAct Oversight:. Statement of Mary D. Nichols, supra note 54, at 175.
383. James P. Sweeney, Governor a Letdown to 'Green' Boosters, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 27,
1993, at Al.
384. Robert B. Gunnison, Wilson Seeks State EPA To Coordinate Regulation, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 18,
1991, at Al. Wilson's promise to create a new CalEPA came in response to the unsuccessful "Big Green"
initiative that was also on the 1990 ballot. Wilson opposed the environmentalist initiative, but promised to
create a powerful agency to address the state's environmental problems. Daniel C. Carson, James Strock Takes
Decisive Approach to Environment Post, SAN DmO UNiO N-TRB., Nov. 24, 1991, at A3.
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environment in the 1990s. ''3M He hoped that the creation of a CalEPA, "[would]
prove useful both in terms of a better physical environment, a safer physical
environment and also, hopefully, a clearer regulatory picture for those who are
regulated. 386 Wilson was so certain that he could convince the legislature to
create the new agency that he announced that he planned to appoint James M.
Strock, the thirty-four-year-old Assistant Administrator for Enforcement at the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency during the Bush Administration, to head
the agency as soon as the bill was passed.3 87 Standing next to Wilson at a press
conference, Strock promised to establish "a Cal-EPA that is tough, smart, creative
and vigorous in its protection of our environment and public health."388 He
believed that vigorous enforcement of the environmental laws "not only protects
the public health, but it also assures that good corporate citizenship is not under-
cut by ill-gotten gains accruing to unscrupulous competitors."389 Both industry
and environmental group representatives applauded Wilson's selection. 9°
During hearings on the creation of the new cabinet level agency, Strock
promised not to interfere with the independence of the environmental boards, like
CARB, that would come under the new agency's authority.391 But Strock soon
proposed a plan for consolidating and speeding up environmental permitting that
would have taken away from the boards and local governments several of their
traditional powers and vested them in regional boards appointed by the gover-
nor.392 Environmentalists and many state legislators complained that this
restructuring was designed primarily to address business complaints that state and
local permit actions took too long. They worried that the move would undermine
powerful local boards like the South Coast Air Quality Management District
(SCAQMD) that had traditionally taken strong environmental positions on
permitting issues.393 Strock denied that the proposal was motivated by any desire
to relax environmental standards?'
The legislature soon expressed its displeasure with Strock's failure to consult
the relevant legislative committees before announcing major new reorganizational
initiatives that could adversely effect agencies like the CARB and SCAQMD.
385. Robert B. Gunnison, EPA Aide Picked as State Environment Boss, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 30, 1991, at
A3 [hereinafter Gunnison, EPA Aide Picked as State Environment Boss]; Richard C. Paddock, Wilson Picks
U.S. Official to Run 'Cal-EPA,' L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1991, at A3.
386. Paddock, supra note 385, at A3.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.; Gunnison, EPA Aide Picked as State Environment Boss, supra note 385, at A3.
391. Ann Bancroft, Lawmakers Criticize Proposal for State EPA, S.F. CHRON., May 23, 1991, at A24.
392. Virginia Ellis & William Trombley, Central Environmental Licensing Process Urged, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 1992, at A3.
393. Todd Woody, Cal-EPA Ambushed by Legislators, THE RECORDER, Apr. 13, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter
Woody, Cal-EPA Ambushed by Legislators]; Ellis & Trombley, supra note 392, at A3.
394. Ellis & Trombley, supra note 392, at A3.
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Assemblymember Byron Scher complained to the Budget Committee that instead
of improving environmental protection, the new agency "seems more intent on
seizing control over existing environmental protection programs." 395 Speaker of
the California Assembly Willie Brown, having played a role in the agency's
creation,396 complained that CaIEPA had improperly used funds from a CARB
account for auto pollution programs to fund more than one half of CalEPA's
budget.397 Budget committees in both houses later proposed severe cuts in the new
agency's budget.398
Surprised by the vehemence of the legislature's negative reaction to the
agency's initial reorganizational efforts, Strock set about some serious fence
mending in anticipation of his confirmation hearings in June.99 Strock and his
underlings spent much time during the next several weeks roaming the halls of
the legislature attempting to soothe ruffled feathers by promising to limit his
agency to a coordinating, rather than a supervisory role.4°° Although the agency's
budget took a significant hit, Strock's conciliatory stance and a well-orchestrated
barrage of letters of support from industry ensured his confirmation and the
continued existence of CalEPA.4' Struggling to deal with an unexpected budget
deficit of $10 billion resulting from a serious recession, the legislature had little
time or inclination to engage the governor in a battle over a relatively minor state
agency. 402
Not long after its creation, the new CalEPA began to draw rave reviews from
the California business community. Praising the agency's "new spirit of co-
operation," the head of the Santa Clara County Manufacturing Group noted that
the CARB "seems more interested in talking to business. 4 3 State environmental
groups reserved judgment. The League of Conservation Voters in late 1993
graded Wilson's environmental performance and awarded him a "C.
'
,14
Governor Wilson had also promised during the gubernatorial campaign to do
something about the enormous growth in population in the state's urban areas and
395. Woody, Cal-EPA Ambushed by Legislators, supra note 393, at 1.
396. Dana Wilkie, State EPA Draws Fire From Brown, SAN DIE UNION-TRIB., Mar. 18, 1992, at A3.
Among other things, Brown was expressing irritation at CalEPA's failure to provide information to the
legislature and its failure to complete a study on the disposal of used tires.
397. Woody, Cal-EPA Ambushed by Legislators, supra note 393, at 1.
398. Id.
399. Todd Woody, After Rough Start, Strock Likely to Be Confirmed, THE RECORDER, June 10, 1992,
at 3 [hereinafter Woody, After Rough Start, Strock Likely to Be Confirmed].
400. Id.
401. Id.; Todd Woody, Cal-EPA's Strock Awaits Confirmation, THE RECORDER, July 6, 1992, at 2
[hereinafter Woody, Cal-EPA's Strock Awaits Confirmation].
402. Woody, After Rough Start, Strock Likely to Be Confirmed,. supra note 399, at 3.
403. Jack Martin, Business Backing, Business People Support California Environmental Protection
Agency, BUS. J., Feb. 17, 1992, at S17.
404. James P. Sweeney, Study Gives Wilson An Environmental 'C,' SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 21,
1993, at A3.
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the adverse effects of the resulting urban sprawl.40 In early July 1991, the gover-
nor appointed a fifteen member Growth Management Council to hold hearings
and make recommendations on a comprehensive growth management plan for the
state.4 6 The governor's director of Policy and Research, who chaired the Com-
mission, reported that he and Wilson shared the belief that the state would have
to play a major rule in growth related issues like air pollution and traffic con-
gestion.4°7 By the middle of March 1992, the Growth Management Council had
submitted wide-ranging recommendations, but it was becoming clear that
economic decline, rather than population growth, had climbed to the top of the
Governor's agenda.4m As the economic recession in California deepened in early
1992, the governor became more concerned with improving the state's business
climate than with managing growth and its environmental consequences.4°9 The
Growth Management Council was soon overshadowed by the newly created
Council on California Competitiveness, headed by former Los Angeles Olympic
Games organizer Peter V. Ueberroth, that was charged with attracting new busi-
nesses and keeping existing businesses from fleeing the state.41°
Increasingly, retaining existing industries and preventing job loss over-
whelmed environmental protection in the state's hierarchy of goals.'" Several
reports, including one issued by the Ueberroth Council on Competitiveness, cited
California's regulatory climate as a primary reason for the flight of companies
from that state.412 Governor Wilson announced in December 1992, that "we are
going to try to undo all of these different layers of regulation" that Ueberroth had
called "a job killing machine.' 3 Wilson ordered all of the state agencies to
review their policies, regulations, and permit procedures with an eye toward
reducing red tape.4 14 To administer this "red tape initiative," Governor Wilson
created a new cabinet-level agency called the Department of Trade and Com-
405. William Trombley, Wilson Attacks Problems Tied to Growth, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1991, at A3
[hereinafter Trombley, Wilson Attacks Problems Tied to Growth]; William Trombley, Wilson Has Yet to Act
on Growth Plan, L.A. TIM , Mar. 9, 1992, at A3 [hereinafter Trombley, Wilson Has Yet to Act on Growth
Plan].
406. Ron Sonenshine, Dire Warnings On Development In California, S.F. CHRON., July 16, 1991, at A3.
407. Trombley, Wilson Attacks Problems Tied to Growth, supra note 405, at A3.
408. Trombley, Wilson Has Yet to Act on Growth Plan. supra note 405, at A3.
409. Louise Kehoe, Backlash in Golden State-After Years of Leading the Green Movement,
Californians Have Had Enough, FIN. TIMEs, Apr. 22, 1992, at 15; Trombley, Wilson Has Yet to Act on Growth
Plan, supra note 405, at A1S.
410. Trombley, Wilson Has Yet to Act on Growth Plan, supra note 405, at A3.
411. Robert Reinhold, California, Struggling in Slump, Faces High Hurdles to Recovery, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 1992, at Al.
412. Howard Fine, Wilson Steps Up Drive to Reduce Regs on Business, ORANGE COuNTY BUS. J., Dec.
21, 1992, at I [hereinafter Fine, Wilson Steps Up Drive to Reduce Regs on Business]; Michael Parrish, State's
Regulators Laying a Gentler Hand on Business, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1993, at Al.
413. Fine, Wilson Steps Up Drive to Reduce Regs on Business, supra note 412, at 1.
414. Id.
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merce 415 The business community, however, kept up the pressure on the clearly
sympathetic governor. The chairman of the Industrial League of Orange County
opined: "There has been an awful lot of good talk of streamlining state regu-
lations, but so far, we have not seen any results at all."416 Responding to this
criticism, CalEPA head James Strock ordered a detailed study of the burden of
California regulations on businesses and solicited ideas from industry on how
costs could be shaved. 7 Yet despite the concern for the state's business climate,
Strock wrote EPA in August 1992, in support of the centralized test-only I/M
option, and expressed concern over "strong pressure from participants in our
current smog-check program to preserve the status quo.'4
18
By the spring of 1993, however, environmental groups were growing
nervous. Sensing that the Wilson Administration was beginning to side with
industry in most environmental disputes, they began to brace themselves "for an
all-out attack on environmental regulation under the guise of spurring economic
growth in the state."419 This concern was well justified. Within months, Strock
was singing a very different tune, and close observers were suggesting that
partisan politics, not technological progress, was responsible for the change.
420
Under heavy pressure from service station owners and with the active en-
couragement of the CalEPA head Strock, the state legislature refused to enact
legislation providing for a centralized test-only enhanced I/M system.42  Strock
and Governor Wilson had become convinced that the existing decentralized test-
and-repair system based on a somewhat improved BAR90 technology would be
more effective than EPA's preferred decentralized test-only system based on IM-
240. State officials expressed confidence in the integrity of the existing biennial
decentralized test-and-repair system, despite a December 1992 "sting" operation
in Los Angeles in which 32 service mechanics and station owners were arrested
for fraudulently issuing almost 100,000 bogus smog certificates, nearly 3% of all
certificates issued in Los Angeles for the year!42 The service stations were able
to fool the statewide computers by entering the serial number of a heavily
polluting car into the computer while inserting the smog check probe into a clean
burning auto.4u Pointing out that a fraudulent certificate could be purchased for
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Dirty-Air Politics, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 28, 1994, at B8.
419. Daniel M. Weintraub, Wilson Juggles Ecology and Jobs, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1993, at A3.
420. Dirty-Air Politics, supra note 418, at B8.
421. Elliot Diringer, California Gets Air Ultimatum, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 15, 1993, at A3; Greg Lucas,
EPA Plan for CleanerAir, S.F. CHRON., May 24, 1993, at Al.
422. Maria La Ganga, 32 Arrested in Sting Aimed at Fraudulent Smog Checks, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18,
1992, at Al.
423. Id.
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about $50-60, Los Angeles District Attorney Gil Garcetti reported that "Los
Angeles is known as the Smog Check fraud capital of California. ' 24
As the November 15, 1993 deadline for submitting enhanced I/M SIPs for
serious, severe, and extreme urban nonattainment areas loomed on the not-too-
distant horizon, EPA began to worry that states like California had no intention
of complying with the statutory requirement. Reacting to reports that California
intended to submit an enhanced I/M plan that would allow testing and repairs to
take place at the same facility,425 EPA Administrator Browner and Secretary of
Transportation Fredrico Pena, on April 13, 1993, threatened California Governor
Pete Wilson with a cutoff of $1.7 billion in highway funds and two-for-one offset
sanctions if the state did not submit an adequate enhanced I/M program in a
timely fashion. 26 Nevertheless, abandoning test-and-repair was difficult in the
face of determined opposition from service station owners who stood to lose
almost $450 million per year in inspection and repair business if the state moved
to a centralized test-only system.427 Strock estimated that moving to the EPA-
preferred regime would cost the state 3000 jobs and cause up to 1300 businesses
to close.42s This prediction came at a time in which many businesspersons and
public officials were complaining that environmental regulations were causing an
"out-migration" ofjobs from California to other states.429 Invoking a popular anti-
regulatory theme, a spokesperson for Governor Wilson maintained that California
merely opposed EPA's "one-size-fits-all" approach to the enhanced I/M program
and promised that California would submit an equally effective program that paid
attention to the interests of California consumers and "small business em-
ployers. 43 ° Strock urged EPA to consider California's "unique" concern for
environmental protection and the severe economic downturn that the state was
suffering.431
After months of legislative paralysis, it looked as if EPA and the state had
reached a compromise in late August. In a letter to California state senator Robert
Presley, Administrator Browner agreed to a program in which all autos would
have to be tested at centralized test-only facilities, but the car would have to be
returned to the centralized facility to verify repairs only if it had been a "gross
emitter.A32 Local environmental groups hoped that this would achieve a break-
424. Id.
425. State Warned of Possible Sanctions for Failure to Enhance Smog Check Program, 24 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 3, at 154 (May 21, 1993) [hereinafter State Warned of Possible Sanctions].
426. Diringer, supra note 421, at A3; State Warned of Possible Sanctions, supra note 425, at 154.
427. Lucas, supra note 421, at Al.
428. Id.
429. Mary B. Barber, Is California Driving Business Out of the State?, CAL. J., May 1, 1993, at 9.
430. State Warned of Possible Sanctions, supra note 425, at 154.
431. Dale Vargas, Wilson Blasts Federal Threat Over Car Smog Checks, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 23,
1993, at BI.
432. Maria Cone & Melissa Healy, Plan to Revamp State Smog Check Endorsed by EPA, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 27, 1993, at A3 (explaining how Browner agreed to be more flexible in California's smog check system).
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through in the stalled negotiations.433 Members of the State Assembly, however,
did not approve of the compromise and continued to press for a test-and-repair
system with greater enforcement of anti-fraud measures. 434 A California lobbyist
reported that: "Some legislators are just itching for a fight with the EPA, saying:
'We dare you to impose sanctions."4 35 Assembly Speaker Willie Brown, a pro-
minent Democrat, opined: "No way in the world.., would Clinton cut off high-
way funds.'436 A consultant to the Senate Transportation Committee noted:
"They're talking big, but we have a hard time believing Bill Clinton would shut
California down in the middle of a gubernatorial election." 437 A CalEPA official
warned, however, that EPA would have to impose sanctions in light of
California's intransigence, because "if they don't, everybody in the nation will
know that the EPA is just full of hot air.' 438
The Wilson Administration also declined to sign on to the compromise, pre-
ferring instead to call EPA's bluff.439 Throughout, CalEPA head William Strock
maintained that California's test-and-repair program was just as effective as cen-
tralized test-only VIM."4 In support of California's recalcitrant position, Strock
quoted General Patton: "Never tell people how to do things .... Tell them what
to do and they will surprise you by their ingenuity.'
Under heavy lobbying pressure from service station owners, the Senate
Transportation Committee, on August 31, 1993, rejected the compromise bill and
substituted a program favored by Governor Wilson that added little to the state's
existing biennial "Smog Check" program.4 2 CalEPA head Strock assured the
committee that this program would be "much more protective of the environ-
ment" than EPA's favored program, citing a Rand Corporation study com-
missioned by the Senate committee that cast doubt on some of the assumptions
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Dana Wilkie, State Plays $1 Billion Game of Chicken with EPA Over Smog Checks, SAN DIEGO
UNioN-TRIB., Aug. 30, 1993, at A3 [hereinafter Wilkie, State Plays $1 Billion Game].
437. Dana Wilkie, Smog-Check Standoff with EPA Grows Testy--Billions in Balance, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRiB., Aug. 16, 1993, at A3.
438. Id.
439. Cone & Healy, supra note 432, at A3; Wilkie, State Plays $1 Billion Game, supra note 436, at A3.
440. Stephen Green, Smog-Check Showdown Looming, SACRAMENTo BEE, Sept. 1, 1993, at Al.
441. Dana Wilkie, Lawmakers Shun Federal Smog Plan, SAN DIEGO UNiON-TRm., Sept. 1, 1993, at A3
[hereinafter Wilkie, Lawmakers Shun Federal Smog Plan].
442. California Senate Panel Backs Measure That Could Result in Federal Sanctions, 24 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 19, at 859 (Sept. 10, 1993) [hereinafter California Senate Panel Backs Measure]; Green, supra
note 440, at Al; Wilkie, Lawmakers Shun Federal Smog Plan, supra note 441, at A3. EPA Administrator
Browner announced that EPA could have approved a system that provided for centralized test-only facilities
for new autos and decentralized test-and-repair facilities for older autos. Id. The bill would have added to the
existing test-and-repair program only additional training for inspectors, remote sensing to detect extremely
heavily emitting autos, and somewhat greater enforcement resources. Id.
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underlying EPA's model. 443 EPA's Assistant Administrator for Policy, Planning,
and Evaluation, Tom Gardener, strongly disagreed with Strock and stated for the
record: "We mean what we say .... We intend to impose the sanctions on a more
rapid timetable if we don't get a piece of acceptable legislation out of this session
of the state Legislature. ' 444 Ultimately, the Senate failed to enact either bill.
CalEPA head Strock later suggested that Senate President Pro Tem David Roberti
torpedoed the bill at the behest of EPA Administrator Carol Browner" 5
As the California legislative session drew to a close, Browner warned that
EPA would impose sanctions within eight days after the session ended, if the
legislature did not pass an acceptable bill.4 6 State Assemblymember Richard Katz
declared: "I refuse to sit here and be cowed by EPA's threat or force a bad
solution down the throats of my constituents just to make a bureaucrat in D.C.
happy.'
' 47
The republican members of the California congressional delegation wrote to
EPA and DOT to urge them to accept California's I/M program, while the Demo-
cratic members wrote Governor Wilson urging him to come up with a program
that could meet the federal requirements.448 The Republicans demanded that EPA
give California a chance to demonstrate that its test-and-repair program was just
as effective as a centralized test-only regime. The Democrats urged Governor
Wilson to demonstrate some political courage." 9 Suspecting that EPA would
delay imposing sanctions if the California legislature enacted legislation allowing
test-and-repair I/M, State Assemblymember Tom Hayden sent EPA a sixty-day
letter informing EPA that he would sue the agency if it failed to invoke sanctions
on November 16, 1993.450
The General Accounting Office (GAO), an investigatory agency of Congress,
threw ice water on EPA's tough stance in early October 1993 when it criticized
EPA's centralized test-only approach and opined that EPA did not have the legal
authority to impose sanctions upon California immediately upon its failure to
adopt an adequate enhanced I/M plan by November 15, 1993.45t The GAO report
argued that EPA's approach was too restrictive and was based on scientific con-
443. California Senate Panel Backs Measure, supra note 442, at 859; Cone & Healy, supra note 432,
at A3.
444. Wilkie, Lawmakers Shun Federal Smog Plan, supra note 441, at A3.
445. Chris Bowman, U.S. Puts Deadline on Smog Dispute, SACRAMENTo BEE, Jan. 8, 1994, at B1.
446. Greg Lucas, EPA's Threat on Smog Testing, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 3, 1993, at A17; Dana Wilkie, EPA
Ready to Act to Cut OffMoney, SAN Dw.,O UNION-TRM., Sept. 3, 1993, at A3.
447. Wilkie, EPA Ready to Act to Cut Off Money, supra note 446, at A3.
448. State Warned of Possible Sanctions, supra note 425, at 154.
449. Id.
450. State's Failure to Adopt Enhanced I/M Plan Calls for EPA Sanctions, Lawmaker Tells EPA, 24
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 1083 (Oct. 8,1993).
451. GAO Report on Inspection-Maintenance Rule Draws Fire at Clean Air Act Oversight Hearing, 24
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 1238 (Nov. 5, 1993).
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clusions that were laden with too many uncertainties.4 52 The report was especially
critical of EPA's decision to discount emissions reduction credits for decen-
tralized test-and-repair programs by 50%453 Not surprisingly, California made
frequent reference to the GAO report in renewing its request to EPA to approve
its test-and-repair system.4m But in congressional hearings on EPA's regulations
and the GAO response, Congressman Henry Waxman criticized GAO for
ignoring relevant information about enhanced I/M.455 Referring to GAO's con-
clusion that EPA was required to give California an additional eighteen months
to submit an adequate SIP before implementing sanctions, Waxman allowed that
he was "struck by the brazen manner in which GAO lawyers dismiss provisions
in the Clean Air Act. Perhaps GAO should consider that Congress meant what it
said. ,A5
6
When the November 15 deadline arrived, California submitted an I/M plan
that did not differ substantially from its existing basic test-and-repair I/M
program.457 The primary addition was a promise to implement a vigorous remote
sensing program to detect very badly polluting vehicles. The Wilson Adminis-
tration thus consciously threw down the gauntlet and challenged EPA to make
good on its threat to impose immediate sanctions.45s Assistant Administrator
Mary Nichols announced that the agency was considering invoking sanctions
against California (and Illinois and Indiana as well) for failing to enact the
legislation necessary to put a test-only system into place.459 She noted that twenty-
two states had submitted complete I/M programs by the deadline, fifteen states
had submitted incomplete programs, and some had failed to submit adequate
plans.46 Although automatic sanctions would kick in upon the expiration of the
statutory eighteen month sanctions clock, the Clean Air Act gives EPA the
discretion to impose sanctions at any time on recalcitrant states.461 Another EPA
official expressed regret that some states were "totally thumbing their noses at
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. EPA May Propose Sanctions for California Within Weeks for Inadequate L/M Program, [1993]
Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 211, at A9 (Nov. 18, 1993), available in WESTLAW, BNA-DEN Database (on
file with the Pacific Law Journal); Greg Lucas, EPA Sure to Reject Smog Check Plan, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 16,
1993, at C3. Interestingly, the legislation favored by Governor Wilson had still not passed the state senate by
the time that California submitted its I/M program to EPA. Id.
458. Lucas, supra note 457, at C3.
459. States that Failed to Authorize 1/M Programs Considered for Sanctions, Air Office Chief Says, 24
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 1333 (Nov. 19, 1993).
460. Id.
461. Id.
1587
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 27
EPA," and opined that the discretionary sanctions could be expected sometime
in March 1994.4 2
To make it clear that California was in fact thumbing its nose at EPA, Strock
and two state senators joined California service station owners in a November 15,
1993 protest against EPA.463 Three days later, Governor Wilson announced that
Jananne Sharpless, the head of the CARB for the past eight years, had agreed to
transfer to a lesser position in the state's energy office.4" Although Strock had
earlier promised to preserve CARB's independence, the transfer grew out of
disagreements between Strock and Sharpless over I/M programs.4 65 Unlike
Strock, Sharpless had urged the state to cooperate with EPA in coming up with
an acceptable centralized test-only system. The environmental director of the Los
Angeles branch of the American Lung Association suggested that Sharples's
removal was "an indication that California is going to step backward .... .,46
With polls indicating that most members of the public were more concerned about
crime and the economy than the environment, Governor Wilson wanted to go into
the 1994 gubernatorial campaign as the candidate devoted to preserving jobs,
even if that cost him some "green" votes. 67
The core of the California program consisted of biennial inspections at
decentralized test-and-repair facilities coupled with the assurance that increased
vigilance would identify and prosecute the facilities that were conducting
fraudulent tests and issuing bogus certificates. CaIEPA promised increased
enforcement despite severe cutbacks in enforcement resources at both the state
and local levels. Only six months before, Strock had complained that "grievous
cuts" in CalEPA's budget left it unable to fill the slack left by cuts in city and
county enforcement programs! 8 With more than 9000 separate test-and-repair
facilities to monitor and more than 2500 facilities in Los Angeles alone, it was not
at all clear that the state could deliver on its promise of stepped up enforcement. 49
EPA Assistant Administrator Nichols opined that "[t]he state has added some
features to the existing fraud-ridden and scandalous program designed to improve
it a little, but they don't come close to meeting the requirements.' ' 70
After some intense negotiations between EPA Administrator Carol Browner
and California Assemblymember Richard D. Katz and additional meetings bet-
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. Chris Bowman & Judy Tachibana, Air Board Chiefs Exit Fuels Suspicion, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov.
19, 1993, at Al; Dan Walters, Wilson Pushing Economy First, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 28, 1993, at A3.
465. See Walters, supra note 464, at A3 (discussing the disagreements between Strock and Sharpless).
466. Bowman & Tachibana, supra note 464, at Al.
467. Walters, supra note 464, at A3.
468. Erin Hallissy, Pollution Prosecution Units Scaled Back as Budgets Shrink, S.F. CHRON., May 10,
1993, at A15.
469. Green, supra note 440, at Al.
470. Jim Mayer, State Given More Time to Devise Clean-Air Plan, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 25, 1993,
at Al.
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ween state leaders and EPA officials in late November 1993, EPA announced that
it had decided not to seek immediate sanctions for the time being.47f 1 Assistant
Administrator Nichols reported that: "Within the last few days there has been a
recognition on the part of business, environmentalists, and legislators that we will
be flexible, that the Smog Check was not just an unpleasant problem that had to
be dealt with, but that we had to fix a program that is failing drastically. 4 72
CalEPA head Strock was "confident that this new spirit of cooperation on EPA's
part will result in timely and swift action."473 Katz was impressed with Browner's
willingness to be flexible: "We decided that our goals were the same: to clean up
the air in California, allowing small (smog-check) businesses to stay in business
and not force anyone out of work during a recession." 474 Nichols cautioned, how-
ever, that the discussions had not reached any breakthroughs. At this point "our
hope is not just to close our eyes and hold our nose and say the program meets the
requirements, but that the state will live up to its past and come up with a plan
that exceeds the federal requirements. ' 47s A Sierra Club lobbyist summed up the
problem that faced state and federal negotiators: "Smog checks are like taxes and
the EPA in this case is about as popular as the IRS. But both of them are
necessary.
'
,476
As a possible compromise, California officials suggested requiring 30% of
Los Angeles automobiles to undergo I/M at test-only facilities in 1995, and 60%
in 1996. In the meantime, California would conduct a demonstration project of
alternatives to centralized test-only facilities, including such alternatives as
remote sensing techniques for identifying gross emitters.477 As Assistant
Administrator Nichols announced that the prospects were good that the California
legislature would enact an acceptable bill in the Spring legislative session,478
lower level EPA officials privately suggested that the agency had "caved in" to
political pressure.4 7
9
The rapprochement, however, was short-lived. On January 7, 1994, EPA
announced that it would impose discretionary sanctions on California (and on
471. Sanctions Against California Put On Hold, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1481 (Dec. 3, 1993);
Mayer, supra note 470, at Al.
472. Mayer, supra note 470, at Al.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. Failure to Adopt Proper IM Programs Brings Proposed Sanctions in Three States, 24 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 37, at 1623 (Jan. 14, 1994) [hereinafter Failure to Adopt Proper I/M Programs]; Remote Sensing
Program on Auto Emissions Expected to Generate Profile, Satisfy EPA, [1994] Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No.
112, at d15 (June 14, 1994), available in WESTLAW, BNA-DEN Database (on file with the Pacific Law
Journal) [hereinafter Remote Sensing Program].
478. State, Federal Regulators Assess Problems In Implementing ZIM Programs, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA)
No. 32, at 1505-06 (Dec. 10, 1993).
479. Id. at 1506.
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Illinois and Indiana as well), because the state had failed to come up with an
acceptable enhanced I/M program. 8 Despite "promising efforts," the California
legislature had still n6t passed the necessary legislation, and Assistant
Administrator Nichols concluded that another threat of sanctions was necessary
to inspire action.48' The sanctions could be expected as early as May 1994.482
Taken aback by this turn of events, Strock accused EPA of "playing games" with
California officials: "We were negotiating together in good faith, then out of the
blue, they say they'll issue these sanctions.48 3 The announcement was, in his
opinion, a "foolish action by the federal government" that raised "a question of
good faith and even competence" of federal officials.494 State Assemblymember
Katz expressed disappointment at EPA's apparent change of heart, noting that he
had been engaged in serious negotiations with agency staff up until the day that
the decision to invoke discretionary sanctions was announced. 485 He complained:
"I don't know how you negotiate with people that act like that.,486 Invoking an
ad hominem popularized by Alabama Governor George Wallace in the 1960s,
Katz declared: "We will not roll over for some pointy-headed bureaucrat in
Washington." 487 He worried that the announcement could aid and abet legislators
who opposed compromise measures: "I don't see why the EPA feels the need to
prove it's the biggest kid on the block .... Particularly for people who don't like
the compromise, it could be a convenient excuse to go to war on this thing." 4"
Other officials maintained that the EPA announcement was tantamount to a
declaration of war.
48 9
Noting that for the last two weeks EPA had warned state officials that it could
not delay sanctions for much longer, Assistant Administrator Nichols (whose
head, in truth, is not especially pointed) maintained that the announcement should
have come as no surprise to Katz and other California officials. 49 She pointed out
that the SIPs for the only other area in which an adequate centralized I/M regime
had not been approved (Chicago) needed only minor technical and funding
480. Imposition of Statewide Sanctions on California Under the Clean Air Act Section 110(m) for Failure
to Submit a Complete SIP Revision for an Enhanced Motor Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance Program, 59
Fed. Reg. 3534 (1994); Failure to Adopt Proper JIM Programs, supra note 477, at 1623.
481. Bowman, supra note 445, at B1.
482. Citing Hardship from Los Angeles Quake, EPA Scuttles Plan for California Sanctions, 24 Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1697 (Jan. 28, 1994) [hereinafter Hardship from Los Angeles Quake].
483. Bowman, supra note 445, at B1.
484. Maria Cone, EPA Begins Steps to Penalize State Over Smog Plans, L.A. TimE, Jan. 8, 1994, at B 1;
Greg Lucas, EPA Turns Up the Heat on State in Smog-Test War, S.F. Ct4RON., Jan. 8, 1994, at AS.
485. Failure to Adopt Proper LIM Programs, supra note 477, at 1623.
486. Id.
487. Lucas, supra note 484, at A5.
488. Cone, supra note 484, at B1.
489. Id.
490. Bowman, supra note 445, at B I.
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revisions, whereas the California legislation required a complete overhaul 491
Nevertheless, she fully expected that acceptable legislation would be forthcoming
before the sanctions took effect in late spring.492 Democratic State Senator Robert
Presley, author of a bill calling for centralized inspection and maintenance,
suggested that far from being obstreperous, EPA had "been very patient and
cooperative with California to this point. '493 California Representative Henry
Waxman, a primary author of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, praised the
announcement as a much-needed "wake up call to Governor Wilson and the
California legislature." 494 Environmental groups also praised the announcement. 95
When the California legislature reconvened the next week, the Senate
Transportation Committee quickly approved the same bill that it had approved in
the previous session. The Bill's sponsor, State Senator Newt Russell, declared
that decentralized test-and-repair would be "user-friendly" and would "preserve
the jobs of the current smog technicians. ' '496 State Senator Tom Hayden, however,
complained that the action would "plunge us into a legal and political con-
frontation with the federal government." 497 Despite EPA's warnings that the bill
was unacceptable, Governor Wilson promised to sign it as soon as the full Senate
passed it, which it did on January 20, 1994.498
Mother Nature provided EPA with a convenient excuse to forestall further
confrontation in the form of a strong earthquake on January 17, 1994.499 In light
of the damage done to the Los Angeles transportation system, EPA announced
that it would cancel its accelerated discretionary sanctions, but at the same time
it urged Governor Wilson to veto the recently passed legislation. 500 The eighteen-
month mandatory sanctions clock, however, continued to run, and it was
scheduled to expire in June 1995.501 EPA hoped that this conciliatory action
would encourage the state to enact acceptable legislation,502 but environmentalists
worried that it would further reduce EPA's credibility with recalcitrant states.
50 3
491. Cone, supra note 484, at B1.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. Id.
495. Id.
496. Greg Lucas & Robert B. Gunnison, Smog Bill Pits State Against EPA, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 21, 1994,
at A17.
497. Id.
498. Legislature Plans Decentralized DM Law Despite EPA Pressure, Proposed Sanctions, 24 Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1657 (Jan. 21, 1994); Lucas & Gunnison, supra note 496, at A17. The California
Assembly had already passed the bill during the previ6us session.
499. Greg Lucas, EPA Gives State Smog Breather, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 25, 1994, at AI5.
500. See id. (citing Hardship froma Los Angeles Quake, supra note 482, at 1697).
501. Id.
502. In a letter to Governor Wilson, EPA Administrator Browner wrote: "The tragedy in Southern
California underscores the importance of all levels of government working together to meet the health and
safety needs of our constituents." Lucas, supra note 499, at A15.
503. California I/M Sanctions, 24 ELR 10101 (1994).
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Governor Wilson accepted the proffered olive branch and announced on
January 25, 1994, that the state would resume negotiations with EPA. 5 04 But the
governor insisted that an agreement would have to be hammered out within two
days to give the legislature time to enact the agreed-upon bill.505 In a letter of the
same date addressed to Administrator Browner, CalEPA head Strock insisted that
any agreement must ensure that the 9000 existing smog check garages were not
thrown out of business.5 Browner agreed to send her chief of staff immediately
to California to negotiate for her.507 But it was naive to expect that an agreement
could be hammered out on such a complex issue in two days.
On March 9, 1994, EPA and California announced that they had entered into
a memorandum of understanding through which EPA agreed to approve a
"hybrid" program in which the most heavily polluting 30% of the automobiles in
Southern California would be required to undergo biennial testing at decentralized
test-only facilities beginning in 1995.508 All gross emitters detected through
remote sensing would be required to engage in test-only inspections on an annual
basis and the remaining vehicles would be selected randomly. Since California
predicted that 26% of on-road vehicles were in the gross-emitter category, only
4% would have to be chosen randomly.50 A $15 million remote sensing demon-
stration project in Sacramento would be used to determine if more automobiles
would need to undergo biennial test-only inspections. If necessary, an additional
30% of the automobiles in nonattainment areas would be subjected to biennial
test-only inspections in 1996.0 ° The program would employ very stringent
cutpoint standards that would result in a failure rate of about 40% for those
vehicles that were subjected to the test-only requirements.51 This was double the
20% failure rate assumed in centralized test-only regimes.
CalEPA head Strock was pleased with the compromise: "California's
program will meet or exceed Clean Air Act requirements-and do so while
providing consumer convenience and relying on market competition."512 Service
station owners also applauded the agreement.513 Environmental groups, however,
504. Carl Ingrain, Wilson Sets Deadline on Smog Check, L.A. TIES, Jan.,26, 1994, A3.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. Carl Ingram, Accord Would Toughen Auto Smog Testing, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1994, at Al; John
Matthews, Pact Near on State Smog Test Program Key Legislators OK Accord with U.S., SACRAMENTO BEE,
Mar. 10, 1994, at Al; Dana Wilkie, State, U.S. Agree on Stricter Smog Checks for Some, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRm., Mar. 10, 1994, at Al [hereinafter Wilkie, State, U.S. Agree].
509. Wilkie, State, U.S. Agree, supra note 508, at Al.
510. State, Federal Officials SetAgreement on IM Plan to Bring About CAA Compliance, 24 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 46, at 1982 (Mar. 18, 1994).
511. States Urged to Avoid California Example in Pursuing Alternative Vehicle JIM Programs, 24 Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 1960 (Mar. 18, 1994) [hereinafter States Urged to Avoid California Example].
512. Matthews, supra note 508, at Al.
513. Ingrain, supra note 508, at Al.
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were dismayed by EPA's backtracking. A representative of the Natural Resources
Defense Council observed that: "It sounds to me as if EPA has compromised
much more than the legislative leaders. 514 The head of the California Coalition
for Clean Air, however, thought that his organization could "live with" the
agreement. 5
On March 30, 1994, Governor Wilson signed three bills implementing the
compromise.56 One of the bills established a subsidy program to help low-income
auto owners repair or retire grossly polluting vehicles. 7 Wilson announced that
the compromise represented "a win-win situation for California," because it gave
the state "the flexibility to target the worst polluting vehicles, get them fixed or
off the road.' 518 Environmentalists believed that the "hybrid" program would be
much less effective than a centralized test-only regime, and predicted that the
agreement would open up a "Let's Make A Deal" atmosphere in other states.519
EPA urged other states not to regard the California agreement as a model for
future "hybrid" programs where centralized test-only regimes were already in
place.52° At the time, several states, including Arizona, Louisiana, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia, were considering abandoning their centralized test-
only I/M programs, and EPA was worried that they would begin to slide back
toward the California hybrid program as a lowest common denominator5 2'
EPA's concerns were well-founded. Within days after the California com-
promise became public, the Environmental Protection Division of Georgia
announced that it would delay entering into a contract with a private company to
administer a centralized test-only J/M program for Atlanta. Noting significant
public opposition to the centralized program, Georgia officials believed that delay
was in order because the California agreement demonstrated that it was possible
to come up with an acceptable enhanced I/M regime without implementing a
centralized test-only regime.5 22
514. l.
515. Id.
516. California Governor Signs Three IM Bills, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at 2116 (Apr. 15, 1994)
[hereinafter California Governor Signs Three JIM Bills].
517. Legislature Approves Compromise IM Bills; Wilson Says He Will Sign All Three Measures, 24
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 2017 (Mar. 25, 1994).
518. California Governor Signs Three IM Bills, supra note 516, at 2116.
519. States Urged to Avoid California Example, supra note 511, at 1960.
520. Id.
521. Id. at 1960. New York Governor Mario Cuomo had written EPA on January 31, 1994, to ask
whether EPA would accept a similar test-and-repair with enhanced enforcement program as a substitute for
New York's proposed centralized test-only system. Cuomo Seeks Clarification from Agency on Enhanced
Inspection/Maintenance Programs, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1796 (Feb. 18, 1994).
522. Georgia Delays Signing Contractfor JM Program, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 2019 (Mar.
25, 1994). The State had already promulgated rules providing for only 25 test-only stations in the Atlanta area.
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2. Texas
Unlike California, Texas initially decided to take EPA at its word, and
initiated a centralized biennial test-only regime for the Houston and Dallas
areas.523 In July, 1993, the State entered into a seven-year contract with Tejas
Testing Technology, Inc. to construct twenty-five centralized facilities in Dallas
and twenty-eight facilities in Houston and begin operating them in January
1995.524 The centers would service approximately 3,000,000 post-1968 model
year vehicles in Houston alone. 25 The Texas partners in Tejas Testing owned
companies that conducted safety inspections at multiple stations in Dallas and
Houston, but they agreed to close their businesses upon being awarded the con-
tract.526 Another partner was Systems Control, Inc., a large testing company that
had operated in California for eighteen years.527 The stations were to be built so
that most residents would be no more than five miles from a station and no person
in the metropolitan area would be more than twelve miles away.S Tejas expected
that each test would cost about $20 and take about twenty minutes.529 The state
agency estimated that only about 20% of the tested vehicles would fail.530 A state
agency official promised that the agency was doing all it could "to make sure the
consumer doesn't have to spend a lot of money, drive very far or wait very
523. Scott Harper, State Announces 'No-Risk' Emission Testing Period, HOUSTON POST, Nov. 22, 1994,
at Al. The state law provided for a two-year waiver of repair requirements for low-income auto owners and
owners of certain specialty vehicles. Id. Tejas Testing was also required to provide referees to administer the
waiver program. Fueling Cleaner Air, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 28, 1994, at El. Some state officials later
maintained that the Texas Air Control Board was coerced into a centralized test-only regime by an overly
zealous EPA. Hearings on Clean Air Act Oversight Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation of
the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 297 (1995) (statement of Jim Hom, Texas State Representative)
[hereinafter Hearings on Clean AirAct Oversight- Statement of Jim Horn]. In fact, the state legislature was
under very little "pressure" from EPA when it enacted the legislation empowering the Texas Air Control Board
to implement a centralized test-only regime, and the state agency touted the new regime as a major plus for the
environment.
524. Terry Box, Firm Picked to Run Auto Emissions Tests, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 17, 1993, at
A12; John Williams, Emissions Test Plans Clearing Up, HOUSTON CHRON., July 17, 1993, at A25. Since
Dallas was not a severe nonattainment area, centralized I/M was essentially voluntary. The state therefore left
in place about 2000 test-and-repair facilities for that area. The centralized facilities were to serve as a
supplement to the decentralized facilities. See Box, supra, at A12.
525. Harper, supra note 523, at Al.
526. Williams, supra note 524, at A25.
527. Box, supra note 524, at A12. The partnership was formed by Merrill-Lynch in New York with
financing from several international banks, including Bank of Montreal, Credit Suisse and Fuji Bank Ltd.
David Plesa & Mary Lenz, House Votes On Tailpipe Test Amid Warnings, HOUSTON.POST, Jan. 26, 1995, at
Al.
528. Box, supra note 524, at A12.
529. Id.; Williams, supra note 524, at A25.
530. Williams, supra note 524, at A25.
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long. '531 Elaborate precautions would be taken to prevent cheating. 532 Because
local service stations would continue to provide annual state safety inspections,
few jobs would be lost, and more than 900 jobs would be created.533 To provide
an additional incentive to avoid delays, operators of individual stations would be
subject to fines if waiting times exceeded fifteen minutes on more than three
occasions per month. 4 The head of the Texas Natural Resources Conservation
Commission (TNRCC) anticipated a good deal of grumbling by affected drivers,
but he maintained that the program was critical to achieving air quality in the
Houston and Dallas areas. 535 The agency's primary concern was ensuring that
enough repair facilities became certified to meet the expected demand 36
D. EPA 's Cave-In
Meanwhile, the enhanced I/M programs that had already been implemented
were encountering some problems. At the annual North American Motor Vehicle
Emission Control Conference in Austin, Texas, on December 8, 1993, the head
of the Emissions Control Strategies Branch of EPA's Mobile Sources Office
reported that administrative costs for the enhanced IM program were running
"substantially higher" than expected in areas where that program was in effect.
The cost per test was also slightly higher at $16 to $21 per car, as compared to
EPA's original estimate of $17 per car.537 Another EPA official reported the
agency's concern that not enough technicians were being trained to run the high
tech centralized testing facilities required by EPA regulations. 538 He worried that
without well-trained technicians, there would be more frequent misdiagnoses,
higher repair costs, and lower consumer satisfaction, all of which could threaten
the political viability of the program.5 39 The agency was pleased to report,
however, some encouraging developments. For example, in some states with test-
only regimes, the testing facilities were beginning to share information with the
repair facilities to help ensure the adequacy of the repairs.
5 1
Although EPA urged the states not to take the California experience as a
signal that they were free to abandon EPA-approved centralized test-only IM
531. Robert Ingrassia, Firms to Feel Impact ofAir-Pollution Laws, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 7,
1993, at HI.
532. Williams, supra note 524, at A25.
533. Box, supra note 524, at A12; Williams, supra note 524, at A25.
534. Ingrassia, supra note 531, at Al.
535. Harper, supra note 523, at Al (quoting John Hall as saying that "without implementing this
program, it would be impossible to comply with our overall goals").
536. Id.
537. State, Federal Regulators Assess Problems In Implementing IM Programs, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA)
No. 32, at 1505 (Dec. 10, 1993).
538. Id. at 1506.
539. Id.
540. Id.
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programs, it could not maintain that position in the face of numerous demands by
similarly situated states for equal treatment. After meeting with governors from
seven affected states, EPA, on December 8, 1994, announced that it would allow
any state to substitute a hybrid program based on the California plan so long as
the state demonstrated that the change would not prevent it from achieving the
15% "reasonable further progress" reduction in VOC emissions from both mobile
and stationary sources that the statute required by November 15, 1996.' The
agency even allowed states that had already begun to implement centralized I/M
based on the IM-240 technology to claim extra credit toward the 15% VOC
reduction target.542 Some states were in fact counting on IM-240 based I/M for
up to 40% of the required VOC emissions reductions.543 Several states also
decided to make greater use of remote sensing devices to identify autos in need
of repairs.5 "
The agency, however, retained the 50% discount in emissions reductions that
could be claimed by states using decentralized I/M."45 Despite some attacks on the
scientific basis for the 50% discount factor, EPA believed that it was supported
by the best available data.5" Determined to force EPA to abandon the 50% dis-
count, Governor Wilson of California appointed a special committee on I/M to
study the matter. As chairperson, Wilson appointed Lynn Scarlett,5 7 vice-
president of the Reason Foundation, a Santa Monica libertarian think tank
specializing in privatizing governmental services. " Not surprisingly, the
carefully chosen panel, which included no representatives from environmental
groups, 549 rejected EPA's explanation5 and vowed to conduct its own study of
541. David Plesa, EPA to Give States More Leeway on Emission Tests, HOUSTON POST, Dec. 10, 1994,
at Al; States Allowed to Draft Hybrid LIM Programs But Must Reduce VOC Emissions By 15 Percent, 25 Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1606 (Dec. 16, 1994) [hereinafter States Allowed to Draft Hybrid IM Programs].
542. States Allowed to Draft Hybrid IM Programs, supra note 541, at 1606.
543. Id.
544. Id.
545. California Panel Challenges Science of Emissions 50 Percent Discount Rule, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA)
No. 40, at 1911 (Feb. 10, 1995) [hereinafter California Panel Challenges Science].
546. Id.
547. James M. Strock, U.S. Strings Tie Up State's Smog-Check Innovations, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar.
24, 1995, at B7. Ms. Scarlett was a frequent guest columnist in U.S.A. Today. Prior to the appointment, Ms.
Scarlett's main claims to fame had been her crusade against mandatory recycling and food labeling laws and
her libertarian advocacy of the repeal of drug and narcotics laws. See, e.g., Lynn Scarlett, Forced Food
Labeling Will Hurt Consumers, USA TODAY, Mar. 12, 1990, at A6; Lynn Scarlett, Give Up the Drug War;
Legalize Drugs Instead, USA TODAY, Sept. 6, 1989, at A8; Lynn Scarlett, Make Your Environment
Dirtier-Recycle, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1991, at A12; Lynn Scarlett, Trash Glut Overrated; Recycling
Overrated, USATODAY, Feb. 19, 1991, at A10.
548. Larry Gordon, One Think Tank's Reasoning, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 1992, at B1. The Reason
Foundation's major contributors have included Amoco Corp., Ford Motor Co., Mobil Oil Corp., Xerox Corp.,
and several politically conservative trust funds. Id.
549. Remote Sensing Program, supra note 477, at 112.
550. For the committee's critique of EPA's mobile source model, see Hearings on Clean Air Act:
Statement of Lynn Scarlett, supra note 63.
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decentralized I/M.551 Before the study had been completed, CalEPA head Strock
wrote an editorial in which he excoriated EPA for refusing to let California claim
more than 50% reductions for its hybrid program. Strock claimed that "[t]his
invidious discount-which has no technical basis-is especially frustrating in
California, where Governor Pete Wilson and a bipartisan group of legislators
succeeded in a battle to retain the state's privately run, decentralized testing and
repair program."552 Strock applauded legislation pending in Congress that would
prevent EPA from imposing centralized I/M on any state
5 53
EPA began to read the writing on the wall when EPA Administrator Browner
and Assistant Administrator Nichols met with several state governors and other
representatives for nearly eight hours on January 18, 1995. The governors threa-
tened to seek legislation to overhaul the Clean Air Act in the newly installed
Congress, a body that was by any measure much more hostile to EPA and the
programs it administered than any previous Congress. EPA officials were no
doubt also aware of the fact that Newt Gingrich had written the governor of
Georgia in March, 1994, to express his view that EPA "has once again over-
stepped its bounds by mandating Georgia use a centralized emission testing
system," and to ensure the governor that "I am really trying to stop this plan.''5 4
As part of a general agreement to allow more "flexible" implementation
approaches, EPA agreed to approve decentralized test-and-repair systems as
enhanced VIM. 555 At the same time, the agency opposed any changes to the statute,
arguing that "within the existing Clean Air Act we can find answers to the
specific problems or concerns that have been raised.,
556
After enduring some very hostile House oversight hearings in March,55 7 the
agency, on April 28, 1995, proposed formal amendments to its enhanced I/M
regulations that promised still more "flexibility." The agency proposed a less
stringent performance standard in areas like Houston, where automobile emis-
sions did not contribute as greatly to overall VOC emissions and in areas where
states could make the 15% reasonable further progress demonstrations on the
basis of emissions reductions from other sources. EPA predicted that this "low
enhanced" performance standard would prove especially useful in ozone transport
areas. The proposal would also allow states to experiment with "hybrid" systems
using different combinations of testing equipment, remote sensing devices, and
centralized and decentralized regimes. States would be allowed to employ less
551. California Panel Challenges Science, supra note 545, at 1911.
552. Strock, supra note 546, at BI.
553. Id.
554. Katie Kerwin, Moves to Kill Emissions Programs, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 23, 1995, at A4.
555. Lee, supra note 378, at Al.
556. Katie Kerwin, EPA Bucks Plan to Dump Tailpipe Tests, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 26, 1995,
at A16.
557. Hearings on Clean Air Oversight Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. (1995).
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expensive technologies than IM-240 if they were suitably effective. But the states
using hybrid systems could only claim 50% of the emissions reductions that the
technology was capable of achieving in demonstrating reasonable further pro-
gress. States would be given additional credit for effective technician training
programs. Finally, states would be allowed to phase in the $450 repair waiver
floor over a period of years and drop the previous one-waiver-per-vehicle require-
ment to soften the impact on low-income drivers.
58
Assistant Administrator Mary Nichols explained that the concessions were
merely an acknowledgment of the reality that "many states had already either
abandoned or slowed down their progress on adopting and moving forward with
inspection and maintenance programs because of opposition, sometimes from the
service station industry, sometimes from members of the legislature, or various
constituency groups."5'5 9 She urged Congress to allow EPA to attempt to imple-
ment "common sense revisions" to its enhanced I/M regulations.
5 6
The concessions were not enough to satisfy the agency's critics. The state
agencies and service station owners were adamantly opposed to the 50% discount
for hybrid enhanced I/M programs. 561 They argued that the factor was based on
audits of unknown accuracy and not "systematically defined by mathematical
relationships." 2 The Service Station Dealers of America argued that "[s]o long
as decentralized programs continue to be subjected to the 50% credit discount,
then this entire procedure is nothing but fluff, and will assuredly by seen by
Congress, the states, and the public as a thinly disguised attempt to head off
legislative action., 563 It also argued against any suggestion that IM-240 should be
required in testing facilities and urged that EPA allow BAR90 plus remote
sensing or on-road testing as an altemative.5 The Executive Director of the
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC) argued that EPA
should find decentralized test-and-repair regimes to be presumptively equivalent
to centralized test-only regimes, thereby placing the burden on EPA to justify
refusal to approve plans containing the former systems
65
558. Inspection/Maintenance Flexibility Amendments, 60 Fed. Reg. 20934 (1995); Hearings on Clean
Air Act Oversight. Statement of Mary D. Nichols, supra note 38, at 177; Proposal Would Allow Varied
Approaches for State Inspection-Maintenance Programs, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at 2524 (Apr. 28,
1995).
559. Morning Edition: Government Will Relax Auto Emissions Testing for Now (National Public Radio
broadcast, Apr. 20, 1995) (statement of Mary D. Nichols, Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, EPA)
(on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
560. NationalAmbient Air Quality Standards: Statement of Mary D. Nichols, supra note 367, at 126.
561. Commentators Have Doubts About LIM Changes; Sufficient Flexibility Still Said Lacking, 26 Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 8 at 458 (June 23, 1995) [hereinafter Commentators Have Doubts About IfM Changes].
562. Id.
563. Id.
564. Id.
565. Id.
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On the other hand, representatives of the centralized testing industry urged
EPA not to cave into pressure from states that were themselves pressured by local
service station owners into opposing EPA's centralized testing presumption.56
They warned that "[t]he assignment of SIP credits based on what is politically
expedient at the time will only undermine the most cost-effective emission
reduction strategy that has been identified to date."' 67 Environmental groups
agreed, arguing that EPA was in reality providing not for greater flexibility, but
for reduced effectiveness.
5 68
EPA soon began to back away from its 50% discount position. In May 12
hearings before the House Appropriations Committee, Administrator Browner
testified that the agency would be willing to allow greater than 50% credit for a
decentralized test-and-repair system if the state could show that it was equally
effective.569
The final revision to the enhanced I/M rule, published on September 7, 1995,
contained few deviations from the proposal.570 EPA was confident that the new
regulations provided "maximum flexibility" to the states. The final rule retained
the "low enhanced" performance standard.57' It also provided for biennial testing,
but did not require centralized test-only facilities or the IM-240 testing tech-
nology. Predicting that the new performance standard would achieve "slightly
less than one-third" the emissions reductions of the original regulations,572 the
agency also retained the 50% discount factor.573 Congress later sealed this victory
for the advocates of decentralized test-and-repair programs when it passed on,
November 18, 1995, a rider to the Highway Appropriations Act (which was
signed by President Clinton) that prohibited EPA from insisting that states adopt
test-only enhanced I/M based on IM-240 technology.5 74
1. Effect of EPA 's Retrenchment in California
While the proposed changes to EPA's regulations were pending, EPA
approved on July 5, 1995 California's hybrid enhanced I/M program, thereby
halting the eighteen month automatic sanctions clock in the nick of time.575 The
566. Id.
567. Id.
568. Id.
569. Id.
570. Rule On Inspection, Maintenance Programs Gives States Greater Flexibility, EPA Says, 26 Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 896 (Sept. 15, 1995).
571. Id.
572. Id.
573. Id.
574. Congress Passes Bill that Would Delete Requirement for Test-Only LIM Facilities, 26 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 29, at 1262 (Nov. 24, 1995).
575. Hybrid Inspection/Maintenance Program Approved by EPA, Halting Sanctions Threat, 26 Env't
Rep. No. 11, at 570 (July 14, 1995) [hereinafter Hybrid Inspection/Maintenance Program].
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proposed SIP had been submitted to EPA hours before the expiration of the
sanctions clock, and EPA issued a clock-stopping "completeness" finding within
minutes. Because it had an opportunity to review the SIP as it was being
developed, the agency was able to approve the full plan in less than a week. 76
EPA was confident that the SIP would meet EPA's soon to be finalized "low
enhanced" performance standard.5" Under the plan, only "gross emitters"
detected through remote sensing (about 15% of the total population) would be
required to use test-only facilities. All remaining autos could be tested at test-and-
repair facilities, which would have to use acceleration simulation mode (ASM)
equipment that was less costly and less effective than IM-240, but more effective
than idle mode testing.78 In approving the SIP, EPA did not have to resolve the
issue of the extent to which emissions reductions would have to be discounted,
because California's 15% reduction demonstration was not due until sometime
prior to November 15, 1996. In his cover letter to Administrator Browner, how-
ever, CalEPA head Strock offered: "Frankly, it is inconceivable that U.S. EPA
will simply not give us credit for the emissions reduction our program is required
to produce."5 79 An EPA spokesman held open the possibility that the new pro-
gram could get full credit.80 In the end, EPA was forced to do what three years
earlier it had hoped not to do: "close our eyes and hold our nose and say the
program meets the requirements," when in fact the agency staff knew full-well
that the program would not work5 t
2. Effect of EPA 's Retrenchment in Texas
By the time that EPA announced on December 6, 1994, that it would allow
states to implement California's "hybrid" program instead of centralized test-only
IIM, Tejas Testing had spent over $100 million constructing a network of fifty-
five multi-lane state-of-the-art IM-240 test-only stations and ten referee stations
in Houston, Dallas, and Beaumont/Port Arthur. 2 Tejas contracted with forty-
three franchisees (70% of which were women or members of minority groups)
to run the stations. For example, Claudia Wilson, a pediatric nurse who was
actively involved in programs to prevent lead poisoning in children, invested
576. Id.
577. Id.
578. Id.
579. State's Reworked YIM Plan Submitted to EPA; Test-Only Facilities Sought in Some Localities, 26
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 535 (July 7, 1995).
580. Hybrid Inspection/Maintenance Program, supra note 575, at 570.
581. See Mayer, supra note 470, at Al.
582. David Plesa, EPA to Give States More Leeway on Emission Tests, HOUSTON POST, Dec. 10, 1994,
at Al [hereinafter Plesa, EPA to Give States More Leeway]; Texas Governor Expected to OK JIM Delay, 25
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1885 (Feb. 3. 1995). Twenty-seven of the stations were located in the Houston
area. David Plesa, Wheels in Motion Todayfor Emission Test Trial Run, HOUSTON POST, Dec. 12, 1994, at AI
[hereinafter Plesa, Wheels in Motion Today for Emission Test Trial Run].
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$7000 of her savings and arranged for a $32,000 bank loan to purchase a
franchise because "[i]t looked like a fantastic opportunity to marry environmental
issues, lead reduction and business.
583
As Texas environmental officials pondered how to react to EPA's cave-in,
Tejas Testing began offering "early-bird" tests in the Houston and Dallas areas
free of charge on December 12, 1994.584 TNRCC purchased billboards and
advertising time on TV and radio in an attempt to educate the public about how
the system would work.5 5 The locations of all of the testing facilities were given
prominent play in local newspapers. 586 Environmentalists were also supportive of
the centralized program. A Sierra Club representative noted that "[i]t is one more
thing to deal with and it will cost some money, but it means cleaner air for
everybody.
587
The head of TNRCC, John Hall, announced on January 1, 1995, that EPA's
action would not affect the implementation of the program. 88 Noting that the
Houston area still had to come up with a 15% reduction in VOC emissions by the
end of 1996, Hall opined that it was "inconceivable [that] Houston can meet the
standards without getting the maximum levels of emissions reductions from cars,
trucks, and buses. '58 9 The state agency would soon change its tune. Indeed, state
officials were already considering a "hybrid" system like California's as an option
to recommend to the Texas Legislature when it convened in January, 1995. When
reminded that Tejas Testing's contract with the State of Texas guaranteed it an
adequate return on its investment, Hall suggested that TNRCC would look into
legal mechanisms for making the federal government pay Tejas's losseso
The local press rapidly picked up on early complaints about the program and
Hall's suggestion that things could be changed.59' Perhaps more importantly, local
talk-radio hosts began to stir up public opposition to the program even before it
had been given a chance function in the real world.5 92
Not surprisingly, the first day of trial tests did not go as smoothly as planned.
In Beaumont/Port Arthur, the "early bird" program was so well advertised that
hundreds of customers turned out on the first day, and lines grew to two hours in
583. Sylvia Moreno, Emission-Test Firm Fears Program Delay Company May Face Ruin, Lawmakers
Told, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Jan. 25, 1995, at A22.
584. Plesa, Wheels in Motion Todayfor Emission Test Trial Run, supra note 582, at Al.
585. Id.
586. Id.
587. Id.
588. Plesa, EPA to Give States More Leeway, supra note 582, at Al.
589. Id.
590. Id.
591. Bill Dawson, Emissions Test Mess; State is Right to Begin Anti-Air Pollution Program, HOUSTON
POST, Dec. 31, 1994, at A22 (editorial referring to the "chaos surrounding the start of program" and TNRCC's
proposed changes, but urging TNRCC not to delay implementation).
592. Clay Robison, Political Pollution Could Choke Us All, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 3, 1995, at 02.
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length.593 In Houston, the system became overloaded when the central computer
allowed only 500 of the 800 inspectors to log on.594 Hour-long waits were not un-
common at a station near the Astrodome.595 One customer who became annoyed
with the length of the wait expressed his view that air pollution in Houston "is
more of a chemical industry problem than it is automobiles." 596 Once the com-
puter error was eliminated, however, only a handful of facilities reported
delays.597 At the facilities where waits were reported, TNRCC discovered that
much of the delay was caused by lengthy conversations between curious cus-
tomers and station employees about how the tests worked and how the program
would be conducted in the future.598 TNRCC also speculated that the absence of
a fee for the early bird tests probably created an artificially high demand on the
first few days.599 Tejas attributed some of the longer-than-expected waits to the
understandable inability of first-time technicians to coordinate with one
another.6 A Tejas spokesman noted that "[tihere is a big learning curve here.
You have to expect some glitches."'
Overall, 25% of the 16,500 vehicles checked during the first trial week failed
in Houston,6 somewhat higher than the 20% predicted failure rate,but only 18%
failed in Dallas?' 3 Most of the failures were caused by engine misfiring and
required only minor repairs.60 Finally, a few motorists complained that the testing
process had damaged their hoods, dirtied their seat covers, or had otherwise
caused their cars not to function properly?' 5 While acknowledging the need to
593. Bill Dawson, Waits Choke Some DriversAs State's Smog-Checks Get In Gear, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Dec. 13, 1994, at A17 [hereinafter Dawson, Waits Choke Some Drivers As State's Smog-Checks Get In Gear].
594. Id.
595. David Plesa, Emissions Tests Start Up Slowly at Some Centers, HOUSTON POST, Dec. 13, 1994, at
Al [hereinafter Plesa, Emissions Tests Start Up Slowly at Some Centers].
596. Dawson, Waits Choke Some Drivers As State's Smog-Checks Get In Gear, supra note 593, at A17.
597. Plesa, Emissions Tests Start Up Slowly at Some Centers, supra note 595, at Al.
598. Lydia Cum, Improvements Expected Once Emissions Tests Begin for Real, HOUSTON CITRON., Dec.
31, 1994, at A26.
599. Id.
600. Dawson, Waits Choke Some Drivers As State's Smog-Checks Get In Gear, supra note 593, at A17.
601. Plesa, Emissions Tests Start Up Slowly at Some Centers, supra note 595, at Al.
602. Plesa, Wheels in Motion Today for Emission Test Trial Run, supra note 582, at Al; John J. Sanko,
25 Percent of Cars Failed Their Emission Tests, HOUSTON POST, Dec. 18, 1994, at A53.
603. John Williams & John Makeig, Whitmire Seeks To Void Emissions-Test Contract, HOUSTON
CHRON., Dec. 21, 1994, at Al.
604. David Plesa, First Day of Emissions Testing; Sees 22 Percent of Vehicles Fail, HOUSTON POST,
Dec. 14, 1994, at Al.
605. Michael Saul, Auto Firm Accused of Damages; 52 Claims Filed Over Emission Tests, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Dec. 31, 1994, at A23. By the end of December, after more than 60,000 autos had been tested
at Tejas facilities, the company had received 52 insurance complaints from drivers who claimed that the testing
process had damaged their vehicles. A spokesman for Tejas Testing was not alarmed by the number of claims
and promised to pay for any damage caused by the testing process. A TNRCC spokesperson agreed that the
number of claims was not surprising. Id.
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reduce delays and prevent damage to tested vehicles, Tejas executives and
TNRCC officials were generally pleased with the results.
Despite the relatively successful first week, the talk radio hosts were begin-
ning to have an impact. The Republican sweep of the governor's office and
considerable conservative gains in the legislature in the November 1994 elections
provided a receptive audience to complaints from Houstonians who did not want
to go to the trouble of having their automobiles tested. Political pressure began
to mount on TNRCC to abandon the centralized test-only regime. 6 A spokesman
for TNRCC noted that EPA's capitulation put his agency in a "very precarious
position" when it came to defending the existing program.60 Chairman Hall com-
plained: "You do exactly what the federal government tells you to do and then
you wake up one morning and find they have changed their minds.'w 9
On December 20, 1994, only eight days after the "early bird" program was
initiated, a TNRCC spokesman announced that the agency was busily formulating
plans for an alternative TIM system that would be "less hostile to the public. 610
Among other options, the agency was considering a proposal to exempt from
mandatory testing all vehicles less than six years old.6 ' Since Tejas's contract
still guaranteed an adequate return on its investment, however, owners of every
automobile would have to pay a biennial fee whether or not the vehicle was
tested. 61
2
On December 21, 1994, state senator John Whitmire of Houston demanded
a complete repeal of the centralized test-only program,1 3 and he urged motorists
to boycott the Tejas facilities.614 Whitmire claimed that TNRCC should not con-
cern itself with making Tejas whole, because the State could simply cancel the
Tejas contract for poor performance by the testing company. Citing no evidence
to support this surprising conclusion, he announced that the State should not
worry about fairness to Tejas, because it was merely "a group of speculators that
came to Texas to make millions of dollars from an ill-conceived, unreasonable
and abusive testing program." 65 Securing the required 15% reduction in emis-
sions required by the Clean Air Act should not detain the state, because Congress
606. Dawson, Waits Choke Some Drivers As State's Smog-Checks Get In Gear, supra note 591, at A17;
Plesa, Emissions Tests Start Up Slowly at Some Centers, supra note 595, at Al.
607. David Plesa, State Eyes Change in Auto Tests, HOUSTON POST, Dec. 20, 1994, at Al [hereinafter
Plesa, State Eyes Change in Auto Tests].
608. Ralph K.M. Haurwitz, Governor-Elect Bush Views Options to Ease Vehicle Testing, AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Dec. 22, 1994, at BI.
609. David Plesa, Doubt Clouds Emission Test Plan's Future; It Looked Solid on Paper, But Reality
Unkind, HOUSTON POST, Dec. 25, 1994, at Al [hereinafter Plesa, Doubt Clouds Emission Test Plan's Future].
610. Plesa, State Eyes Change in Auto Tests,-supra note 607, at Al.
611. Id..
612. Id.
613. Williams & Makeig, supra note 603, at Al.
614. David Plesa, Bush Sees 'Chaos' inAuto Tests, HOUSTON POST, Dec. 21, 1994, at Al.
615. Williams & Makeig, supra note 603, at Al.
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was sure to amend the Clean Air Act within the next two years to relieve the
states of that obligation.1 6
Governor-elect George Bush, Jr. lent his support to the opponents of the
centralized system, claiming (without any supporting evidence) that the system
was "too onerous and will not work."6 7 At a local Chamber of Commerce
luncheon, Bush claimed that the centralized system would "create chaos in
Texas," and he announced that he supported efforts by Houston Representative
Tom DeLay to amend the Clean Air Act to eliminate all mandatory I/M require-
ments.618 Echoing California officials, Bush argued that because 70% of auto
emissions came from older autos, the I/M program should be directed exclusively
to those problem cars.619 Even moderate legislators who supported a testing pro-
gram suggested that a test-and-repair program would be equally effective.62"
Lieutenant Governor Bob Bullock, a democrat, claimed that centralized IM was
"too onerous." 621 A spokesman for TNRCC, which made no effort to challenge
the perceptions generated in the local media, offered that "we are gathering
directions from the incoming leadership and elected officials to fornulate the type
of program they want in the State of Texas.
' 22
Tejas Testing provided the only hard data on consumer acceptance of the
program when it announced that the people who had actually used the system
during the first week had filled out comment cards that were generally
favorable.623 During the first two weeks in which more than 40,000 autos were
tested, Tejas received only 500 complaints.624 During that time there were a few
delays of more than one hour, but the average waiting time for all autos was ten
minutes.62 For Houstonians, who think nothing of spending two hours per day
in bumper-to-bumper traffic, this was not an extensive wait. Tejas said that it was
willing to work with TNRCC to make any necessary improvements.626 But it
pointed out that if the state abandoned centralized I/M, it would have to come up
with equivalent emissions reductions from other polluters, presumably stationary
616. Id.
617. Id.
618. Plesa, Bush Sees 'Chaos' in Auto Tests, supra note 614, at Al; Williams & Makeig, supra note 603,
at Al.
619. Williams & Makeig, supra note 603, at Al.
620. Id.
621. Plesa, Bush Sees 'Chaos' in Auto Tests, supra note 614, at Al.
622. Id.
623. Id.
624. Victoria Loe, Testing Firm Backs Plan on Emissions, DALLAS MORNING NEWs, Dec. 28, 1994, at
A23.
625. Id.; see Mary Lenz, Tailpipe Test Firm Warns Against Delays, HOUSTON POST, Dec.28, 1994, at
Al.
626. Plesa, Bush Sees 'Chaos' in Auto Tests, supra note 614, at Al.
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sources. 627 And it warned: "We lived up to our end of the bargain. We would
hope the Legislature would live up to their end, if it comes to that."6
The local companies that had contracted with Tejas to run individual testing
facilities were barely heard in the cacophony. The operator of the Pasadena
facility, M.S. Safadi, reported that his employees were already beginning to jump
ship for fear that their jobs would be eliminated by the legislature.629 The local
facility operators recognized a few problems with the early operation of the
program, but witnessed nothing to inspire the vilification that was beginning to
flow from the talk show hosts and local politicians. 630
A representative of the Sierra Club characterized the sudden and unexpected
outpouring from state elected officials as "cheap political pandering." 63' Because
the governor-elect had not been involved in the extensive planning and pre-
paration for the centralized program, "he can't really be expected to know how
important this program is. 6 32 To the Sierra Club, however, it was clear that
absent an effective I/M program, Houston would never achieve the NAAQS for
ozone.
633
Governor Bush met with officials from TNRCC on December 22, 1994 to
explore options for making the system "less of a hassle for the public." 6mAn EPA
regional official assured the state that although EPA preferred a centralized
system like the one that was already in place, "we are also willing to work with
the state on any possible changes to the program., 635 Meanwhile, Texas Senator
Kay Bailey Hutchison demanded that EPA give the state a six-month grace period
to decide whether to replace the centralized program with an alternative
acceptable to EPA.636
On December 27, 1994, TNRCC announced that it had decided to let the
program go forward for the time being, but it would attempt to implement some
changes to make it "more convenient." 637 The agency announced that for the first
two years, it would reduce the maximum required repair from $450 to $150.63"
627. Loe, supra note 624, at A23.
628. Ross Ramsey, Emissions Test Alterations Costly, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 28, 1994, at A17.
629. Leigh Hopper, Auto Emissions Flap Worries Contractos, HOUSTON POST, Dec. 24, 1994, at A20.
630. Id.
631. Id.
632. Id.
633. Dan Feldstein, Car Emission Tests to Start on Time, HOUSTON POST, Dec. 29, 1994, at Al.
634. Haurwitz, supra note 608, at B1.
635. Plesa, Doubt Clouds Emission Test Plan's Future, supra note 609, at Al.
636. Id.
637. Victoria Loe, Changes Announced in Emissions Testing, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Dec. 30, 1994,
at Al [hereinafter Loe, Changes Announced in Emissions Testing].
638. Ken Herman, State Lowers RepairLimit on Emissions Test to $150, HOUSTON POST, Dec. 30, 1994,
at Al; Loe, Changes Announced in Emissions Testing, supra note 637, at Al; Mark Smith, Car Owners Given
Some Slack, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 30, 1994, at Al. This change represented a clear violation of the Clean
Air Act for serious and above nonattainment areas like Houston. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7511a(c)(3)(C)(iii) (West
1995).
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The required pressure tests of the fuel lines and purge canister would be
accomplished without opening the hoods, thereby reducing the risk of damage to
the automobiles.639 The agency also promised to conduct daily on-site inspections
to ensure that everything was running smoothly.? But it warned that some form
of I/M would have to be implemented, because it was "not technically or
economically feasible to shift to industry those reductions we are slated to get
from emissions testing. ' €'4t The agency pointed out that centralized IM would
cost only about $1500 per ton of VOCs removed as compared to $10,000 per ton
for some industrial sources. 42
The TNRCC concessions did not satisfy Texas politicians. Senator Hutchison
maintained that "[t]hese last-minute changes only show how wrong it is to try to
start a new federally mandated program by Jan[uary] l."63 Governor-elect Bush
agreed with Senator Hutchison that more sweeping changes were desirable.6"
State Senator Whitmire echoed these sentiments, proclaiming that the last minute
changes "show how arbitrary and ridiculous the whole thing was in the first
place.' ,645 He promised to introduce emergency legislation on the first day of the
upcoming legislative session to suspend all I/M testing for two years.64
When the Tejas stations opened for official business on January 2, 1995, cold
weather and the end of free testing kept the customers away.647 During the first
eight days, 89.5% of the inspected autos passed the inspection, much better than
the 20% failure rate TNRCC expected.648 Despite the absence of any lines, some
motorists still claimed that the tests were unnecessary.649 Others complained that
if TNRCC allowed the waiver cutoff to go below $450, the most egregious
violators would still be on the road and the program would be a waste.650 Pastor
Aubrey Vaughan, minister of Grace Baptist Church, led a sparsely attended
protest march on city hall claiming that the program's supporters were '"just elite
people talking about ecology, and they're getting rich off it."65' Vaughan, who
was convinced that air pollution control should be left up to God, 652 later formed
639. Herman, supra note 638, at Al; Smith, supra note 638, at Al.
640. Loe, Changes Announced in Emissions Testing, supra note 637, at Al.
641. Id.
642. Id
643. Id.
644. Herman, supra note 638, at Al.
645. Smith, supra note 638, at Al.
646. Id.
647. Dana Willhoit, Cold, Holiday Get Tailpipe Testing Off to a Slow Start, HOUSTON POST, Jan. 3,
1995, at Al.
648. David Plesa, Tailpipe Test Officials Warn Long Lines Ahead, HOUSTON POST, Jan. 12, 1995, at A1.
649. Willhoit, supra note 647, at Al.
650. Id.
651. Id. Twenty people showed up for the march. Id.
652. John Williams, Emissions Draft Backs Annual Test, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 1, 1995, at A25.
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a group called "Houston for a Healthy Society" to protest the centralized I/M
program.653 No long lines developed during the next three weeks.6 4
Despite the fact that the testing facilities were working well, Senator
Whitmire was determined to put an end to mandatory I/M. In a fire-breathing
editorial published in the major Dallas and Houston newspapers, he castigated the
I/M program as an "unnecessary, inefficient and ill-conceived bureaucratic
nuisance." 655 He noted that in light of EPA's promised flexibility on I/M, several
states had decided to terminate centralized I/M programs6 56 Senator Whitmire
painted Tejas Testing as the villain, observing that it stood to make millions on
the program and that it had hired prominent attorneys and lobbyists in Austin to
defend the centralized I/M program.657 Ignoring the fact that the Tejas facility was
built to meet EPA's guidelines for IM-240 test-only facilities, Whitmire claimed
that the Tejas operators, most of whom were small locally owned businesses,
were "speculators that came up with a bad program and they don't deserve to be
rewarded." 658 According to Whitmire, industrial sources had no need to fear that
they would be forced to come up with further emissions reductions because EPA
would no doubt be flexible with them as well. 659 In any event, several important
members of the incoming Congress were committed to amending the Clean Air
Act to eliminate stringent requirements on both individuals and industry.
660
Senator Whitmire, however, assured his readers that the public health would not
suffer as a result. Finally, the Senator was confident that the state could not
possibly be held liable for damages to Tejas stemming from the cancellation of
its contract. 66t
On January 10, 1995, the first day of the new legislative session, Senator
Whitmire introduced the promised bill to suspend mandatory I/M for two years. 662
The Legislature obligingly made Senator Whitmire's bill one of its first orders of
business.663 Lieutenant Governor Bob Bullock, who was responsible for
653. David Plesa, Tailpipe Quiz: Guess Who Pays?, HOUSTON POST, Jan. 16, 1995, at Al.
654. One old pickup truck that underwent testing emitted so much carbon monoxide that the testing
facility had to be evacuated. The owner decided that it might be time to buy a new truck. Stefanie Asin,
Uncertainty of Emissions Tests Not Deterring Car Owners, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 4, 1995, at A13.
655. John Whitmire, Auto Emission Testing Program; Makes Profits, Doesn't Clean Air, HOUSTON
POST, Jan. 9, 1995, at A13; John Whitmire, Hold Up On Emissions Testing, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 8, 1995,
at Ol [hereinafter Whitmire, Hold Up On Emissions Testing]; John Whitmire, Let's Delay Emissions Tests,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 15, 1995, at J6.
656. Whitmire, Hold Up On Emissions Testing, supra note 655, at 01.
657. Id.
658. Terrence Stutz, Senate Panel OKs Delay in Emissions Tests, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Jan. 12,
1995, at A29 [hereinafter Stutz, Senate Panel OKs Delay in Emissions Tests].
659. Whitmire, Hold Up On Emissions Testing, supra note 655, at 01.
660. Id.
661. Id.
662. Mary Lenz, Emissions Test Up To Legislature, HOUSTON POST, Jan. 11, 1995, at A19; Sylvia
Moreno & Terrence Stutz, New Legislature Convenes, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 11, 1995, at Al.
663. Moreno & Stutz, supra note 662, at Al.
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governing the flow of legislation through the Texas Senate, agreed to support a
bill that would declare a three-month moratorium on centralized I/M, and he pro-
mised a vote on the bill within a week."9 He announced that a three-month delay
would in no way imperil the State's receipt of highway funds."5 Most of the
members of the Senate signed on as co-sponsors to a three-month moratorium
sponsored by Senator Whitmire. 6" Whitmire reported that U.S. Senator Kay
Bailey Hutchison had assured him in a recent telephone conversation that a three-
month delay would allow Congress to provide relief from centralized I/M on a
national level." 7 According to Whitmire: "We are all for clean air... but this is
about getting government off the backs of the people of Texas.
'
"
8
With only the briefest of hearings and with virtually no deliberation, the
Senate Natural Resources Committee favorably reported the Whitmire bill the day
after it was introduced." 9 At the truncated hearings, a Tejas representative pointed
out that Tejas had "financing agreements of $100 million which we would be in
default of if we cannot generate sufficient revenue to make payments." 670 Reading
the writing on the political wall, Tejas expressed a willingness to "work with the
state to reshape the program," but it urged that "any changes should be made over
time." 671 Demonstrating a keen sense for the direction of the political winds,
TNRCC head John Hall testified in support of the Whitmire bill, "because it will
give the state of Texas time to determine what substantive changes the new
Congress may make in the provisions of the Clean Air Act, particularly with
regard to emissions testing."6 72 Senate Finance Committee Chairman John
Montford, however, warned that if Tejas sued, "we're looking down the barrel of
some pretty hefty damages." 673 Montford urged his fellow senators not to take the
state's contractual obligations lightly.674 Whitmire replied, erroneously, that the
state could not be sued unless the legislature agreed to allow the suit.675 The
state's Legislative Budget Board apparently accepted this assessment when it
concluded that the Whitmire bill would not cost the state a penny.
6 76
664. Id.
665. Id.; Lenz, supra note 662, at A19.
666. Moreno & Stutz, supra note 662, at Al.
667. Id.; Lenz, supra note 662, at A19.
668. Terrence Stutz, Texas Senate OKs 3-Month Delay on Emissions Tests, DALLAS MOPNING NEWS,
Jan. 17, 1995, at A19 [hereinafter Stutz, Texas Senate OKs 3-Month Delay on Emissions Tests].
669. Stutz, Senate Panel OKs Delay in Emissions Tests, supra note 658, at A29.
670. Id.
671. Id.
672. Id.
673. Mary Lenz, Senate Panel Votes to Delay Emission Tests, HOUSTON POST, Jan. 12, 1995, at A23.
674. Ben Wear, Possible Liability Has Senators Re-Examining Auto, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN,
Jan. 14, 1995, atB1.
675. Id.
676. Id.
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While the bill was pending, Senator Hutchison announced that she had asked
EPA to grant a six-month delay in all I/M requirements while it came up'with a
new program.677 She noted, inaccurately, that EPA had just given California a
two-year reprieve from the enhanced I/M requirements.6 78 EPA had in fact
approved a "hybrid" enhanced I/M program for California, but it had not granted
a total waiver. Texas was in fact asking for a period of six months with no I/M
program beyond the very modest pollution checks that had historically been
undertaken during the state-required safety inspections. Senator Hutchison
maintained, accurately, that it would be very difficult for EPA to deny Texas's
request for an extension after having demonstrated considerable flexibility with
California.679 Just in case EPA proved difficult, Senator Hutchison introduced a
bill to grant all states a six-month moratorium from enhanced I/M require-
ments.6 Senator Hutchison recognized, however, that the State might have some
obligation to compensate Tejas Testing for its predictable losses.681
In a rare editorial response to the barrage of criticism from elected officials,
the owner of one of the Houston testing facilities maintained that the attacks were
a "pure smoke screen. 68 2 He argued that the IM-240 tests employed in Texas
were, according to EPA, the most accurate in existence.68 3 To the charge that
centralized I/M caused unnecessary delays, he pointed out that the average testing
time at a centralized facility was one-half the time that the State allowed for
annual safety tests.6" To the charge that the program was suddenly foisted on an
unaware public, he noted that TNRCC had conducted extensive hearings to elicit
the input of members of the public and elected officials before initiating the
program: "Any politician acting like this is a new and unexpected issue is being
disingenuous.'6s5
With the state's major newspapers editorializing in favor of a 90-day mora-
torium,m the Whitmire bill unanimously passed the Texas Senate on the next day
of the session.68 7 Senator Whitmire proclaimed: "The people of Texas want
677. Stutz, Texas Senate OKs 3-Month Delay on Emissions Tests, supra note 668, at A29.
678. Id.
679. Id.
680. Mary Lenz, Senate Backs 90-Day Delay of Tailpipe Test, HOUSTON POST, Jan. 17, 1995, at Al
[hereinafter Lenz, Senate Backs 90-Day Delay of Tailpipe Test]; Stutz, Texas Senate OKs 3-Month Delay on
Emissions Tests, supra note 668, at A29.
681. Ben Wear, Officials Differ on State's Costs from Emissions, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Jan.
17, 1995, at B3.
682. Rick Sharbrough, Smell of Politics in Opposition to Emission Tests, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 17,
1995, at A19.
683. l
684. Id.
685. Id.
686. Postponement Until the Fog Clears Is Warranted, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 13, 1995, at A28.
687. Lenz, Senate Backs 90-Day Delay of Tailpipe Test, supra note 680, at Al; Stutz, Texas Senate OKs
3-Month Delay on Emissions Tests, supra note 668, at A19; Wear, supra note 681, at B3.
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government off their backs. That's what this vote is all about."88 Joined by
several other Senators, Whitmire then hopped on a plane for Washington to urge
the Texas delegation to pressure EPA into foregoing any sanctions.6 9 TNRCC
announced that it was working on a backup proposal in the event that the
Whitmire bill was not enacted in the House prior to January 31690 It took the
House a little longer to consider the bill, because it had not even appointed the
relevant committees by the time that the Senate had rushed through the
legislation.69'
On January 19, Whitmire's delegation met with Senator Hutchison, EPA
representatives and House Majority Whip Tom Delay of Houston in DeLay's new
office. After a "cooperative dialogue," Administrator Browner agreed not to
enforce the centralized test-only regime provided for in the Texas SIP for ninety
days while the state legislature attempted to come up with a more "user friendly"
testing regime.692 Browner cautioned, however, that this action did not presage
any relaxation of the ambient air quality standards. 693 It did mean, however, that
as far as EPA was concerned, the state could violate its SIP. According to Whit-
mire, EPA's action allowed the state to go "back to the drawing board" and come
up with a new I/M program for Houston and Dallas.694 Senator Hutchison
announced that she would still introduce legislation making enhanced I/M a
voluntary program,695 and Representative DeLay promised to insert a rider in
EPA's appropriations bill preventing EPA from enforcing any SIP requirements
calling for centralized 1/M.696 Governor Bush also applauded Browner's decision
and promised that the state would deal with Tejas in a "fair fashion. ''697
The Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives placed the moratorium
bill on a fast track.68 He assigned the bill to a special committee, which held a 7.5
hour hearing on the state's potential liability to Tejas Testing and other relevant
issues.699 Although the Sierra Club and a few representatives complained that the
688. Lenz, Senate Backs 90-Day Delay of Tailpipe Test, supra note 680, at Al.
689. Id.; Wear, supra note 681, at B3.
690. Terrence Stutz, Agency Crafting Emissions-Test Plan, DALLAS MORNING Nmws, Jan. 18, 1995, at
A26.
691. Lenz, Senate Backs 90-Day Delay of Tailpipe Test, supra note 680, at Al.
692. William E. Clayton Jr. & John Williams, State Allowed to Devise New Emissions Plan, HOUSTON
CHRON., Jan. 20, 1995, at Al; Rosalind Jackler, EPA Giving State A Break on Emissions, HOUSTON POST, Jan.
20, 1995, at Al; Texas Gets Time To Modify Emissions Testing, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1850 ( Jan.
27, 1995).
693. Clayton & Williams, supra note 692, at Al.
694. Id.
695. Id.
696. Jackler, supra note 692, at Al.
697. Clayton & Williams, supra note 692, at Al.
698. John Williams, Emissions Test Bill Put on Fast Track, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 21, 1995, at A27
[hereinafter Williams, Emissions Test Bill Put on Fast Track].
699. John Williams, Emissions Delay Clears House Panel, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 25, 1995, at A18;
Williams, Emissions Test Bill Put on Fast Track, supra note 698.
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state was taking precipitous action with potentially grave financial conse-
quences, 700 the House passed the ninety day moratorium bill on January 26, 1995,
by a lopsided vote of 132-10.!' The fact that Tejas received its financing not
from local banks, but from the Bank of Montreal, Credit Suisse, and Fuji Bank
Ltd., was prominently featured in the House debates.7 02 If Tejas suffered
bankruptcy as a result of the state's breach of its contractual obligations, it would
not impact adversely on the state's banking industry.
On January 31, 1995, Governor Bush signed the legislation. 703 The governor
stated that his main concern was that "Texas be treated like California or any
other state, that we be granted maximum flexibility on how we are judged."7 4
Like all of the other politicians who engineered the moratorium, Bush declared
that "we can achieve clean air standards," but he was quite sure that "[w]e do not
want a rigid system that penalizes Texas and Texas car owners., 705 The governor
did not suggest where the state would find the emissions reductions required to
meet the clean air standards in the absence of a centralized I/M program. That
was a matter for another, no doubt less triumphant, day.
In addition to placing a ninety day moratorium on all I/M testing, the
legislature graciously provided an $8.8 million fund to make loans to Tejas so
that it could repay some of its nearly $100 million in outstanding debts to
suppliers and other creditors, and so that its franchisees could avoid bankruptcy
for the next three months. Tejas promised to use the respite to work with TNRCC
to come up with a more "user friendly" system for conducting high tech 1IM
testing.706 In the hope that some sort of centralized program would emerge from
its negotiations with the State, Tejas Testing retained a skeleton staff and kept a
few testing facilities open in Houston and Dallas.70 7 Senator Whitmire was not
700. Mary Lenz, Panel Votes to Suspend Emissions Test, HOUSTON POST, Jan. 25, 1995, at A17; Sylvia
Moreno & Charlette-Anne Lalas, Emission-Test Firm Fears Program Delay Company May Face Ruin,
Lawmakers Told, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Jan. 25, 1995, at A22. Several state representatives were concerned
that if the state reneged on its contract with Tejas, the state would acquire a bad reputation in the business
community and might even suffer a reduction in the ratings for its bonds. Sylvia Moreno, Bill to Delay
Emissions Tests Hits Snag in House, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Jan. 26, 1995, at A23; John Williams, Three
Move To Save Emissions Test Firm, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 26,1995, at A23.
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Expected to OK LIM Delay, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1885 (Feb. 3,1995).
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1995, at Al.
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1, 1995, at Al [hereinafter Stutz, Bush Signs Bill to Delay Emissions Tests 3 Months]; John Williams,
Emissions Test Put Off 91 Days While State Revamps Program, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 1, 1995, at Al.
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707. David Plesa, Most Emissions Test Sites to Close for Moratorium, HOUSTON POST, Feb. 3, 1995, at
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certain that the legislature could come up with an acceptable I/M program within
the ninety day moratorium period, but he was confident that as long as the State
was proceeding in "good faith" EPA or Congress would grant additional
extensions.7°s In particular, Whitmire was determined to destroy Tejas's mono-
poly over I/M testing in the Houston and Dallas areas.7 9
As the Legislature set about the task of coming up with an alternative
enhanced I/M program, an attorney for many industrial sources of VOCs in the
Houston area cautioned that an I/M program could not be avoided if air quality
in that city was ever going to achieve the NAAQS. It was therefore "totally
irresponsible to say you ought not to test my car.' 7t0 A spokesman for the Texas
Automobile Dealers Association suggested that auto dealers and service stations
could probably add 150 testing facilities to the twenty-seven cites in Houston if
a less expensive, low-tech testing technologies were allowed. TM In early April, a
new organization called the Texas State Inspection Association, composed pri-
marily of service station owners, presented to the Governor a petition signed by
40,000 people demanding a test-and-repair I/M program using local service
stations.
712
Lieutenant Governor Bullock appointed a Special Committee on Emissions
and Clean Air in the Senate to come up with a "user friendly" IM program.
71 3
The Special Committee reported out a bill that would provide for annual testing
for all vehicles more than three years old at decentralized test-and-repair facilities.
Autos three years old and younger would not have to be tested, but purchasers of
new autos would have to pay a fee of twenty dollars that would go toward paying
for tests for low income owners. State owned vehicles and fleets of commercial
vehicles would have to be tested at centralized facilities. The plan would reduce
the number of counties surrounding Dallas that would be subject to I/M require-
ments also. T1 Senator David Cain, a member of the Special Committee, assured
the public that "we are not backing off from our goal of making sure we have the
clean air that all our citizens deserve."715 He did not indicate how the emissions
reductions lost by moving to a less effective system would be achieved.
A House committee came up with an alternative plan, sponsored by Repre-
sentative Warren Chisum, a democrat from the unpolluted Texas Panhandle, that
708. Stutz, Bush Signs Bill to Delay Emissions Tests 3 Months, supra note 703, at Al.
709. Id.
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atAI5.
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was similar to the one that EPA had recently approved for California. The
Chisum bill would have required owners of vehicles six years old and older to be
tested at centralized test-only facilities and allowed owners of vehicles less than
six years old to pay a "mitigation fee" of ten dollars or have them tested at
decentralized test-and-repair facilities. Remote sensors would be used to identify
heavily polluting vehicles that would also have to undergo centralized testing.
1 6
In mid-April, EPA Assistant Administrator Mary Nichols wrote Governor
Bush to tell him that EPA would approve the House program, but not the Senate
program. She warned that if the state submitted the Senate program to EPA for
approval, the state would not receive full emissions reduction credit. 717 A furious
Senator Whitmire vowed on the Senate floor to "fight EPA harder than ever."
718
Without citing any evidence, Whitmire maintained that the panel's program
would actually be more effective in reducing emissions than a centralized test-
only system. Noting that the Environmental Defense Fund of Texas had testified
in favor of his plan,719 he proclaimed that "[wie are sick and tired of the federal
government trying to control our lives."72 Senator Jerry Patterson of Pasadena
cheered Whitmire on and compared Whitmire's attack to the Confederate Army's
first salvo at Fort Sumpter.!2' He also accused Tejas Testing of using its $8.8
million loan to hire a former Whitmire employee to run a phone bank to generate
opposition to the Whitmire plan and to spread rumors about Whitmire's personal
life,72 charges that Tejas vigorously denied. 3 One long-time observer of the
Texas legislature called Whitmire's ten minute harangue "quite a show of
testosterone, adrenaline and perhaps even endorphins-producing the legislative
equivalent of runner's high.
724
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Governor Bush was also put off by the EPA letter and accused the agency of
meddling in Texas's affairs: "I take great, great umbrage at the federal govern-
ment trying to tell Texans how to run Texas."725 He warned ominously that
"Browner better get a hold of her agency."
726
Whitmire's fiery speech inspired the Texas Senate to adopt a confrontational
stance. On April 18, 1995, the Senate rejected the Special Committee's recom-
mendations and approved a Whitmire-sponsored bill that would have simply
postponed all vehicle I/M testing for two years 27 Whitmire explained: "If the
EPA didn't like what we were doing before, it might be a good message to send
them that one body of the Legislature has called for a two-year moratorium.,
728
One sure result of the bill would be to dash any hopes that Tejas Testing and its
franchisees might have had of surviving the legislative onslaught. Noting that
"[s]everal other states are doing exactly what we just did," Whitmire predicted
that "[i]f the major states get together and speak with one voice, they could dictate
to the EPA the terms for implementing this program. ' 729 One Republican state
senator complained that "[t]his idea of sending messages [to the federal govern-
ment] is Idds' stuff,"730 and he urged the Senate not to "cut off our nose to spite
our face."73' Whitmire admitted that once the House passed a bill, the Senate
conferees would probably use the Special Committee's bill as a negotiating
vehicle.7 32
On April 25, 1995, Representative Chisum withdrew his bill after numerous
objections from his colleagues made it clear that it would not be passed.733 At this
point, Governor Bush intervened and asked his staff to work with representatives
from both the House and the Senate to come up with a collaborative plan that
would be "good for Texas. '734 The collaborative plan they arrived at failed to
incorporate any elements of Representative Chisum's bill! 35 Instead, the bill
725. Lenz, Bush to EPA: Don't Tell Us What to Do, supra note 720, at A27; Stutz, Bush Accuses EPA
of Meddling in Emissions Plan, supra note 723, at D12.
726. Williams, Bush to EPA: Don't Meddle In State Affairs, supra note 720, at Al.
727. Terrence Stutz, Senate Supports 2-Year Delay for Vehicle Emissions Tests, DALLAS MORNINO
NEWs, Apr. 19, 1995, at Al [hereinafter Stutz, Senate Supports 2-Year Delay for Vehicle Emissions Tests];
John Williams, Senate Sends Message to EPA, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 19, 1995, at Al [hereinafter Williams,
Senate Sends Message to EPA]. Whitmire noted that the decentralized test-and-repair I/M program that was
in place in Dallas could continue during the moratorium. Id. Since Houston did not have an existing l/M
program, the moratorium would mean two more years of noncompliance with requirements that had been in
place since 1987.
728. Stutz, Senate Supports 2-Year Delayfor Vehicle Emissions Tests, supra note 727, at A1.
729. Id.
730. Id.
731. Williams, Senate Sends Message to EPA, supra note 727, at Al.
732. Stutz, Senate Supports 2-Year Delayfor Vehicle Emissions Tests, supra note 727, at A1.
733. John Williams, Emission-Test Bill Withdrawn, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 25, 1995, at A13.
734. John Williams & R.G. Rateliffe, Final Battle Shaping Up Over Tailpipe Inspections, HOUSTON
CHRON., Apr. 27, 1995, at Al.
735. Id.
1614
1996/Regulating Commuters to Clear the Air
returned things to their pre-1995 status with Dallas vehicles undergoing basic I/M
using the old BAR90 technology and Houston vehicles undergoing no testing at
all. 3 In a further attempt to be "user friendly," the bill placed enforcement
authority in the hands of the Department of Public Safety rather than in the
TNRCC.7 37 The bill also gave the Governor discretion to negotiate with EPA
should that agency disapprove the resulting amendment to the Texas SIP
31
The House and Senate both passed the Governor's bill and the Governor
signed it on May 1, 1995,739 despite the fact that it unquestionably violated the
1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act. Senator Whitmire hailed the House
action as a "major victory for the people."740
Not everyone was pleased. Representative Garnett Coleman announced that
he had voted against the bill "because every time I fly into Houston, I look down
and see the haze, [a]nd I think about my son, who has asthma and doesn't need
to breathe air like that."74' The American Lung Association confirmed that almost
700,000 children in the Houston area were at increased risk of serious lung
disease because of the high levels of air pollution.742 Senator John Leedom
observed that "[w]e're just going back to a system that already has been declared
not satisfactory for cleaning the air."743 Noting that the new legislation required
Tejas Testing to repay its $8.8 million loan in ninety days, a spokesman for Tejas
declared that the statute "essentially puts Tejas and all of its contractors in Dallas
and Houston out of business."744
The Governor's "user friendly" system did not even meet the "basic I/M"
requirements that should have been in place for more than a decade. One EPA
official stated categorically that it would not achieve nearly the emissions re-
ductions of the enhanced I/M program that the legislature had abandoned after
less than one month.745 The prospect of attaining the NAAQS in Dallas and of
achieving a 15% reduction in VOC emissions in Houston by 1996 became a
"tailpipe dream."
7
"
736. Sylvia Moreno, Bill Would Reinstate Earlier Tests, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Apr. 28, 1995, at
A39. Autos in the suburbs surrounding Dallas would not have to undergo even basic I/M testing.
737. Governor Signs Legislation Modifying State Vehicle Emissions Testing Plan, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA)
No. 1, at 31 (May 5, 1995) [hereinafter Governor Signs Legislation].
738. Moreno, supra note 736, at A39. Autos in the suburbs surrounding Dallas would not have to
undergo even basic I/M testing.
739. Terrence Stutz, Emissions Measure Approved, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 2, 1995, at Al
[hereinafter Stutz, Emissions Measure Approved]; John Williams, Texas Law Sidesteps EPA Emission Rules,
HOUSTON CHRON., May 2, 1995, at Al.
740. John Williams & Bill Dawson, House Backs Bill to Kill Centralized Emissions Testing, HOUSTON
CHRON., Apr. 28, 1995, at Al.
741. Id.
742. Id.
743. Stutz, Emissions Measure Approved, supra note 739, at Al.
744. Id.
745. Governor Signs Legislation, supra note 737, at 31.
746. A Crucial Reprieve, HOUSTON POST. Feb. 2, 1995, at A22.
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Rather than condemning the wholesale retreat as patently unlawful, EPA
announced that it was looking forward to further negotiations with Texas and held
open the possibility that highway sanctions would not be forthcoming if the
negotiations were successful.747 Senator Whitmire, however, discounted the threat
of lost federal highway funds: "I'm convinced Congress is going to make adjust-
ments to the Clean Air Act and we need to take advantage of them. '748 The
Senator was confident that President Clinton would not veto any such adjust-
ments: "If he can make a 180-degree turn like he did on affirmative action...,
EPA regulation isn't anything hard for him to do a back flip on."749
After operating a state-of-the-art facility for about one month, Tejas was out
of business, its forty-three franchisees were bankrupt, and 1800 newly hired
employees were out of work. James Rodriguez, who had worked as an auto
mechanic and auto parts salesperson all his life, had purchased one of the
franchises with $4000 of his own money and a $6300 loan. He had to lay off the
eighteen employees that he had fashioned into an effective team to run his
facility. One of the laid off employees, Oliver Rodgers, explained: "I really
believed we were building something beautiful here. We were cleaning up the air,
helping people take care of their cars and giving them a chance to understand why
we were all having to do this.750 Mubarka "Ali" Asharia had resigned from a
$60,000 per year job and invested his life savings in one of the franchises. After
the legislature walked away from the contract, Mr. Asharia said that he "couldn't
believe a thing like this could happen, not in Texas."75' Robert Grayson, who quit
his job with an engineering consulting firm and invested $20,000 of his savings
in his franchise, "grew up with the image that in Texas, a man's word was his
bond. 752 The Texas legislature proved both men wrong. At a hearing in which
forty-four franchisees begged the Special Committee not to destroy their busi-
nesses, Senator Whitmire responded with the compassion of a long-time Texas
politician: "I am sorry about what has happened to you, but that is not my con-
cern. My concern is for my constituents, and they were mad as hell over the way
you were doing business. 753
The day after the Governor signed the bill, Tejas announced that it would sue
Texas for atleast $150 million to cover the losses it had entailed as a result of the
747. Randy L. Loftis, EPA Ready to Negotiate on Emissions, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 3, 1995,
at A29.
748. Mary Lenz, Senate Panel OKs Retooled Version of Vehicle Emissions Testing Program, HOUSTON
POST, Apr. 11, 1995, at A15.
749. John Williams, Panel OKs New Test Plan for Emissions, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 11, 1995, at A13.
750. Lori Rodriquez, No Testing Means No Jobs, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 3, 1995, at Al.
751. Rebecca Howland, Dreams Vanish into the Ozone, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 5, 1995, at Al.
752. Id.
753. Stutz, Senate Panel OKs Delay in Emissions Tests, supra note 658, at A29.
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state's breach of its contract.7M Later, in August, Tejas presented a formal bill for
$187.5 million to TNRCC.755 Tejas won an initial victory in September 1995,
when a state district court held that the state could not enforce the legislation that
called for Tejas to repay its $8.8 million loan in ninety days. The court held that
the legislation violated Tejas's rights under the Texas Constitution, which pro-
vides that the state may not enact legislation that impairs contractual obli-
gations.5 The court explained: "It used to be in Texas that a person's word was
their bond. 757 Apparently, the state was not above the law.
The court victory was of only small comfort to Tejas Testing, which filed for
bankruptcy on September 12, 1995, listing as its primary asset its contract claims
against the State of Texas.5 Among the creditors listed were the lessors of the
land on which the testing facilities were erected, various suppliers, many large
companies and car dealerships that had paid for testing in advance, and, of course,
the State of Texas for the $8.8 million loan. 59
In November 1995, TNRCC proposed amendments to the Texas SIP that
would give drivers a choice of annual testing at a decentralized test-and-repair
facility using the low-tech BAR90 testing technology or biennial testing at a
centralized test-only facility.760 The agency did not, however, explain why anyone
would be willing to build and operate a centralized facility after Tejas's
experience. And the head of the Houston Chapter of the Automotive Service
Association was not even sure that Houston service stations would be anxious to
shell out $10,000 to $20,000 for the BAR90 testing technology, given Tejas
Testing's recent experience. 6'
In addition, the plan excluded several suburban counties in both the Dallas
and Houston areas from the IM program.762 Like the California plan, the new
754. Loftis, supra note 747, at A29; John Williams, Emissions Testing Company Sues State, HOUSTON
CHRON., May 3, 1995, at A25.
755. John Williams, Emissions Firm Sends State $18Z5 Million Bill, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 8, 1995,
at A13.
756. Pauline Arrillaga, Emissions Test Firm Wins Ruling Against Repaying Loan Now, AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Sept. 1, 1995, at B8; Clay Robison, Tejas Testing Wins Ruling on Repayment,
HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 1, 1995, at A53 [hereinafter Robison, Tejas Testing Wins Ruling on Repayment].
757. Walt Borges, Senate's Debate Trips Up Testing Law, TEXAS LAw., Sept. 11, 1995, at 4; Robinson,
Tejas Testing Wins Ruling on Repayment, supra note 757, at A53.
758. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Emissions Testing Finn FilesforBankruptcy, DALLAS MORNINGNEWS, Sept.
13, 1995, at ID.
759. d; Clay Robison, Emissions Testing Firm Tejas Files Chapter 11, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 13,
1995, at A15.
760. Dan Feldstein, Emission Plan Gives 3 Choices, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 10, 1995, at Al; Randy
L. Loftis, Bush to Reveal Emissions Plan Today Supporters Hope to Satisfy EPA, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Nov. 10, 1995, at A33; Wayne Slater, State Outlines Compromise Emissions Plan, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Sept. 2, 1995, at Al; Terrence Stutz, State Offers Wider OptionsforAuto Emissions Testing, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Nov. 11, 1995, at Al [hereinafter Stutz, State Offers Wider Options for Auto Emissions Testing].
761. Feldstein, supra note 760, at Al.
762. Id.; Slater, supra note 760, at Al.
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Texas plan called for remote sensing. 63 The Texas remote sensing program,
however, was a good deal weaker than the California equivalent, because it did
not require automobiles identified as gross emitters to undergo centralized testing.
Instead, gross polluters would receive a polite request to have their automobiles
checked at a test-and-repair facility. Second-timers would be required to have
their vehicles checked, but there would be no penalties for violating the require-
ment. Only after multiple violations would a vehicle's registration be subject to
revocation.64 The plan would also implement a "cash for clunkers" program
under which TNRCC would buy up older polluting automobiles and retire
them.76 This proposed "motorists choice" plan pleased both Governor Bush and
Senator Whitmire. 766 Governor Bush announced: 'The Texas plan now offers the
drivers of Dallas, Fort Worth and Houston greater choice and greater con-
venience, and this plan will result in cleaner air.' 767
Some local officials and environmental groups, however, wondered how the
much less effective low-tech testing would achieve the degree of emission
reduction needed to meet the statutory 15% VOC reduction requirement by the
end of 1996.768 A TNRCC analysis predicted that the new plan would reduce
VOC emissions by twenty-eight tons per day in Dallas and by twenty-four tons
per day in Houston,769 but it would allow about 25% more VOC emissions than
the original plan calling for centralized I/M.70 Environmentalists noted that air
quality in the Dallas/Fort Worth nonattainment area was apparently growing
worse. The fifteen exceedences that occurred during the summer of 1995 were the
greatest number since 1984. Yet, the new plan would allow many more tons of
emissions.
Governor Bush effectively conceded this point and argued that meeting the
existing EPA air-quality standards would be impossible, "no matter what we do
with emissions testing."77' The governor advocated amending the standards so
that a single violation of the NAAQS would not throw an area into nonattain-
ment.772 The relevance of this solution to Dallas and Houston, both of which had
suffered multiple exceedences in every year since the Clean Air Act was enacted,
was not immediately apparent.
Senator Whitmire's confident assurance that sovereign immunity would
shield the state from Tejas's lawsuit was proved wrong in mid-March 1996, when
763. Feldstein, supra note 760, at Al.
764. Stutz, State Offers Wider Options for Auto Emissions Testing, supra note 760, at Al.
765. Loftis, supra note 760, at A33.
766. Bill Dawson, Local Leaders Are Mixed on Emission Plan, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 6, 1995, at Al.
767. Ross Ramsey, Pollution Abatement Plan Is Unveiled, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 11, 1995, at A34.
768. Dawson, Local Leaders Are Mixed on Emission Plan, supra note 766, at.A1.
769. Stutz, State Offers Wider Options for Auto Emissions Testing, supra note 760, at Al.
770. Loftis, supra note 760, at A33.
771. Stutz, State Offers Wider Options forAuto Emissions Testing, supra note 760, at Al.
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a federal magistrate ruled that the state's insistence on recovering the $8.8
million loan constituted a waiver of any sovereign immunity from Tejas's
counterclaim.773
Thus, Texas quickly overtook California in the head-long race to the bottom.
All that remains of the state-of-the-art facilities that the now-bankrupt Tejas
Testing Corp. constructed in Houston are a $200 million lawsuit and fifty-five
boarded-up monuments to de facto devolution in the 1990s.
VI. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM-A CYNICAL VIEW
EPA is a large regulatory agency, but it is not large enough to administer a
dozen major environmental programs by itself. Because there will never be a
large enough federal environmental police force to ensure that each of the
millions of commuters in large urban areas complies with the law, a large degree
of voluntary compliance is necessary for the successful implementation of any
program of mobile source air pollution controls." 4 In addition, EPA must have
the active cooperation of state and local governments if a program that impacts
so directly upon the population is to have any chance of succeeding.
The 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act reflected the frustration of its
supporters with prior state efforts to address the problem of air pollution. After
twenty years of failed state programs, Congress took the bull by the horns and
created a federal program in which the states played a critical, but distinctly
subservient role. The buzzword of the time was "cooperative federalism," and the
vision was of a highly trained cadre of experts at the federal level setting ambient
air quality standards to be achieved by statutory deadlines through state imple-
mentation plans drafted by officials knowledgeable about local matters. The
model had the potential for considerable tension between states and the federal
government, and that potential has been fully realized over the years. In 1977,
Professors Krier and Ursin characterized the relationship as "distinctly un-
cooperative,"'" 5 and it has only gotten worse in the ensuing twenty years."
6
A. EPA's Inability to Commandeer State Resources
At first, the federal agency to which Congress delegated implementation
responsibilities initially attempted to secure state cooperation by requisitioning
773. TJ. Milling, State Loses Immunity to Lawsuit, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 16, 1996, at A30; Richard
A. Oppel, Jr., Emissions-Testing Firm Wins Right to Bring State of Texas to Trial, DALLAS MORNING NEws,
Mar. 16,1996, at Fll.
774. See, e.g., DAVIES, supra note 1, at 91 ("Pollution laws, like all other laws, require a high degree of
voluntary compliance for their success.").
775. KpiER & URSIN, supra note 81, at 297.
776. See generally Ora F. Harris, Jr., The Automobile Emissions Control Inspection and Maintenance
Program: Making It More Palatable to "Coerced" Participants, 49 LA. L. REV. 1315 (1989).
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it. EPA simply commanded the states to establish various programs and threa-
tened civil and criminal sanctions if the states refused. This short-sighted
approach served only to raise state hackles and to interject emotional arguments
about state sovereignty into the debate over how to clean up the environment.
777
It was ultimately a battle that EPA could not win, and it lost both in court and in
Congress.
EPA cannot simply commandeer state resources and force state legislatures
and executive officials to take affirmative steps to implement federal policies.
EPA was foolhardy to take the position initially that it-could simply order the
states to enact, implement, and enforce regulatory programs dictated by a federal
bureaucracy. This extreme stance, which rested on the rather weak argument that
a state's highways were indirect sources of automobile pollutants, undermined
fledgling state agencies, alienated the courts, armed anti-regulatory politicians
with horror stories, and ultimately caused even the agency's allies to run for
cover. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals called EPA's position
"astonishing;"778 other observers were less circumspect.
B. Unwillingness of the States to Undertake Adequate Implementation
Efforts
The history of federal I/M programs plainly demonstrates that the states are
entirely unwilling to implement such programs voluntarily. The states often couch
resistance to implementing federal programs in the rhetoric of state sovereignty,
and it is no doubt true that federal officials have at times paid insufficient
attention to legitimate state concerns about the usurpation of their jealously
guarded powers.779 It is also true that some states have occasionally gone out of
their way to assert their independence, even when cooperation would not sacrifice
any important state interests. For example, during the late 1993 face-off between
California and EPA over whether a centralized test-only enhanced I/M program
would go into effect in Los Angeles, a California lobbyist reported that: "Some
legislators are just itching for a fight with the EPA, saying: 'We dare you to
impose sanctions. '
The fierce resistance in many states, however, is more complex than
simplistic appeals to "states rights." Left to their own devices, the states would
have achieved very little of the substantial progress that the country has made
toward attaining health-based goals for urban air quality. And, it is painfully clear
777. See KRIER & URSIN, supra note 81, at 298 ('he sovereign states so honored (less and less with
time, but still honored) in the past were suddenly stripped of their royal robes; they became commoners subject
to enlistment in the war to save the environment.").
778. Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 224 (4th Cir. 1975).
779. Harris, supra note 776, at 1317.
780. Cone & Healy, supra note 432, at A3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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that if the states are again given primary responsibility for reaching those goals,
they will never be achieved, and air quality in most urban areas will decline.
There are several explanations for state resistance that go beyond simple "turf
consciousness," including disagreement with basic implementation goals, lack of
political will at the state level to accomplish environmental goals, competitive
pressures among states, and local demagoguery.
C. Disagreement with Basic Implementation Goals
In the early days, some states took the position that photochemical oxidant
and carbon monoxide pollution did not pose significant health risks to the general
public and were therefore reluctant to force important economic actors to reduce
emissions and to require members of the general public to go out of their way to
clean up pollution. Although fundamental disagreement with the goals underlying
the NAAQS virtually disappeared after the mid-1970s, it has resurfaced again in
the wake of the 1994 elections. Commissioner R.B. Marquez of the Texas Natural
Resource Conservation Commission recently testified that it was not worthwhile
to force companies and commuters to take additional steps merely to reduce
ambient levels of a "relatively benign" pollutant that affects only a very few
sensitive persons.!" If the process of establishing ambient air quality standards
is returned to the states, pollution-sensitive individuals had best view Houston
through the rearview mirror, and the rest of its residents had better get used to a
little discomfort once in awhile.
States have also expressed disagreement with the role that reactive
hydrocarbon emissions and NO, play in forming photochemical oxidants. In the
early 1970s, for example, the State of Texas took the position that industrial
sources accounted for the bulk of reactive hydrocarbons in the Houston area and
assured EPA that the primary standard for ozone (which was at that time 0.08
ppm) could be met by 1977 without any limitations on commuter traffic. In 1990,
after the state's stationary source controls have been fully implemented (and even
tightened in some instances), ambient ozone levels in Houston exceeded 0.2 ppm
on eight days and exceeded the amended primary standard (now 0.12 ppm) on
forty-eight days.782 It is by now fair to conclude that the state's optimistic model
was driven much more by politics than science. If such modeling exercises are
781. Hearings on Clean AirAct Oversight Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation and the
Subcomm. on Health and Environment of the House Comm on Commerce, 104th Cong. 13 (1995) (statement
of R.B. Marquez, Commissioner, Texas Natural Resource and Conservation Commission) [hereinafter
Hearings on Clean AirAct Oversight: Statement of R.B. Marquez]. Other state officials have supported more
modest changes, such as amending the primary NAAQS for photochemical oxidants to allow eight-hour
averaging so that violations are less likely to be caused by unique incidences of especially hot weather. See
Hearings on Clean Air Act Oversight- Statement of Dennis Drake, supra note 370, at 19.
782. 1991 EMISSIONS TRENDS REPORT, supra note 3, at fig.4-2.
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once again delegated to the states, local politics will once again be in the driver's
seat.
D. Lack of Political Will
State and local governments are exceedingly reluctant to implement programs
that may cause important industries to relocate or may hinder their efforts to
attract new industries.7 3 Thus, prior to the enactment of the 1970 amendments,
the states had adopted what Professors Krier and Ursin called the "policy of least
steps"--take the path of least resistance designed to disrupt the status quo as little
as possible.!" Thus, while it was politically feasible for California officials to
insist that auto manufacturers from Tokyo and Detroit install stringent pollution
reduction technologies, it was beyond the pale to require California citizens to
install retrofit technologies in existing automobiles or to suffer the additional time
and expense of centralized I/M.
State agencies have generally demonstrated a great reluctance to take steps
that could alienate important economic interests or that could arouse the general
public.85 Many state officials in fact freely acknowledge that if it were not for the
federal presence in the area of air pollution, state regulation would not be nearly
as stringent as it is.7M As one official at the Texas Natural Resource Conservation
Commission explained: "The agency staff needs to have EPA as the 'gorilla in the
closet' if it is to have any credibility with industry and local officials.v787
State officials often express frustration with the intrusiveness of federal
programs. They resent being treated like junior partners in the relationship, and
they react negatively to the threat of federal sanctions, even when those sanctions
are merely refusals to provide federal dollars to fund state programs. Governor
Engler of Michigan, for example, argues that "[s]tates should comply because it's
the right thing to do, not because they are forced to comply by sanctions." 788
Unfortunately, what the states regard as the "right thing to do" is often
inconsistent with cleaning up the air in a reasonable period of time. The Texas
experience, and the similar experiences in other states that rapidly retreated from
centralized I/M programs, amply demonstrate that when the "right thing to do"
783. DAVIEs, supra note 1, at 134-35.
784. KRIER & URSIN, supra note 81, at 252.
785. OTA OZONE REPORT, supra note 4, at 35.
786. Hearings on Implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970-Part I Before the
Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong. 184 (1972) (statement
of Frank Josselson, Assistant Attorney General, State of Ohio) ("More often than not, it was federal law and
the federal regulations promulgated by the administrator of EPA that defined and decisively reinforced our
furtherest fall back positions.").
787. The official requested that the quoted remarks remain anonymous.
788. Hearings on Clean Air Act Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Coam. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 134 (1995) (statement of Governor John Engler, State of Michigan).
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is determined by manipulable state legislatures, the national interest in protecting
the citizenry from air pollution plays second fiddle.
E. Race-to-the-Bottom
One of the primary rationales for a national Clean Air Act is the fear that
states will quite consciously compete with one another to attract new industry and
to avoid losing existing industry. The fear of a "race-to-the-bottom," for example,
helped to justify national ambient air quality standards, national emissions stan-
dards for new stationary sources, and national emissions standards for hazardous
air pollutants.8 9 The retreat from centralized enhanced I/M provides powerful
evidence of another kind of pressure toward the lowest common denominator.
States are very conscious of how their sister states are treated and will demand to
be allowed the same degree of "flexibility." In this context, as in most pollution
control contexts, the term "flexible" should be read to mean "less protective." If
EPA administers a national program in a way that gives one state special treat-
ment, it will never be able to resist the inevitable political pressure to treat every
other state the same way. As the pressure toward flexibility grows, the national
program rapidly disintegrates. The ultimate result is that national pollution re-
duction and media quality goals are not achieved. This is exactly what happened
with EPA's enhanced I!M program.
When California proved recalcitrant and adamantly refused to implement an
enhanced I/M program meeting the requirements that EPA had painstakingly
promulgated and had successfully defended in the D.C. Circuit, the agency
initially decided to hold the line. EPA officials promised in no uncertain terms
that if the state did not put an adequate program into place, the federal govern-
ment would lower the boom and the state would lose hundreds of millions of
dollars in highway funds and would be subject to even greater restrictions on
growth. California decided to call EPA's bluff; there was a brief standoff in
which each party attempted to stare the other down; and EPA finally blinked.
With that fateful decision, EPA's carefully crafted I/M program was doomed.
Within days, other states that had also delayed implementing centralized I/M
demanded the same degree of "flexibility" to ignore the federal law. EPA had no
choice but to allow additional state "hybrid" programs that, the politicians'
protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, everyone knew would not be as
effective. Even programs, like the Texas centralized I/M regime, that were in
place and operational, rapidly collapsed as states vigorously fought to ensure that
their drivers were no more inconvenienced than drivers in California. When he
signed the bill that destroyed the existing state-of-the-art enhanced I/M program
789. Hearings on Clean Air Oversight- Statement of Carol M. Browner, supra note 378, at 20 ("National
standards are essential in order to prevent the emergence of 'pollution havens' after a 'race to the bottom': that
is, the use of environmental standards as a weapon in the economic competition among states.").
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in Texas, Governor Bush said that his main concern was that 'Texas be treated
like California or any other state, that we be granted maximum flexibility on how
we are judged."790
From the midst of the ruins, EPA steadfastly declared that the states would
have to come up with alternative sources of enforceable emissions reductions to
replace those lost with the abandonment of centralized I/M. But it was far too late
in the day for this bluster to have any impact. Everyone knew that when the chips
were down, EPA would back away from the statutory 15% VOC reduction
requirement, or failing that, Congress would come to the rescue and grant further
delays or abandon the 15% target altogether. In short, everyone knew that the air
in America's major cities would remain at dangerously unhealthy levels because
no state was willing to burden its car-owning citizens to any greater degree than
its sister states.
F. Local Demagoguery
The enhanced I/M program came along at the perfect moment for
opportunistic local politicians looking for any reason to attract public attention by
attacking the federal government. State Senator Whitmire of Houston timed his
entry into the enhanced I!M debate perfectly. Although he voted for the state
statute that provided for the implementation of enhanced I/M by January 1, 1995,
when the initial free tests of the Tejas Testing system yielded some complaints,
Senator Whitmire seized the spotlight with strident, but wholly uninformed
criticisms of the state bureaucracies charged with implementing the program that
he had supported. He deflected criticism of his own demagoguery by painting
Tejas Testing as a front for sharp dealing California speculators and foreign
bankers who had perpetrated a "bad program" with the sole intent of sucking
profits out of the 80% of car owners who passed the biennial tests. The "bad pro-
gram" that he attributed to Tejas Testing was in fact the program recommended
and for a time insisted upon by EPA. By shifting the focus of the debate from
clean air to the inconvenience of undergoing biennial testing, Whitmire was able
to take an aggressively anti-environmental stance without appearing to oppose
clean air: "We are all for clean air... but this is about getting government off the
backs of the people of Texas."79'
State Representative Jim Horn of Texas testified in March 1995 that EPA's
policy of allowing only 50% credit for decentralized test-and-repair programs
would "penalize Texas, a state which has done everything in its power to improve
790. Stutz, Bush Signs Bill to Delay Emissions Tests 3 Months, supra note 703, at Al.
791. Stutz, Texas Senate OKs 3-Month Delay on Emissions Tests, supra note 668, at A19. Similarly,
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, who took an equally aggressive anti-environmental stance in the United States
Senate, maintained: "I do not want to stop cleaning up the air. I just want to do it in a common-sense way."
Lenz, Senate Backs 90-Day Delay of Tailpipe Test, supra note 680, at Al.
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air quality, for not going along with exactly what the agency wants."792 To
characterize a state program that steadfastly refused to implement even basic I/M
for fifteen years in the second most heavily polluted airshed in the country as
having "done everything in its power to improve air quality" was a mighty act of
self-deception, even for a Texas politician. But Representative Horn's complaint
was characteristic of the kind of logic that dominated the political debate in the
states over enhanced I!M.
VII. CONCLUSION: UNCOOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND THE ABSENCE OF
CONSEQUENCES
Perhaps the clearest lesson of the history of state implementation of I/M
programs is that there are generally no adverse consequences for states that thumb
their noses at EPA and refuse to take the appropriate implementation steps. One
California legislator noted during the collapse of the 1977 regulatory regime that
EPA's sanctions lacked credibility because EPA almost never invoked them.7 93
Almost two decades later, a Texas legislator complained: "Citizens in Texas see
that other states are not being punished for not following along with the EPA and
they write to my office saying that, in actuality, Texans are being punished more
for doing what they were supposed to do.'794
When EPA asserted the power to compel state officials to take affirmative
implementation steps under threat of civil and criminal penalties, Congress
intervened even before the courts held that EPA lacked that power. The states that
refused to put I/M programs into effect suffered no adverse consequences, and the
states that in good faith attempted to write plans that at least set things moving in
the right direction wound up stuck with exceedingly ambitious plans for the next
two decades.
When Congress in the 1977 Amendments adopted the "modified carrot"
approach and merely promised to take away highway funds and to impose a
construction moratorium on states that did not request an extension until 1987, the
states that were the most recalcitrant and refused even to request extensions
suffered absolutely no adverse consequences. Congress dutifully provided
appropriations riders prohibiting EPA from imposing the threatened sanctions.
Later, when the extended 1987 deadline for attainment of the carbon monoxide
and photochemical oxidant standards came and went, Congress once again
obligingly placed a hold on the sanctions.
792. Hearings on Clean AirAct Oversight. Statement of Jim Horn, supra note 523, at 299.
793. According to this legislator: "I think you've got the threat but the threat is not exercised. So I am
not sure people regard it as a real threat. I think it's important to keep that threat in place because without it
you don't have the will." Harris, supra note 776, at 1321 n.34.
794. Hearings on Clean AirAct Oversight: Statement of Jim Horn, supra note 523, at 304.
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Administrator Browner in early 1995 assured Congress that "the development
of... state-based approaches will allow states like Colorado and Arizona to get
the full environmental credit they deserve for moving forward with strong I/M
programs, and will provide the flexibility needed by other states to ultimately
achieve the emissions reductions necessary for clean air."795 But the agency, by
yielding every time to state recalcitrance, sent precisely the opposite message to
the states that went to the effort and expense of implementing a centralized high-
tech program. As the Texas program was collapsing in the state legislature, one
legislator who was an active participant in the state legislative debates testified
to Congress that "EPA's unequal treatment of the states has led to the massive
public outcry against the IM-240 testing program implemented in Texas, and I for
one cannot disagree with a single voice out there who refuses to take such treat-
ment from the federal government." 796
When EPA finally draws the line, Congress invariably steps in and takes
recalcitrant states off the hook. Just as it did not escape the attention of drivers in
Houston that drivers in California were able to avoid centralized I/M, it cannot
escape the attention of drivers in Denver and Phoenix that drivers in Houston still
do not have to undergo the basic I/M that was absolutely required by the 1977
Amendments and that Houston has not suffered a single sanction for its continued
failure to implement an adequate I/M regime. At the end of the day, states like
Colorado and Arizona did not get the credit they deserved for implementing
effective I/M programs, and states like California and Texas got credit they did
not deserve.
The lessons seem reasonably clear. It is almost impossible for the federal
government to induce the states to press local populations to take action aimed at
reducing pollution when there is no price to be paid for failure to engage in
cooperative federalism. It is not clear that some state pollution control officials
seriously believe that attaining the National Ambient Air Quality Standards is a
desirable goal. Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commissioner, Ralph
Marquez, for example, testified to Congress that, in his opinion, the game was not
worth the candle.797 Yet in the face of active resistance by state officials who
question the value of the entire federal enterprise, EPA has steadfastly refused to
use the one tool that it does possess-the power to write a Federal Imple-
mentation Plan for the state.
It may be that the only credible way for EPA to send a message to recalcitrant
states that the federal Clean Air Act cannot be ignored is to take over the air
quality planning process for a major metropolitan area. For example, EPA, not
the state, could write the contracts with centralized I/M companies and send a
strike force of federal officials to the area to exercise the federal government's
795. Hearings on Clean Air Act Oversight- Statement of Carol M. Browner, supra note 378, at 19.
796. Hearings on Clean Air Act Oversight: Statement of Jim Horn, supra note 523, at 304.
797. Hearings on Clean AirAct Oversight: Statement of R.B. Marquez, supra note 781, at 11.
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authority to write field citations of up to $5000 to individual drivers who do not
demonstrate proof of having successfully passed a biennial IM test. 98 The
federal government will, of course, encounter resistance at the local level, as it did
when it attempted to implement the federal civil rights laws in the 1960s. But
most people will comply with the law, even at the cost of some personal
inconvenience, if they are convinced that the law is being administered evenly in
all states.
An aggressive show of federal determination to implement the federal law in
a major urban area will no doubt precipitate attempts to amend the Clean Air Act
to take away the power to write FIPs or to remove the centralized I/M re-
quirement for heavily polluted areas. A renewed national debate on the need for
effective J/M programs or on the desirability of a strong federal implementation
role is not, as some EPA officials apparently believe, something to be avoided at
all costs. The timing of that debate is, of course, important. EPA Administrator
Browner may have wisely concluded that the first few months of the 104th
Congress was not the most propitious time to precipitate a congressional debate
on the Clean Air Act. The history of radical regulatory reform efforts in Congress
demonstrates, however, that the public does not support a wholesale retreat from
national environmental goals. The first session of the 105th Congress may be an
especially appropriate time to reconsider some aspects of Clean Air Act imple-
mentation! 99 In any event, if EPA fails to take vigorous steps to implement the
clear requirements of the existing statute, it will have amended it defacto without
the national debate that should attend such important changes in the national law.
If EPA fails to adopt an aggressive stance, it is safe to predict that states
containing many of the nation's most heavily polluted urban areas will fail to
make the demonstrations of hydrocarbon emissions reductions (6% by 1996 and
3% per year after that) and the "reasonable further progress" demonstrations
required by the statute at the end of 1996. It is also safe to predict that those states
will suffer no adverse consequences. The statutory consequences are plain, but
in the real world they will never happen. EPA will first struggle to come up with
innovative interpretations of the statute that provide sufficient wiggle room to let
states off the hook or Congress will, as it has in the past, amend the statute in
slight, behind-the-scenes ways to cushion or eliminate the impact of the required
sanctions. This is not an especially comforting prospect from the perspective of
the citizens who continue to breath polluted air. It is, unfortunately, a realistic
one.
798. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(d)(3) (West 1995).
799. Operating on this assumption, EPA and seviral private organizations, including the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, the National Academy of Public Administration and the Keystone Center,
have assembled four groups of representatives of industry, environmental groups, state and local officials and
academics to consider recommendations to broad changes in the environmental laws. This large effort, called
Enterprise for the Environment, plans to arrive at consensus recommendations at the outset of the 105th
Congress.
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